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ABSTRACT 
Water institutions are highly diffused throughout society. These 
institutions interact with one another in various ways. As water needs 
and services expand, collaborative and cooperative arrangements are 
commonly sought as a means of meeting common goals of providing a safe, 
dependable and least cost water supply to particular constituencies. Of 
the many different institutions involved in the development, management, 
distribution, and use of water, perhaps the most significant in terms of 
extensive interactions with other institutions is the kind that is 
typified by Water Conservancy Districts and Metropolitan Water Districts 
in Utah. The sLatutory and operating framework of counterpart organiza-
tions in Arizona, Colorado, Nebraska, Oregon, and South Dakota are 
compared in this report. Significant differences in procedures for 
creation and termination, selection of officers, powers and legal 
rights, opportunity for input to policy formulation, sources of finan-
cing, planning responsibility, and coordination are identified. 
Interstate comparisons provide the backdrop for more specific 
examination of the interactions of districts in Utah with other organi-
zations and agencies. The results indicate that districts have tended 
to embrace large scale projects as solutions to projected water short-
ages. The continuing and long term financial obligation constrains the 
districts flexibility to adjust to alternative supply options that may 
become visible to retail users as demand patterns change during the 
drawn out construction schedules of large projects. Because the Bonne-
ville Unit of the Central Utah Project is presently engaged in a large 
and active investigative and construction program, and is negotiating 
water purchase contracts, examples of some of the kinds of impediments 
to effective institutional interaction were more readily identified in 
that region by those interviewed. In situations where institutional 
differences occur, their mediation could be more readily effected if 
districts were more directly linked to general purpose government and 
particularly to state oversight. State government might promote more 
harmonious coordination of district operations by inviting periodic full 
and open appraisal of district plans and policies in a search for 
mid-course corrections that might better serve the public interest 
without abrogating contractual commitments. 
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PREFACE 
Urban-industrial development changes the amounts and timing 
of water use, generally in the directions of diverting more water 
while consuming less and a demand spread more uniformly over the 
year. It also changes water quality requirements and effects, generally 
in the direct ions of greater concern over drinking water safety and 
lesser concern for the agricultural effects of salinity. These new 
demands are met through large investments in water supply facilities 
bringing larger volumes of water from greater distances, water treatment 
facilities to provide safe drinking water, and waste water treatment 
facilities to protect aquatic environments. The new systems are often 
accompanied by diminished use and eventual abandonment of the earlier 
irrigation facilities. 
These new needs are met by large capital investments achieved 
only at the culminat ion of major po litical efforts and necessitat ing 
a long term financial commitment for payback. Failures to make the 
needed investments can lead to calamitous water shortage or water 
quality problems. The wrong investments can require a generation to 
continue paying for white elephants. Yet these critical decisions are 
made in a period of uncertainty over future needs in an often unstable 
period of political transition. 
This report explores the institutional aspects of this phenomenon. 
It seeks criteria for good organizational arrangements, ones that 
combine wise investment decisions, reliable water services, and a 
flexibility to respond to changing situations. It attempts to recommend 
effective organizational arrangements for the future from the lessons of 
history. The look backward to past examples is not to criticize or 
Monday morning quarterback but to observe and learn, all the time 
realizing that the observations necessarily combine facts with inter-
pretations and are bound to be associated with differences of opinion. 
The important point here is to emphasize that neither the Utah 
Water Research Laboratory nor Utah State University are taking policy 
pos it ions on either the side of the authors of this report or of the 
districts whose histories are discussed as examples. This report has 
provided a forum for the authors, the districts discussed, and inter-
ested citizens from a variety of viewpoints to make points and stimulate 
discussion. It does not produce the answers, but hopefully the posi-
tions exchanged will contribute to the expressed study purpose of more 
efficient urban water investment and management decisions in the future. 
The spirit of the day is one of rethinking and articulating positions 
in good will and in the interest of objectivity and progress. 
L. Douglas James 
Director 
Utah Water Research Laboratory 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Problem Statement 
As a growing populat ion steadily expands its use of technology 
and its natural resources as factors in the production of goods, 
services, and amenities, so also is there an increase in the complexity 
of social structures and their interactions with one another. Many of 
the early foundations of small scale self-sufficient enterprises and 
institutions have been modified or superseded by institutions more 
compatible with large scale development. With growth has come various 
transforms In institutional structures, shifts in political power, and 
adjustments in cost burdens. 
Private and community actions in pursuit of "increased well-being" 
goals translate into a myriad of water uses which change over time as 
social aspirations and priorities change. Water problems are deriva-
tives of the many InItiatives taken to enhance economic, social, and 
environmental well-being. The pervasive need for water in practically 
every human activity and enterprise has led to the creation of many 
different organizations and institutions with responsibility to plan, 
develop, and manage water. Entities established to marshall techni-
cal and financial resources for project development and for designing, 
constructing, and operating projects must also be capable of adapting 
organizational structures, functional responsibilities, and juris-
dictional domains if a timely matching of water uses with public 
preferences is to be maintained. 
Water related institutions are diffused throughout society and have 
evolved on an "as needed" basis. Decisions about water are made by 
individuals, irrigation companies, municipalities, districts, states, or 
the nation. Each entity in this hierarchical array may be affected by 
the actions of every other entity (in different degrees of course). 
Thus, intentions need to be communicated if common or conflicting 
interests are to be amicably addressed. The interaction and interde-
pendency of a growing number of social interests to be served by water, 
and the number and complexity of the political and institutional 
entities involved, complicates the communication process which is so 
vital in forestalling conflict and avoiding counterproductive decisions 
and actions. 
Over the past two decades, numerous initiatives at the state 
and federal level aimed at abating water pollution and improving 
the utilization of land resources In the face of economic growth 
and pressures of population expansion have aggravated institutional 
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coordination problems. Out of these new management thrusts have 
emerged new institutions (often specifically mandated in the legis-
lation) which have fostered new and different interactive patterns 
on the ongoing operations of existing institutions. Unless adequate 
accommodation of exist ing and new programs and insti tut ions can be 
achieved, hoped for goals of these recent legislative expressions 
may never be realized. 
It is important, therefore, that water organizations not only 
be internally efficient, but that they also foster effective and 
meaningful interactions with other water planning/management entities 
(both vertically and horizontally). Such coordination and communica-
t ion is essent ial in minimizing duplication, overlap, and conflict ing 
jurisdictions. Eftective interaction suggests institutional connectives 
to general purpose and state governments in order to properly coordinate 
water and related land resources planning and management programs and 
objectives. It connotes a sensitivity and responsiveness on the part of 
organizations and agencies to the queries, comments, and suggestions of 
one another and to their constituencies. For interactions to be effec-
tive, decision and policy making must be made openly with opportunity 
for review and input by interacting units as well as affected citizenry. 
Unless institutional officers are representative and accountable to 
those bearing the cost burdens, institutional interactions may be 
prejudicially effected. Effective interaction is ·facilitated as finan-
cial ties and/or obligations are understood and the institutional and 
constituency liabilities are known. 
A paramount consideration in the quest for appropriate institu-
tional interaction should be the efficient utilization of the water 
resource itself. Hence, institutions should have flexibility to 
mod ify or rest ruc t ure operating rul es and working re lat ionshi ps where 
such changes promote cost effectiveness and resource conservation and 
do not violate repayment commitments or other obligations. 
Of the many different institutions involved In the development, 
management, distribution, and use of water, perhaps the most pivotal 
is the kind that is typified in Utah by the Water Conservancy District 
and the Metropolitan Water District. Because of their size, broad 
authority in kinds and levels of water service provided, and the 
spectrum of options available for producing revenue, most of these 
organizations have extensive direct and indirect linkages with other 
water oriented entities as well as those institutions with responsi-
bility for the management or coping with the urbanization process. 
Water Conservancy Districts (WCD) and Metropolitan Water Dis-
tricts (MWD) typify a kind of multi-purpose water serVIce organIza-
tion that has become a part of governmental structure in many states. 
Commonly, such districts are formed in anticipation of some federally 
sponsored development of rather large scale whose serVIce area tran-
scends the boundaries of cities and/or counties. Such organizations 
are political subdivisions of the state, governed by a board of direc-
tors wi th broad powers to I) raIse the necessary fi nanc ing to build 
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water project works; 2) to negotiate repayment contracts for long term 
debt; and 3) to make and enforce rules and regulations for the manage-
ment, control, delivery, and use of water. One of the most significant 
features of such organizations is their power to levy ad valorem taxes 
on real and personal property within the district, including property 
owned by both rural and urban taxpayers. They commonly have consider-
able fiscal and administrative independence from other units of general 
purpose government. 
Most WCD's and MWD's are operating under statutes that were 
enacted decades ago. In light of changing patterns of water uses and 
users, a reexamination of their enabling features is in order. In-
dividually and collectively, WCDs and MWDs represent a substantial 
influence on the direct ion of water deve lopment programs. Experiences 
gathered may suggest some modification and restructuring of laws/poli-
cies so as to permit districts to perform their roles with a minimum of 
institutional friction and a maximum of economy and public accountabil-
ity. 
Study Approach and Scope 
Institutional problems sometimes trace to the enabling statutes. 
Within a given state, statutory authority of different agencies may 
be overlapping, inconsistent, or ambiguous. Under such circumstances, 
there .may be sources for friction or discord as institutions inter-
act with one another. The study approach was to first analyze the 
statutory basis under which multi-purpose water districts operate in 
Utah and then broaden the perspective by examining the statutes govern-
ing the operation of counterpart organizations in Arizona, Colorado, 
Nebraska, Oregon, and South Dakota. Visits to each of these states 
provided opportunity to meet with officials and managers to see what 
kind of operating policies were being employed to cope with problems 
emanating from urbanization. 
The interstate comparisons provide a backdrop for more compre-
hensive examination of the operation of Water Conservancy Districts 
and Metropolitan Water Districts in Utah and their interaction with 
other organizations and agencies. Although Utah's operating experience 
may vary from other states, the example can illustrate problem sources 
and (regardless of the success experienced in resolving them) suggest 
the direction of measures to cope with problems identified. 
A set of questions was prepared to guide interviews conducted 
with elected and appointed officials of state and local government, 
professional planners, water util ity managers, water users, and land 
developers in order to identify difficulties pending or resolved in 
providing cost effective water deliveries to retail users (see Appendix 
A). Information was obtained about how the major water oriented insti-
tutions make policy and operating decisions; their perspectives regard-
ing jurisdiction and operating latitude; the extent to which the program 
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and operating policies of others influence their actions; and the 
influence that sources of financing and repayment obligat ions have on 
operating policies. 
The interviews were a principal source of informat ion from which 
specific impediments were identified and which provided insights into 
the general ation of certain institutional relationships. Associating 
viewpoints with specific individuals is avoided although interview notes 
and tapes are on file. In selecting the individuals to be interviewed, 
the authors tried to identify individuals whose present or past posi-
tions provided a basis for representative response. Although no set 
number of interviews was planned, those thought to be capable of pro-
viding some analytical depth to the questions posed were sought out. 
Time and financial resources were limitations to the number of inter-
views possible. Interview materials acquired in connection with a 
previous exploratory study accomplished under the auspices of the Utah 
Water Research Laboratory and the Utah Division of Water Resources were 
available and utilized to supplement information obtained during the 
current study (unpublished draft report ent i tIed "A Cursory Review of 
Utah Water Conservancy Districts--Their Role and Operation" by Jay M. 
Bagley, Frank W. Haws, and Carl H. Carpenter). A list of those inter-
viewed in both studies is included in Appendix B. Those interviewed 
comprise a cross section of backgrounds and institutional associations. 
Individual perspectives were at variance on many points. Therefore, the 
findings as reported should not necessarily imply concurrence of all 
those interviewed. 
Although the set of questions in Appendix A was used as a guide in 
the interview process, the answers to initial questions often led to 
other interesting commentary and questions on aspects of the subject not 
fully anticipated. The authors soon came to appreciate that institu-
tional interactions are time-dependent and that citation of certain 
interactive problems today would not have been cited yesterday and might 
not be cited tomorrow. It would have been useful to have been able to 
visit with each individual interviewed a second time, having the benefit 
of the aggregation of information obtained in the first set of inter-
views. 
Information was not collected in a standardized format. All 
questions included in the interview guide materials did not apply to all 
organizations whose representatives were interviewed because of the 
diversity of organizational function and individual position. There was 
no plan to collect the interview information with a view toward quanti-
fication in order to employ statistical analyses. Rather, the approach 
was to visit with knowledgeable/representative people in their own 
setting and let the interview range over examples or instances which 
the person being interviewed wished to draw from in answering questions. 
In other words, the authors accepted what was given by those inter-
viewed. Interviews were not tightly held to a uniform set of questions, 
but freedom was allowed to comment about the subject in general. In 
most cases a copy of the interview guide questions was left with the 
individual interviewed extending an invitation to follow up the inter-
view with additional information as a second review of the questions 
might prompt. 
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Through an analysis of interview contributions, statutory com-
parisons and other related information, it is hoped that a better 
understanding of the institutional features or factors that affect 
coordination and cooperation in the implementation of land use and water 
use policies will emerge. Results should be helpful in revealing 
whether defects in institutional interactions are of statutory origin, 
a result of operating policy conflicts, or whether they may stem from 
administrative rules and regulations. 
Frame of Reference for Examining Interactions 
All water supply management entities. regardless of water supply 
purpose or geographic jurisdiction, have their genesis in a common 
objective to provide a safe, dependable water supply at lowest cost 
over time. The best means for achieving this common objective, how-
ever, are seen differently by different water management entities. 
This is understandable because water source options are different; 
revenue generating capabilities and authorities vary; and vertical and 
horizontal interfaces with one another are mult iform. The options a 
part icular water supply organization has for developing and utiliz ing 
its own resource base will greatly influence the kind of cooperative 
arrangements or purchase! sale agreements it may seek as it strives to 
fulfill its charge. Each water management entity must weigh the 
economic and financial feasibility of its own decisions and options 
in its efforts to provide a safe and sure supply in the most cost-
effective way. 
Meeting a cost effectiveness criterion prescribes a water develop-
ment logic in which each incremental acquisition is the least costly 
alternative. Of times , the least costly alternative may be achieved 
through collaborative arrangements between entities. Utah municipali-
ties have found the most cost-effective sequence of water supply de-
velopment to be: (1) develop springs and flowing wells; (2) acquire 
spring and groundwater supplied from irrigation companies by exchange or 
purchase; (3) develop pumped wells; (4) acquire surface water supplies 
with first priority on those not requiring extensive "conditioning,1I and 
second priority on acquisition of water sources requiring more complete 
treatment; (5) construct and place in operation water treatment facili-
ties; and (6) obtain water from participation or subscription from large 
project development in which participation offers prospects for mini-
mizing costs through scale economies. While this development logic and 
sequence holds generally, at any given point in time water supplying 
institutions find themselves at different positions in the development 
sequence. The position of a given institution in this development 
sequence has a substantial influence on the kind of collaboration it 
seeks with others in meeting its perceived needs. Its standing also 
influences the kind of operating policy it would prefer in any colla-
borative arrangement. 
As water needs and services expand, collaborative advantages 
are recognized. Subsequently, cooperating entities experience a 
need for some reallocation of powers, functions, and jurisdictions 
5 
pursuant to meeting the continuing goal of a safe dependable and 
least cost water supply. The adjustment in powers and responsibilities 
must be accompanied by corresponding adjustments in informational flow 
paths. Otherwise those who ultimately pay the costs (directly or 
indirectly) may be denied the information and knowledge needed to 
understand the full implications of policies and actions pursued in the 
context of collateral involvement. 
Managers of smaller water supply organizations providing water 
services from uncomplicated physical works have a high degree of 
political accountability to their users (Advisory Commission on Inter-
governmental Relations 1974). Communication is usually direct and voter 
influence is strong. Cost and financing issues are readily extrapolated 
to individual liability so that the potential beneficiary can readily 
assess the merits of a proposed improvement or system enlargement. 
Thus, in smaller water supply systems, beneficiaries are readily identi-
fied and have the kind of involvement that assures the understanding 
needed to be an effective voice into policies and actions of the water 
supply entity. 
Large water development projects characteristically involve a 
"super" agency wholesaling water to ent~t~es who have more limited 
capability to raise capital to finance large projects. In theory, the 
economies of scale which attend large projects should be enjoyed by 
subdistributors/retailers who obtain supplies from wholesaler and 
condition them as may be necessary for delivery to their own customers. 
In practice, policies followed by the wholesaler may limit the-ease with 
which a sub.agency can optimally integrate the large project supply in 
with other owned. supplies. This illustrates how water problems and 
"best" solution perspect ives will differ among the various water supply 
entities. Unless special effort is directed toward compromising these 
perspect ives as plans are formulated, achievement of necessary recon-
cilations when design and construction features have been completed may 
be difficult to achieve. When joint involvement in a large project 
appears to offer that "best" solution, the multiplicity of individual 
perceptions about the solution matrix may have to be compromised. 
Compromise is ultimately accomplished in the political process. 
As new and larger institutions are created, and as linkages are 
forged with state and/or federal government organizations, economic 
and political power generally becomes more concentrated. Operating with 
greater independence may result in insufficient attention being given to 
the communication of the information needed for informed choice by the 
c~t~zen water user. Unless informational flow paths are maintained and 
fitted to the new institutional structures, the general public cannot 
choose intelligently nor judge the merits of actions recommended by 
others (Sowell 1980). As a general rule, the quality of policy and 
decision making increases in direct proportion to available policy and 
choice information. A reduced ability of the electorate to influence 
policy decisions is one of the consequences of more layers of water 
organizations. 
In summary, the consideration of the interactions between multi-
purpose water districts and other governmental institutions in the 
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formulation and implementation of land and water policies and programs 
needs to be grounded in the notion that water institutions operate from 
a basic objective that the public be provided with a safe dependable 
water supply at lowest cost over time. In meeting that objective, 
public input and choice should be perceived and/or decisionmakers should 
be made responsible for their acts; those who benefit should bear the 
cost burden; powers and rights of each institution should be commensur-
ate with purposes and necessary functions; policies and decisions 
should be made openly and subject to constituency approval; and pro-
cedures should be followed that insure fiscal and financial integrity. 
Ac tions and interactions should be evaluated within the above context 
and the appropriateness of particular interactions judged within this 
framework. 
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CHAPTER II 
COMPARISON OF STATES USE OF SPECIAL DISTRICTS 
TO SPONSOR WATER PROJECTS 
All states have enacted legislation which enables groups of 
citizens to form subgovernments or districts to provide special services 
or facilities available only to members of the district. Although the 
specific cri teria which guided part icular states in the formulat ion of 
their district statutes is unavailable, important standards have been 
cited by Hawkins (1976). These criteria serve as an evaluation base in 
this report and are outlined in the following paragraph. 
As sub-governments of the state, special districts should be 
designed and organized to solve governmental problems as citizen needs 
transcend the boundaries of cities and counties. State laws should 
therefore require a significant community interest to exist before a 
district is created. The requirements of formation should not be so 
low as to allow minority groups to form districts, nor should the costs 
of formation be so high as to discourage timate desires for district 
government. And, since a district is a means to an end and not an end 
in itself, state law should provide for district dissolution when the 
need is no longer perceived. Control of the district should be in the 
hands of those persons or voters &ho pay the expenses of the district 
and costs of projects; who receive the benefits of the district; and who 
are therefore most interested in the success of the district. Citizen 
access to their representatives and to policy and program information is 
important in maintaining system accountability. Elections are pertinent 
to districts because of the informational flow generated in the process. 
Districts should not be adverse to public argument and debate because 
such discuss ion adds to the information in the system. The fiscal 
structure of districts should be a function of the type of good pro-
vided, the problems being addressed, and the preferences of the con-
stituency. A mixture of taxes and fees may thus be specified. 
The presumption is that productive and effective institutional 
interaction is likely when the above characteristics are operative and 
the different ent it ies are invo lved in common-resource/multiple use/ 
spillover kinds of problems. Hawkins (1976) has also found that where 
water districts serve more urbanized areas there is greater likelihood 
that they will have intert ies with adjoining producers. Other statu-
tory provisions might serve to adapt or specialize the district to 
particular objectives, such as water supply or wastewater disposal. 
As has been indicated earlier, the most important kind of special 
purpose district in Utah in terms of its extensive interaction with 
other institutions is the water conservancy district. On the assumption 
that counterpart organizations in other states play similar roles, it 
was desired to compare such organizations with respect to criteria noted 
in the paragraph above. Organizat ions in Arizona, Colorado, Nebraska, 
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Oregon, and South Dakota were selected for comparison with the water 
conservancy and metropolitan water districts in Utah. Differences, and 
the justification for them, should be interesting and provide a basis 
for reassessment of the operating mandate of any given institutional 
form. 
In the following paragraphs, the organizations used 1n the com-
parison are briefly described and comparisons of statutory provisions 
for each organization with respect to categories derived from the 
criteria noted above and which may influence interactive patterns are 
discussed. 
Public Water Districts by States 
Utah 
Quite commonly in Utah metropolitan water districts and water 
conservancy districts have been formed in anticipation of some major 
water resources development which requires an "agent" organization with 
authority to organize financial and technical resources, issue and 
monitor contracts for construction, and to operate and maintain the 
completed physical works. 
The Utah Water Conservancy District Act was passed by the Utah 
Legislature in 1941. The first district created thereafter was the 
Carbon Water Conservancy District. Over the years, 15 more districts 
have been formed (including two subconservancy districts). Some large 
districts contain smaller districts and subdistricts within'their 
boundaries. The areas of the state not now having conservancy districts 
are Box Elder, Cache, Rich, Daggett, Tooele, Beaver, Iron, and Kane 
Counties. The geographic boundaries of WCD's in Utah contain approxi-
mately two-thirds of the land area of the state. Cumulatively, these 
districts manage (or will manage upon completion of planned projects) an 
extremely large portion of the water supply of the state. 
Water conservancy districts are formed by judicial action upon 
petition of property owners within the proposed district boundaries. 
This advocacy petition must represent 20 percent of the landowners 
(or 500 signatures, whichever is less) in the unincorporated county 
areas proposed for inclusion in the district, and 5 percent of the 
landowners (or 100 signatures, whichever is less) of each incorporated 
city or town to be located within the boundaries of the proposed 
district. After the petition has met these requirements, the district 
court will conduct a hearing to determine whether the petition should 
be granted. 
The same law which enables a right of advocacy also preserves 
the right of protest, although this action follows a path somewhat 
different than that of the advocacy action. The protest must be by 
petition and must represent 20 percent of the landowners of the unin-
corporated county area and 20 percent of the assessed valuation of the 
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lands contained therein, and also represent 20 percent of the landowners 
of each municipality within the boundaries of the proposed district and 
20 percent of the assessed valuation of each municipality. In the 
absence of a protest petition which meets all these more demanding 
requirements, the court is instructed to create a water conservancy 
district as described in the advocacy petition. 
Executive officers (a board of directors) for a newly formed 
WeD were formerly appointed by that district court which created the 
district. The 1983 legislature modified the statute to transfer the 
board selection authority from the judicial to the legislative and 
administrative branches of government. Single county districts have 
directors appointed by the board of county commissioners of the county. 
MUltiple county districts have directors appointed by the governor with 
the advice and consent of the senate from nominees submitted by the 
boards of county commissioners and (under certain conditions) by a city. 
The modified statute also contains provisions to obtain representation 
more in accordance with levels of water subscription by various user 
categories. 
Once empowered, the board of directors of a water conservancy 
district is given broad discretionary power to guide the affairs of that 
district. The powers of this board are essentially those of a "quasi 
municipal corporation" as defined by the courts. A WeD is not con-
strained with respect to water rights and water service in the same way 
as municipalities. The decision to carry out any of the necessary 
funct ions may be made by a simple majority vote of the 'directors in 
attendance (quorum necessary) at a board meeting. 
The decision making capacity of the WeD board of directors is 
exercised in the levying of property taxes, the modification of dis-
trict boundaries, and the investigation and approval of the water 
deve lopment project features. The board is charged by law to hold an 
annual meeting on a date fixed by the court and special meetings at 
least quarterly. An annual report of business transacted and financial 
status must be filed with the clerk of the district court. 
The statutes indicate that WeDs are expected to: 
1. Be for the public benefit and advantage of the people of the 
State of Utah. 
2. Indirectly benefit all industries of the state. 
3. Directly benefit the State of Utah in the increase of its 
taxable property valuation. 
4. Directly benefit municipalities by providing adequate supplies 
of water for domestic use. 
5. Directly benefit lands to be irrigated or drained from works 
to be constructed. 
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6. Directly benefit lands now under irrigation by stabilizing 
the flow of water in streams and by increasing flow and return flow 
of water to such streams. 
Promot ion of water development within the district is mandated. 
The WCD board is charged by statute to adopt plans and specifications 
for the works for which the district was organized and make such plans 
open to publ ic inspect ion. There is no mandate for the WCD to "prepare" 
the plans it adopts. 
The WCD may issue bonds to be redeemed by revenues from a par-
ticular water market area. If this particular market area is not 
located within the boundaries of a municipality at the time that the 
bonds are issued, then the WCD shall thereafter be the sole public 
corporation or political subdivision authorized to supply water to 
such area and no subsequent modification of boundary lines by another 
district or municipality through annexation or incorporation will 
provide to that newer entity either an authority to supply water 
or a franchise to supply water to the newly incorporated area. This 
restriction may be modified so long as changes do not jeopordize payment 
of principal and interest on the bonds of the district. 
The WCD may levy four kinds of property taxes: 
Class A. To levy and collect taxes upon all property within 
the district on an ad valorem basis. 
Class B. To levy and collect assessments for special benefits 
accruing to property within municipalities for which 
use of water is allotted. 
Class C. To levy and collect assessments for special benefits 
accruing to lands within irrigation districts for 
which use of water is allotted. 
Class D. To levy and collect assessments for special benefits 
accru1ng to private lands for which use of water is 
allotted. 
These taxes, together with water charges and user fees, may be used to 
pay for district indebtedness, operations, and any reserve fund which 
the district might see fit to maintain against contingencies, debt 
service, or temporary shortfalls in revenue. 
Metropolitan Water Districts were authorized by the Utah Legisla-
ture in 1935 ancillary to construction of the Provo River Project by 
the Bureau of Reclamation. Shortly after its passage, six metropolitan 
water districts were formed, five in Utah County and one in Salt Lake 
County. Each was created with boundaries to serve a particular city 
or cities, and each was located geographically to enable it to take 
water from the Salt Lake aqueduct. No other metropolitan water dis-
tricts have been formed. 
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The primary justification for creating a metropolitan water 
district was to avoid being constrained by the debt ceilings that apply 
to cities and which make it more difficult for cities to participate in 
projects that involve large and long term encumbrances. By forming a 
district as a legally separate entity, taxing and bonding authorities 
are not counted against constitutional or statutory borrowing limits 
imposed on the municipal corporation itself. As a contracting agent, 
the MWD is favored by the Department of the Interior over dealing 
directly with municipalities because of the more explicit lien on tax 
collections through which repayment is secured. 
A Metropolitan Water District (MWD) is formed by municipal ordi-
nance declaring the intent to create such a district, the names of other 
municipalities to be included within that district (if more than one 
municipality is to be included), and an apportioned cost of district 
incorporation for each municipality to be included. This ordinance is 
then mailed to the chief executive officer for each included municipal-
ity. The legislative bodies of these municipalities have 60 days to 
accept or reject the ordinance with amendment. If the municipal legis-
lative body chooses to accept the ordinance, it must, within 120 days 
from its acceptance, submit the proposition to the electors within each 
of the participating municipalities for their approval. Only in those 
cities where the majority vote is for approval will the incorporation 
take place. 
The selection of executive officers for a MWD depends on the 
number of cities served. If the MWD is composed of only one city, a 
board of five or seven members will be chosen by the legislative body of 
that city and given votes of equal weight. The term of office for such 
a director is six years unless no qualified replacement is presented, 
~n which case he shall hold office until he decides to resign. 
If the incorporated metropolitan water district comprises more 
than one municipality, the board will have at least one director from 
each city, and each city will have one vote for each $10 million of 
assessed valuation. The city may have more than one representative 
on the board, but its total vote will not be increased. The only 
municipal government officer eligible for appointment to the MWD board 
is the Commissioner of Water Supply and Waterworks or other comparable 
officer. The legislative intent is that the directors be continually 
reappointed to their positions. This suggests a concern for continuity 
in operation despite changing political administrations. Qualifications 
are that board members be of good standing in the community and of high 
integrity and proven competence. 
The board of directors of a metropolitan water district (MWD) 
has a large amount of discretionary power to carry out its necessary 
functions within the limitations of its financial constraints. Any 
activity that will cause the MWD to incur indebtedness requires the 
submission of the proposal to the electorate and majority approval. 
Furthermore, the intent of the legislature is that the district pay 
its obligations, as far as is practicable, from water rates rather than 
in property taxes. In the event that rates become insufficient to 
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cover the operating and indebtedness expenses, a tax may be levied, but 
only until the indebtedness is repaid. The tax levying rate is limited 
to 2 1/2 mills and the total indebtedness limited to 10 percent of 
total assessed valuation. Although the MWD is a corporate entity 
separate and independent from the municipal corporation, the close 
electoral links and officer appointment procedure may serve to limit 
the discretionary power of the board. 
The function of a MWD is described by statute as: 
Metropolitan water districts may be organized hereunder 
for the purpose of acquiring, appropriating, developing, 
storing, selling, leasing, and distributing water for, 
and devoting water to, municipal and domestic purposes, 
irrigation, power, and any and all other beneficial 
uses, and ... may be formed of the territory included with-
in the corporate boundaries of anyone or more municipalities, 
wh ich need not be cont iguous. , , . Each such district when so 
incorporated shall be a separate and independent political 
corporate entity, 
Both types of districts, the WeD and the MWD, have similar proper-
ty powers. The enabling legislation grants each the power to: 
take by appropriation, grant, purchase, and to 
hold and enjoy water, water works, water rights, and sources 
of water suppl y and any and all real and personal propert y of 
any kind within or without the district necessary or con-
venient to the full exercise of its power; to sell or dispose 
of within the district (WeD only); to acquire any or all 
works ... necessary for the exercise of its powers .,. within 
and without the district within and without the state 
(MWD only) for use within the district (WeD only), 
A significant difference in the two enabling codes is that a weD 
may use or sell water only within the district boundaries. The MWD 
statutes do not contain this restrictive language. Both the WeD's and 
the MWD's are granted the power of eminent domain to engage in the 
condemnation of private property for public purposes; however, the 
water conservancy district cannot utilize this power to acquire the 
title to or beneficial uses therefrom of any vested water rights for 
transmountain divers ion, nor can it act as a carrier for any water 
source which has been obtained in such a manner by any other municipal 
entity. Both kinds of districts may incur debt in order to finance 
their development activities. This debt may be redeemed by rate 
charges and taxes in each case. However, there are some significant 
differences in the redemption provisions. 
The MWD legislation contains no provision for preserving future 
market areas since most of its services are already located within the 
boundaries of incorporated municipalities. The law is not clear 
regarding the annexation process and the possible interaction between 
munic ipal water departments, metropolitan water district s, and other 
water management districts. 
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Arizona 
Two enabling statutes have been selected from the Arizona ex-
periences for comparative purposes. Both originated in response to 
federal rec lamat ion projects and only one district has been formed 
under each statute. 
In 1971 Arizona passed legislation enabling the creation of 
Multi-county Water Conservation Districts (MCWCD). This was in direct 
response to the demands of the Secretary of the Interior for a tax-levy-
ing agency of the state empowered to contract with the federal govern-
ment to repay and manage water allocation of the Central Arizona Project 
(CAP). The CAP will direct water from the Colorado River and transport 
approximately 1.5 million acre-feet annually to the urbanizing areas 
from Phoenix to Tucson embracing Maricopa, Pinal, and Pima Count ies. 
The legislation is narrow and restrictive making it necessary for 
at least three counties to combine in forming one district. Petitions 
are directed to the Arizona Water Commission which must approve the 
form and effect the corporate organizat ion after conduc t ing hearings 
and satisfying objections. Only one district has been approved to 
date, with no opportunity in sight for other similar districts to ever 
be formed. 
The district is governed by a board of elected directors. Each 
county is entitled to one director for each 100,000 people in the 
county, and the term of office is four years. 
Any district organized under the act is specifically directed 
to enter into contracts with the Secretary of the Interior for the 
repayment of the cost of the CAP and for the delivery of water in 
accordance with the provisions of federal law PL-90-537. The district 
is also directed to levy an ad valorem tax not to exceed 1 mill to pay 
for the expenses of the district and to assist in the repayment of the 
CAP to the federal government. 
At present the Central Arizona Water Conservation District is 
strictly a repayment organization to satisfy the requirement that the 
Secretary of the Interior contract with one responsible state agency 
for development of the CAP. It remains for future state legislation 
to determine the assignment of operational responsibilities. However, 
the master cont ract wi th the Secretary of the Interior for CAP water 
includes some provisions not contained in any other reclamation con-
tract. One provision is that municipal and industrial use has a 
100 percent priority over agriculture in the event of shortage. 
Another provision is the requirement that an agricultural user has to 
gIve up pumping groundwater acre-foot for acre-foot of CAP supply. 
The groundwater overdraft in Arizona has reached a critical stage. 
Annual groundwater withdrawals exceed 2,500,000 acre-feet while natural 
recharge is approximately 300,000 acre-feet producing an overdraft of 
2,200,000 acre-feet. For this reason the Secretary of the Interior 
indicated it would be necessary for Arizona to establish a groundwater 
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management regime before 
sioned a comprehensive 
led to some rather basic 
CAP water 
study of 
changes in 
is made available. Arizona commis-
groundwater management needs which 
water laws and water administration. 
The other Arizona district statute of interest is that which 
enables the creation of Agricultural Improvement Districts (AID). 
The initial act was passed in 1922 and was designed to accommodate some 
of the special problems arising from the operation of the federal 
reclamation project on the Salt River. 
Landowners in the Salt River Valley having water rights pledged 
their land as security to repay the federal reclamation project, the 
Roosevelt Dam, and associated diversion water on the Salt River. They 
formed a private corporation known as the Salt River Water Users 
Association as the legal contracting agent for the project. When it 
became evident that electric power could be generated in connection 
wi th the dam, the associat ion gained concession from the Reclamation 
Service that allowed the association to sell the power to landowners 
and use the revenue to reduce the cost of water to the user and to 
essentially have independent control over the marketing of excess 
power. The private nature of the association soon incurred problems 
with taxation on revenues and on potential bonds to pay for capital 
construction. 
By transferring the power revenue and management responsibility 
to a public district the taxation problems were averted. Hence, the 
formation of the Salt River Agricultural Improvement and Power D~strict 
in 1922 was accomplished and the Salt River Project became the unique 
private-pub lic ent ity it is today. The as sociat ion remains as the 
trustee for the landowners with water rights pledged as security for 
repayment while the district is the corporate manager of the water and 
power facilit s and services. The Salt River Project is at once an 
electric water utility, a municipality type organization, a nonprofit 
community service company, and a federal reclamation project. 
The overall organization of the district is patterned after a 
representative type municipal government. The project has 10 voting 
divisions and each division elects one member to the board of directors 
and three members to a district council. In 1976 two at-large members 
were added to the district board by revision of state law that enables 
urban population to increase its voice in project affairs. Two addi-
tional at-large members were added in 1980 on the basis of one vote per 
property owner. The pres ident and vice pres ident of the board are also 
elected and the board becomes the corporate business manager of the 
district. The 30 member council can enact and amend bylaws relating to 
the government of the district, the management of its business, and the 
conduct of its affairs. The council meets at least once each year. 
The Salt River Project has water contracts with eight of the 
valley cities within the project boundaries. The project contract with 
Phoenix provides that the city pay the annual assessment for urban 
acreage which is no longer irrigated. In turn, the water to which 
this urban acreage is entitled is delivered by the project through its 
transmission system to the Phoenix water filtration plants. Other 
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cities which have similar domestic water supply contracts for sur-
face and underground water are: Tempe, Glendale, Mesa, Scottsdale, 
Chandler, Peoria, and Gilbert. These contracts provide cities within 
the project boundaries with a stable water supply at the same rate as 
irrigation customers. Since water cannot cross project boundaries the 
City of Phoenix is split with a portion having available project water, 
but not one drop can go to the thirs ty area of the city beyond the 
project pale. 
In a period of water scarcity there is no priority of use of 
water within the project such as culinary usage before agriculture. 
The land has the right to the water regardless of the beneficial use 
to which it is applied. 
Colorado 
Metropolitan Denver and other Front Range cities, all within the 
eastern rain shadow of the Rocky Mountains, are the principal urban 
and urbanizing areas of Colorado. At least 80 percent of the state's 
population is within 10 counties along the eastern slope. 
The entire Denver metropolitan area contains approximately 23 
agencies supplying water and nearly 200 participating in water distri-
bution. The responsibility of supplying water to most incorporated 
areas in Colorado rests with the municipality. Many of these munici-
palities supply water beyond their boundaries, thus the large number 
of distribution agencies as compared to supply agencies in the Denver 
area (Walker et ale 1973). 
Colorado was the first western state to adopt a comprehensive 
water development act which created districts with general power of 
taxation, and broad authority to contract for services. This was done 
in 1937 in anticipation of the proposed Colorado-Big Thompson reclama-
t ion project. 
The Water Conservancy Act of Colorado provides that a water 
conservancy district may be organized if the proper number of land-
owners petition for organization and if no protests are acknowledged. 
The petition must be signed by not fewer than 1500 owners of irrigated 
land in unincorporated areas and a Iso by at least 500 owners of non-
irrigated land or lands embraced in the incorporated limits of a city 
or town. No city having a population of more than 25,000 shall be 
included within the district unless approved by the chief executive 
officer and legislative body of such municipality. Less exacting 
provisions are specified for proposed districts having irrigated lands 
valued at less than $20 million. 
The district court is empowered to establish a water conservancy 
district in an area over which it presides after appropriate hearing. 
If a protest is filed, signed by not fewer than the number required 
for the petition, then the court shall order an election on the ques-
tion of the formation of the district. If the petition conforms to law 
and protes ts have not been filed or have been dismissed, the court 
17 
shall declare the district organized as a political subdivision of the 
state with all the powers of a public or municipal corporation. The 
court shall then appoint a board of directors of the district consist-
ing of not more than 15 persons who are owners of real property and 
residents of the counties in which the water conservancy district is 
situated. 
The district has broad powers for water development including 
contractual arrangements with the United States. The board each year 
is empowered to determine the amount of money necessary to be raised 
by ad valorem taxation and shall fix a levy on assessed property within 
the district. The rate shall not exceed one-half mill on the dollar 
prior to delivery of water, and thereafter shall not exceed one mill, 
except in the event of accruing defaults when an additional one-half 
mill may be levied. The board may allocate water to petitioning 
municipalities within the district in such quantity as will in the 
judgment of the board make adequate available water supply for the 
municipality and shall fix and determine the rate per acre-foot. 
The Northern Colorado Water Conservancy District, created in 
1937, was the first and most important of 36 water conservancy dis-
tricts in Colorado created under this act. The ad valorem tax levied 
by NCWCD raised about $400,000 in 1962 and in 1978 raised more than 
$1,500,000 (NCWCD, Annual Report, 1978). 
The Northern Colorado Water Conservancy District divided the 
assumed 310,000 acre-feet of water supply into 310,000 units. Because 
of the variability of supply the directors early each year declare the 
availabili ty of water quant ity varying from 60 percent to 100 percent 
of the 310,000 acre-foot units under contract. All the water was 
allocated soon after it became available, with each unit valued at 
about $30, while recent individual sales have been between $2,000 and 
$2,500 per unit. 
Water can be transferred within the district by private sale 
but the transfer requires the approval of the board which at leas t 
theoretically can deny the transfer. The board wi 11 approve trans fers 
to cities within the district up to twice their current use. Excess 
acquisitions by cities are rented back to farmers at agricultural water 
market rates until needed by the city. At present approximately 30 
percent of Colorado-Big Thompson water is allocated to municipal, 
domestic, and mUlti-purpose uses, with the balance to agriculture. 
However, about half of the municipal allocation is rented back to 
agriculture (NCWCD, Annual Report, 1978). 
The Northern Colorado Water Conservancy District is only a whole-
saler of water. Agricultural allot tees are served by 125 mutual ditch 
and reservoir companies. Similarly, the residents of 16 cities and 
towns and rural residents within the service area of 25 rural domestic 
water distributing agencies receive water delivery service under the 
same operating rules. Special problems have been created by the 
existence of rural domestic water districts adjacent to municipalities. 
An example is the rural area between Fort Collins and Loveland which 
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is served by a rural domestic water system. As the cities annex 
additional land within the rural district problems of water supply and 
treatment require adjustment as the district is faced with a shrinking 
base. One solution would be for the cities to purchase the district 
facilities and continue to supply present users beyond their corporate 
limits. Apparently both the Northern Colorado Water Conservancy 
District and the counties involved have played a relatively passive role 
in land use planning as it is linked to domestic water supply. 
Nebraska 
In an effort to deal more adequately and efficiently with growing 
state resource problems, Nebraska has recently undergone a major 
reorganization or restructuring of its resource related organizat ions. 
Over the years many different kinds of special purpose political 
subdivisions and organizations had been established. With time, also, 
their scope of permissible activities had expanded resulting in over-
lapping boundaries, duplication of actIvIties, and substantial In-
fighting (Marlette and Williams 1978). In order to provide more effec-
tive coordination, pl anning, deve lopment, and general management of 
areas wi th related resource prob lems, Nebraska implemented legislation 
creating nonoverlapping but contiguous Natural Resources Districts 
(NRD's) whose boundaries followed approximate hydrologic patterns. The 
NRD statute (and amendments) directed the Nebraska Natural Resource 
Commission to define and create not less than 16 nor more than 28 
NRD's. Consequently, the commission established 24 such districts 
resulting in the merger of more than 150 special purpose districts. 
Certain special districts were excluded from mandatory merger but were 
encouraged to cooperate with the NRD's and were given the opportunity to 
merge if they wished. 
As presently operated, each NRD is governed by a board of di-
rectors which may vary from 5 to 21 (an odd number required) as deter-
mined by the commission. Apparently, districts have the option of 
choosing whether subdistricts are represented by one or two individuals. 
A candidate for director must file a petition signed by 25 electors 
residing in the appropriate subdistrict. Elections are held In con-
nection with a state general election and candidates receiving a "plu-
rality of the votes cast" in the subdistrict are elected. 
NRD's have broad power and authority which have been enumerated 
as (Marlette and Williams 1978): 
1. To acquire property by eminent domain. 
2. To promulgate and enforce land use regulations. 
3. To promulgate and enforce groundwater regulations. 
4. To make studies, surveys, and investigations. 
5. To conduct demonstration projects. 
6. To store, transport, and supply water to users In the dis-
tricts. 
7. To acquire and dispose of water rights. 
8. To furnish financial aid. 
9. To construct facilities. 
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10. To levy a general purpose tax not to exceed 3 1/2 mi ll. 
However higher levies may be imposed upon a favorable refer-
endum within the district. 
Districts may establish improvement project areas within which 
special assessments may be levied. In addition, districts may borrow 
money and issue revenue bonds. NRD's may also levy a one-quarter 
mill general purpose tax for purposes related to groundwater manage-
ment. Little or no use has been made to date of the revenue bonding 
authority. 
Nebraska has a modest Resources Deve lopment Fund which receives 
annual appropriations by the state legislature and is administered by 
the Nebraska Natural Resources Commission which may be used in cost 
sharing with NRD projects the commission approves. 
NRD's are required to prepare and adopt a master plan. This plan 
must contain a statement of goals and objectives for each statutory 
purpose enumerated for the NRD' s. This master plan must be updated 
at least every 10 years and a "long range implementation plan" must be 
updated annually. District plans must conform to the state water plan, 
the state outdoor recreation plan, and the state fish and wildlife 
plan. 
Although institutional coordination 1.S improved with the estab-
lishment of the NRD' s the enabling legislation limits the powers to 
coordinate at the district level by making certain coordinating efforts 
subject to acquiescence by other local agencies. County and municipal 
regulations have priority over those of an NRD. Contracting authority 
does not extend to water delivery to those within boundaries of a 
municipality, county, or metropolitan utility district without permis-
S1.on of the respective agency. 
Nebraska makes very heavy use of groundwater for irrigation and 
has initiated legislation to provide for its prudent and orderly 
management. The legislat ion provides that NRD' s after recogn1.Z 1.ng a 
groundwater problem within its district may petition the State Depart-
ment of Water Resources (DWR) to establish a control area. After 
designation of a groundwater control area, the NRD must adopt, with the 
approval of the DWR, specific regulations to conserve and manage 
groundwater supplies. 
Oregon 
Oregon has a number of statutes enabling the creation of water 
districts, but only one which provides for a district with general 
taxing power. The statute was first enacted in 1955 at a time when 
the state water resources administration was being reorganized. Al-
though the statute 1.S intact, to date no district has been formed. 
Under the act, formation of a district follows a petition-hearing-
election format with the board of county supervisors as the authorizing 
agency. Petitions signed by 50 or a majority of landowners initiates 
the process. The county board of supervisors notifies landowners and 
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schedules a hearing. If the objections are satisfied, the county board 
then schedules an election. Of the votes cast, a 60 percent majority 
~s necessary for creating a district, otherwise the issue is dead. 
The governing board of the district is elected and has power to 
conduct the business and fulfill all the purposes of the district. The 
board can levy a general tax but the tax is limi ted to that approved 
by the voters in the formation. Special assessment can be made to 
beneficiaries of project works and bonds can be issued after voter 
approval. Fees or tolls for services can also be charged. 
Oregon retains considerable state oversight in all water projects, 
and plans prepared by the district must be approved by the State 
Engineer as well as by the landowners. Projects can be suggested by 
landowners and receive a hearing before the County Board of Supervisors. 
Landowners may also protest proj ects and prevent them from deve 10pment 
if protested by 50 percent or more of the landowners. 
Oregon also has a state water policy board which sets guidelines 
and priorities for project development which all subdivisions of state 
government must follow. 
South Dakota 
Historically, South Dakota has sought to maintain a strong state 
oversight wi th respect to water development and management. The South 
Dakota Conservancy District, legislatively created in 1959, ~s a 
statewide district whose principal function is to coordinate all local 
water resource project activities and to maintain a close liaison with 
the governor and legislature concerning water policies and programs. 
South Dakota has maintained that because of the vital nature of water 
in the development and use of other resources and as a necessary 
ingredient in pract ically every human enterprise, the sovereign powers 
of the state needed to be employed to coordinate and integrate the 
multiple uses of water. The statewide water conservancy district 
enactment was a companion to a legislat ive act which provided for the 
creation of subdistricts. The South Dakota subdistricts are quite 
similar in purpose and function to water conservation districts as 
provided for in other states. The use of the nomenclature "subdistrict" 
is to make clear the organizational linkage to the South Dakota Conser-
vancy District. 
The subdistricts are created through a vote of the landowners 
of the geographical area of the proposed subdistrict. A petition 
calling for such an election must originate with landowners whose 
signatures represent 25 percent or more of the area and must be pre-
sented to the governing board of the statewide district. If the 
board approves the petition, the question is placed on a separate 
ballot at the next general election for approval of voters residing 
in the proposed area of the subdistrict. A 60 percent favorable vote 
is required for the subdistrict to be organized. The board governing 
the statewide district determines the number of directors the sub-
district shall have (not to exceed 11) and sets out the criterion to be 
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followed in maintaining equitable representation geographically. 
Municipalities are considered separate election districts so that only 
their residents may determine whether or not the city is to be a part 
of the subdistrict. Any election district may withdraw from the 
proposed subdistrict in a manner similar to that required for creation. 
A petition must be signed by 25 percent of the landowners and presented 
to the board governing the statewide district within 60 days of a board 
resolution to create the subdistrict. The board then sets up another 
election in which a 60 percent vote in favor of withdrawal required. 
A subdistrict has power of eminent domain and may contract with 
public or private agencies for construction of water facilities and 
repayment of costs associated with water development projects. Such 
contracts must receive electoral approval, however, and are not dis-
cretionary with the board of directors. All taxable property within 
a subdistrict may be levied. Prior to any contractual agreements for 
project development, the tax limit is set at 1/10 of one mill. After 
entering into contractual agreements, the levy may be raised to a 
maximum of one mill. There are no spec ial taxing authorities related 
to different water supply purposes. Since authority to issue bonds is 
. not ment ioned in the statutes, presumably costs that exceeded the one 
mill taxing revenue would have to be obtained through water charges. 
The responsibility of the board of directors governing the state-
wide district has been enlarged as certain reorganizations in state 
agenc ies have occurred. While the statewide district still maintains 
its supervision over subdistricts, its board now has principal policy 
authority for the Department of Natural Resources Development. Thus, 
it has responsibility for reviewing and approving all water development 
plans .and reports both to the governor and the legislature with recom-
mendations for programs and financial schemes for carrying them out. 
The statewide district has' no taxing authority but has authority to 
issue bonds if projects have been legislatively sanctioned. Bond 
security is obtained in the form of liens on income revenues. They 
are not enforceable against the state. The board may seek legislative 
appropriations for meet ing costs which have been determined to be the 
state share for bene fits accruing to the general taxpayer. However, 
legislative policy is that each purpose of water projects is to pay 
the full costs associated with providing their benefit. Thus, legisla-
tive approval of financing schemes requires a comprehensive evaluation 
of costs and benefits and their distribution on a project by project 
basis prior to any establishment of loan funds. The board has been 
given the responsibility for preparing a comprehensive statewide water 
plan and development system. In this connection, it must provide 
yearly progress reports and develop updated plans not less than once 
every four years. The board recommends to the governor and the legis-
lature those portions of the statewide water plan considered neces-
sary in some prioritized fashion and proposes means of financing the 
state share of costs of water facilities that may be authorized for 
construction. 
Analysis and Comparison of 
Language by States 
Statutes of Utah, Colorado, Arizona, Oregon, Nebraska and South 
Dakota which create or enable the creation of special water districts 
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have been examined and comparisons made with respect to certain fea-
tures considered important in effecting or directing the performance of 
the organization. The statutory elements compared are: legislat ive 
purpose, procedure for creat ion, procedure for terminat ion or wi th-
drawal from the district, selection of officers, powers and legal 
rights, opportunity for input or approval of policy options, sources of 
funding and financial responsibility, planning responsibility, and 
legislative requirements for coordination with or subordination to 
state, regional and general purpose local governments. This information 
is summarized in Table 1. 
Legislative Purpose 
In most states the state legislature has not created a county, 
ci ty, business corporat ion, special improvement district, or a water 
district by statute. Rather the state provides the enabling legislation 
by which subdivisions of the state can be created and it can specify 
conditions that must be observed such as number of petitioners, qualifi-
cations of electors, taxing authority, etc. The legislature also 
provides in some form the limitations and purposes for which specific 
subdivision of government can be created. In doing this it may reveal a 
philosophy about resource development or the policy of the state with 
regard to water use and development. 
The enabling statute is in some respects similar to the article 
of incorporation of a business venture. Since a corporat ion cannot 
engage in activities not granted by the articles of incorporation, it is 
common practice to include very broad purposes to cover any unforeseen 
future needs. The articles of incorporation are not useful instruments 
in the management of a business because the manager must still set the 
specific goals and guide the organization into successful decisions. 
Likewise, while the incorporators of water conservancy districts are 
limited to the powers specified in the enabling statutes, the district 
has latitude to set specific objectives and employ available resources 
in order to accomplish them. The statutory language is important, 
however, in revealing the thinking and philosophy of the legislature at 
the time of the creating act. 
As originally adopted, Utah and Colorado language authorizing the 
creation of water conservancy districts was the same. Both wrote 
statutes in anticipation of federal reclamation projects and in com-
pliance with Department of Interior desires for a contracting agent for 
water users. Both were written and passed in the late 1930s and early 
1940s during a period of substantial western water development under 
the federal reclamation program. Both statutorily declare the WCD 
to fulfill a public need as a prerequisite to general taxing authority. 
Both recognize that projects have direct and indirect benefits. 
Arizona passed a law to create districts for much the same reason 
as Utah and Colorado--to provide an "agent" organization with good 
repayment capability. The specific project which prompted the need 
for the Arizona Multicounty Water Conservation District was the Central 
Arizona Project. The district function is restricted to tax collecting 
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Table 1. Statutory comparison of state organizations for multi-purpose 
water management. 
UfAHWATER 
CONSERVANCY ACT 
(U.CA.73-9) 
Declared to be a public use which will 
benefit indirectly all industry; benefit 
state by increasing taxable property 
valuation; provide adequate supplies of 
water for domestic use; benefit lands to 
be irrigated or drained; benefit irrigated 
lands by stabilizing flow in streams; and 
promote comfort, safety, and welfare of 
people of state. 
Initiation Advocacy petition must repre· 
sent 20% of the landowners (or 500 sig· 
natures, whichever is less) of each in· 
corporated city or town location within 
proposed boundaries. Signature must re-
present $300 or more of assessed valua-
tion. 
Protest petition must represent 20% 
of the land owners of the unincorpo-
rated area, and 20% of the assessed valu-
ation of lands contained therein, and 
also represent 20% of owners of land in 
each municipality within proposed dis-
trict and 20% of the assessed valuation 
of each munici pality. 
Authorizing Body District Court. 
Public Notice and Hearing After filing 
petition, hearing date set within 60-90 
days. Public notice of hearing published 
by clerk of court. Specifically required 
to notify county commissions. 
Voter Approval No election required. 
No provision for termination. 
Owners of lands may petition board 
for wit hdrawal, if no outstanding bond 
or other indebtedness. If under contract 
with the U.S. no dissolution shall take 
place without consent of Secretary of 
the Interior. 
UTAH METROPOLITAN 
WATER DISTRICTS 
(U.cA.73-8) 
A quasi municipal organization for ac-
quiring, apprppriating, developing, 
storing, selling,leasing, and distributing 
water for, and devoting water to, mun-
icipal and domestic purposes, irrigation, 
power, milling, manufacturing, mining, 
metallurgical, and any and all other 
beneficial uses. 
May be formed of the territory included 
within the corporate boundaries of any 
one or more municipalities, which need 
not be contiguous. 
Initiation Legislative body of any muni-
cipality passes ordinance expressing de-
sire for MWD, listing all cities to be 
included. 
Authorizing Body Legislative body of 
each city. Ordinance must be approved 
or rejected within 60 days. Secretary of 
State provides certificate of incorpora-
tion. 
Public Notice and Hearing No special 
hearings required. Ordinance published 
once at least 10 days before election. 
Voter Approval Special election held 
in approving cities and pass by vote of 
majority of electors in each city. New 
area may be added as a result of muni-
cipal annexation. A city desiring annexa· 
tion must be approved by electors in 
petitioning municipality. 
No statutory provision for termination. 
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ARIZONA MULTICOUNTY 
WATER CONSERVATION 
DISTRICTS 
(ARSA-45-2601) 
To create legal body as contracting agent 
with Secretary of the Interior with 
power to levy and collect ad valorem 
taxes on aU district property and make 
payments to U.S. in accordance with 
contracturalobligations. 
Initiation Three or more cou:lties must 
combine to form a district and each 
county must submit a petition signed by 
the chairman of the Board of County 
Supervisors to the Arizona Water Com-
mission or its successor organization. 
Alternately, qualified electors equal 
to at least 1 % of the votes cast for gover· 
nor in the last election may submit a 
signed petition to the Arizona Water 
Commission. 
Authorizing Body Arizona Water 
Commission. 
Public Notice and Hearing The Arizona 
Water Commission posts notice and con-
ducts a hearing. At the hearing any af-
fected person may appear and be heard 
on any matter relating to the establish-
ment of the proposed district. After 
hearing, the commission will make de-
cision and, if affirmative, declare the dis· 
trict organized. Appeals to this decision 
may be taken by special petition to the 
supreme court. 
Voter Approval No direct voter ap· 
proval req uired. 
District may be dissolved by resolution 
of its board after approval by the At· 
torney General and the Secretary of the 
Interior and the pa yment of all indebt-
edness and satisfying of all legal obliga· 
tion. 
Table 1. Continued. 
ARIZONA AGRICULTURAL 
IMPROVEMENT DISTRICf 
(ARS Chapter 45.901-1041) 
An enabling act and no specific legisla-
tive purpose or intent is stated. It is an 
organization of land owners within the 
boundaries of a federal reclamation 
project. Function is business and econo-
mic, not governmental. Owned by pri-
vate land holders. 
Initiation A petiticn, signed by five or 
more landowners within the boundaries 
of a federal reclamation project, propose 
the formation of a district to accomplish 
specified water related purposes. 
Authorizing Body County board of 
supervisors. 
PubDc Notice and Hearing The board of 
supervisors sets the time of hearing not 
less than 3 weeks nOr more than 6 weeks 
after date of order and publishes notice 
of hearing not less than 2 weeks nor 
more than 4 weeks prior to hearing date. 
If more than one county is involved each 
county must be similarly notified. 
Voter Approval After the hearing and 
any subsequent appeal, a notice of elec· 
tion is published for the purpose of de-
termining whether or not the district 
shall be organized. Only qualified voters 
may cast a ballot. Qualifications include 
ownership of real property of 1 auce or 
more and possessing the qualifications of 
electors for State offices under general 
election laws. 
No provision for withdrawal or 
termination. 
COLORADO WATER 
CONSERVANCY DISTRICfS 
(CRS 37-45) 
Declared to be a public use which will 
benefit indirectly all industry, benefit 
state by increasing taxab Ie property 
valuation, provide adequate supplies of 
water for domeStic use, benefit lands, 
to be irrigated or drained, benefit irri-
gated lands by stabilizing flow in 
streams, promote comfort. safety, 
and welfare of people of state. 
mHiation f or districts having an assess-
ed valuation of over $20 million, the ad-
vocacy petition must be signed by 1500 
owners of irrigated land outside the 
limits of incorporated towns, and by 
500 owners of nonirrigated land within 
limits of cities and towns. Assessed valu-
ation for each irrigated tract must be at 
least $2000; for nonirrigated tracts, 
$1000. Protest petition must be signed 
by eit her 1) 1500 owners of irrigated 
land having aggregate assessed value of 
not less than $2 million; and also be 
signed by 500 owners of nonirrigated 
land within the limits of cities and 
towns, or 2) the owners of taxable prop-
erty regardless of n umber having aggre-
gate assessed valuation is more than 50% 
of the total assessed valuation of all 
property in the proposed district. 
For districts having an assessed valua-
tion of less than $20 million; the advo-
cacy petition must be signed by 25% of 
the owners of irrigated land, each having 
an assessed valuation of $1000, and also 
signed by 5% of the owners of nonirriga-
ted lands located in incorporated limits 
of a city or town, each having an assess-
ed valuation of $1000. Protest petition 
must be signed by 25% of the owners of 
irrigated land and also by 5% of the own-
ers of nonirrigated land, or must be sign-
ed by owners representing an assessed 
valuation of more than 50% of the total 
assessed valuation of all property in the 
proposed district. 
Cities of 25,000 or more shall be In-
duded only with consent of chief ex-
ecutive and legislative body. The maxi-
mum tax to be levied is specified by the 
city. 
AuthOrizing Body District Court. 
PubDc Notice and Hearing After filing 
petition, hearing date set within 60-90 
days. Public notice of hearing published 
by clerk of court. Specifically required 
to notify County Commissions. 
Voter Approval No election required. 
May be dissolved if district has not been 
authorized to incur bonded or other in-
debtedness under election procedures 
specified. If agency has entered into con· 
tract with United States no dissolution 
shall take place unless consented to by 
Secretary of the Interior. 
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NEBRASKA NATURAL 
RESOURCES DISTRICTS 
(Revised Statutes 2-3200) 
Essential to welfare of people of 
Nebraska to conserve, protect. develop 
and manage natural resources of state. 
Most efficient and economical method 
of accelerating these achievements be-
lieved to be the creation of natural reo 
sources districts. Functions of soil and 
water conservation districts, watershed 
conservancy districts and watershed dis-
tricts to be consolidated into NRDs. 
Other special purpose districts including 
rural water districts, groundwater con-
servation districts, and irrigation districts 
are encouraged to cooperate with and, 
where appropriate, merge with NRDs. 
Initiation State legislation directing 
establishment of not less than 16 or 
more than 28 Natural Resource Districts 
(NRD) to cover state based on hydro-
logic patterns. 
Authorizing Body State Legislature. 
Public Notice and Hearing Legislative 
hearing. 
Voter Approval None. 
Not specified. 
Table 1. Continued. 
OREGON WATER 
IMPROVEMENT DISTRICT 
Oregon Revised Statutes 
(45-552) 
For constructing works to prevent dam-
age and destruction of life and property 
by floods, to improve the agricultural 
and other uses of lands and waters and 
to improve the public health, welfare, 
and safety. May also provide domestic 
or municipal and industrial water sup-
ply and water related recreation and can 
enhance water pollution control, water 
quality, and fish and wildlife resources. 
Initiation By petition to the County 
Court or County Board of Supervisors. 
If over 50% of the land is represented 
by the petitioners, the County Board 
of Supervisors can declare the district 
formed. If less than 50%, the proposi-
tion must be submitted to the voters. 
The petition must state the maximum 
ad valorem tax that can be imposed. 
If municipalities and/or other orga-
nized districts are included in the region 
of the profosed district, they must be 
notified 0 the proposed action, and may 
withdraw by filing a resolution with the 
County Board of Supervisors. 
All registered voters owning property 
or residing within the proposed bounda-
ries are eligib Ie to vote. 
Authorizing Body County Court or 
County Board of Supervisors. 
Public Notice and Hearing If less than 
50% of land proposed for the district is 
represented, a hearing is scheduled by 
the County Board of Supervisors. Board 
decides whether or not to submit to 
vote. Voting is at time of state primary 
or general election. Of those voting 60% 
or more must be in favor. 
An election on dissolution is req uired 
and must be held concurrently with a 
primary or general election. 
SOUTH DAKOTA 
CONSERVANCY DISTRICT 
(Chapter 46-17, 
South Dakota Statutes) 
To benefit from more effective develop-
ment and utilization of the land and 
water resources of the state in terms of 
greater economic security, protection of 
health, prosperity and general welfare of 
the people of South Dakota. Public con-
cern necessitates the exercise of the sov-
ereign powers of the State. It is in the 
public interest that a coordinated inte-
grated, municipal use water resource 
policy be formulated and adivated. 
For any water resource projects de-
veloped under this act, it is the legislative 
inte It that financing should relate rea-
son! bly and equitably to the benefits 
rece ved, by each level and beneficiary_ 
Initiation The South Dakota Conser-
vancy District was created by the legisla-
ture as a separate corporate body with 
boundaries coinciding with the bounda-
ries of the state of South Dakota. 
Authorizing Body State legislature. 
Voter Approval None required. 
Not specified. Legislature could repeal 
act and dissolve. 
SUBDISTRICTS OF SOUTH 
DAKOTA CONSERVANCY 
DISTRICT 
(Chapter 46-18. 
South Dakota Statutes) 
To obtain the objectives of the South 
Dakota Conservancy District (Chapter 
46-17). 
!nitiation Petition I/lUSt represent 25% 
of the landowners from each separate 
geographical area within the subdistrict. 
Petition is for an election on the estab-
lishment of SUbdistrict and is presented 
to the state Natural Resources Develop-
ment Board. If the board approves the 
petition, the question will be placed on 
a separate ballot at the next general elec-
tion in the proposed area of the sub-
district for voter approval. 
Authorizing Body Board of Natural Re-
sources Development of South Dakota. 
Public Notice and Hearing Not rnention~ 
ed in statutes. 
Voter Approval Proposed subdistrict re-
quires 60% favorable vote in any election 
district. Municipalities are considered 
::eparate election districts. 
Subdistrict can be dissolved by an affir-
mative vote of 60% in election called by 
the Natural Resources Development 
Board following receipt of a petition 
signed by 25% of the landowners within 
the subdistrict. 
Upon dissolution, the powers of the 
subdistrict board of directors is exercised 
by the South Dakota Conservation Dis-
trict until responsibilities, Obligations, 
and contractural commitments are 
satisfied. 
Any election district may withdraw 
from a pro posed subdistrict by petition-
ing the Natural Resources Development 
Board within 60 days of Board resolu-
tion to create. The withdrawal petition 
must be signed by 25% of the land own-
ers of the election district and then a 
60% vote is required in another electio.n. ,.~ ______ ~ ______________________________ L-____________________________ ~ ____________________________ ~ 
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Table 1. Continued. 
UTAH WATER UTAH METROPOUf AN ARIZONA MULTICOUNTY 
CONSERVANCY ACT WATER DISTRICTS WATER CONSERVATION 
(U.C.A.73.9) (U.C.A. 73·8) DISTRICTS 
(ARSA.45·2601) 
The number, representative and votes of Directors appointed by legislative bodies Membership to board of directors is by 
directors for each district is established of municipalities they represent. For election conducted the same time as a 
by court in decree creating district. For more than 2 cities, each city allowed at U.S. presidential election. Candidates 
a WCD of 1-4 counties, not more than 11 least 1 representative who is allowed 1 are nominated by petition signed by not 
'" 
directors permitted. For a WCD of 5 or vote for each $10 million of assessed less than 200 qualified electors. Term of 
... 
more counties, 21 directors permitted. value of property taxable for MWD pur· office is 4 years and director must be a 
<U Directors must be residents of district poses. A city may appoint more repre· qualified elector of one of the counties C) 
0;: and serve for three year terms. Directors sentatives, not exceeding 1 for each $1 included in district. Each county entitled 
.... are selected as follows: WCD of single million of assessed value. The total votes to one director for each 100,000 people 0 county, director appointed by board allowed a city remains the same. For a in county (as certified by the Secretary 
~ of county commissioners. WCD's of single city MWD, the legislative body of of State) based on the last decennial 
= 
more than one county have director the city shall cPoose 5 or 7 directors. census of the United States. 
0 appointed by governor with advice and In each munidpality within MWD. 1 Majority of the Directors constitutes 
~ consent of senate from nominee Sub- representative shall be the designated di- a quorum. 
~ mit ted by board of county commission- rector of water supply and waterworks. ers and/or cities. Director chou.a chair- All ether elected, iippointed officia!::, or 
tf.l man of board. MajOrity constitutes employees of city are ineligible for 
quorum. Majority req uired to create board. Municipalities adhere to a policy 
policy and excercise powers. of continuing reappointment of repre· 
sentatives. Term is 6 years. 
Not a municipality. No statutory or con· Not a municipality. Statutory debt A municipal corporation to the extent of 
stitutional debt limitations. May create limitation is 10% of assessed valuation. powers conferred by law and state con· 
reserve funds. Not req uired to spend in May invest surplus or reserve funds. May stitution. Funds may be expended at di· 
the same year collections made for that borrow money and incur indebtedness rection of Board to effectuate purposes 
year. May invest any surplus or reserve with voter approval. May acquire water/ of the act. May establish and maintain 
funds. May bOrTOW money and incur in· water rights within and/or without the surplus or reserve account in amounts 
debtedness. May study, investigate, and state. Develop, store, and transport that may be 'required by contracts with 
promote water development within the water. May join with other public or pri. Secretary of the Interior. Cooperate and 
district. May obtain by any legal means vate corporation for purpose of carrying contract with the Secretary to carry out 
water rights, water works, etc., from out any of its powers. Possesses power provisions of the Reclamation Act and 
within or wit hout WCD boundaries and of eminent domain. Fixes rates for de- the Colorado River Project Act. May 
dispose of for use within the district livered water in accordance with legisla· contract with other governmental agen· 
boundaries. May construct and operate tive intent to recover operating, capital, cies and organizations and may enter in· 
'" 
all facilities necessary for carrying out and overhead costs through water to subcontracts with water users for the 
.... 
..c: functions within or without the WCD. charges. Should taxes and charges be in- delivery of water through facilities of 
.ell Possesses power of eminent domain. adequate for obligations, the MWD may the Central Arizona Project. 
~ Full contract ural capacity. May contract authorize a special tax. Cities within May establish (and cause to be col· 
e: with the government of the United MWD have a preferential right to pur- lected) charges for water consistent with 
! States or any agency thereof. May ac· chase water from the district. federal reclamation law. quire perpetual rights to the use of aU District is specifically not authorized water from such works and sell and dis· to determine how CAP water is to be 
'"0 pose of perpetual rights from such works allocated. 
= ~ to persons and corporations public and 
~ private. May allot water to irrigation 
<U lands. May fix rates at which nonirri· 
~ gation water shall be sold or otherwise 
~ disposed of. May make and collect fees and charges for water connections. Has 
power to levy and collect general and 
specific taxes on property. 
May generate a'nd sell electrical 
power that is generated incidental to 
the development of water under cer· 
tain conditions. 
One annual meeting plus special quarter- All policy created by resolution or Holds annual and special meetings open 
Iy meetings scheduled. Board sets annual ordinance. Regular and special meetings to public. Water user may file a petition 
e: 
hearing date to receive objections to are scheduled, subject to usual open in the superior court of the county to 
property tax assessments. Minutes and meetings, laws, and public access. determine validity of his contract with >- records open to public inspection. Per· District sched ules publi c hearing an· the District. Court hOlds hearing and 0 
... sons asserting invalid actions or unfair nually with adeq uate notice for input examines contract. J:>.. 
J:>.. tax assessments may appeal through the to purposes and necessities of tax rate 
~ judicial system. recommended by board. 
.... Interested parties may be heard in 
S. any petition for a board-initiated judi· 
= 
cial determination of acts with respect 
- lfi! 
to taxing, contracts, and powers. 
... When expenditures are greater than o 0 
..... - income and revenue for a given year or 
'""" :>'J:>.. period of time, the issue must be sub· ~O mitted to the electors with published 
;:I ~ notice followed by an election to be 
1::: .- held not less than 10 days following the 
0"0 fmal notice. A majority vote by the el· 
J:>..~ ectorate authorizes bonding or other 
J:>.. .... indebtedness. o 0 
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Table 1. Continued. 
ARIZONA AGRICULTURAL COWRADO WATER NEBRASKA NATURAL 
IMPROVEMENT DISTRICT CONSERVANCY DISTRICTS RESOURCES DISTRICTS 
(ARS Chapter 45-901-1041) (CRS 37-45) (Revised Statutes 2-3200) 
Management is by a board of directors District Court shaH appoint a board of Number of board members for a given 
and a council. District is divided into 10 directors of the district consisting of not district determined by the Natural Re-
SUbdivisions. The board of directors con- more than 15 persons who are residents sources Commission. Boards elected for 
sists of 10 directors. one elected from of the counties in which the water con- 4 year terms on nonpartisan ballot held 
each division. The council consists of 30 servancy district is Situated, all of whom at the time of general state elections. 
'" 
members, three elected from each divi- shall be owners of real property in the Majority of directors constitute a 
.. sion. President and vice president of the district. Term of office is 4 years. Mem- quorum. A majority of the quorum is ~ board are elected along with councilmen bers may be reappointed. A majority of necessary for initiating policy and 
5 and directors and serve a term of 2 the directors shall constitute a quorum. action. 
0 years. Nomination for councilman and A concurrence of a majority of those in 
~ director is by petition signed by 2S attendance is sufficient for conducting landowners within division. NOmination business of the board. 
=: for president is by petition signed by 
.~ 250 landowners. 
-
0 
,£ 
Q.) 
til 
A public, political. taxing subdivision of Organized as a political subdivision of Districts are political subdivisions of the 
the state, and a municipal corporation, Colorado with the powers of a public state, havin~ perpetual succession, and 
... having immunity of its property and or municipal corporation . may sue an be sued. District has power 
bonds from taxation. No statutory debt May take by any legal means water, to adopt rules and regulations, may ac· 
limit but, because bonds are lien on waterworks, water rights and sources of quire property by eminent domain. May 
iaod, bonds cannot exceed the value of water supply, and real and personal promulgate and enforce land use and 
the land within the district. May create property of any kind within or without groundwater regulations. Make studies 
reserve funds. May invest surplus, bor- the district convenient to the full exer· and investigations relative to storing and 
row and incur indebtedness. Survey, cise of its powers. May sell, lease, encum· transporting water for domestiC, irriga-
plan, locate, and estimate costs of nec- ber or otherwise dispose of water, water- tion, milling, manufacturinl! and all 
essary works for irrigation, drainage, or works, water rights, and sources of sup· other beneficial uses. May IX terms and 
power. May enforce rules and regula- ply of water for use within the district. rates for water supplies made available. 
tions necessary to carryon any bUSiness Has power of eminent domain. May May acq uire and dispose of water rights. 
of district. Fix rates fo r power and make and execute contracts. May con· May levy property tax not to exceed 1 
.., water. May not acquire water rights. tract with United States for construe· mill. May borrow money and invest sur-
-
May acquire bonds, easements, and lion, preservation, operation, and main- plus money in bonds or treasury notes; ~ other property, real and personal. Con- teJ:l3DCe of t IInnels, reservoirs, regulating establish sinking fund; use grants and 
I¥ struct, operate and keep In repair all basins, diversion canals and works, dams, state appropriations. 
it works and property used for purposes power plants, etc. and to acq uire per· Board has authority to cooperate of district. May act as agent for land· petual rights to the use of water from with other organizations and agencies 
~ owners in district in all matters pertain- such works. Allocates water to land and as deemed appropriate. ing to purposes of district. Has right of determines maximum beneficial use. 
"0 eminent domain. The council makes the Fixes rates for water not allocated to 
=: by-Iawa and sets policy for the govern- land. May borrow money and incur in-~ 
~ ment of the district. Management of the debtedness. Board may be majority vote, 
Q.) bUSiness is by the Board of Directors raise mill levy to maximum authorized 
~ and its presiding officer. Profits from by law. May create reserve fund. sale of electricity can be used to defray No authority to generate or sell elec-Q.. expenses of irrigating private lands. tric energy except for district works and 
fucilities. 
Board may adopt bylaws not in con· 
flict with the constitution and laws of 
the state for carrying out the business, 
objects, and affairs of the board and of 
the district. It may organize subdistricts 
upon petition and with court approval 
and serve as directors of such sub-
districts. 
The council (30 members) holds an an- Annual and other scheduled meetings Districts give notice of, and hold, regu-
nual meeting and special meetings as open to public, as are copies of minutes Iarty scheduled open meetings. Annual 
i needed. Voters have access to policy and records. report of financial condition and sche-
c through the council and president of Board will hear objections to assess- duling of open discussion. Copies of 
.. the Board of Directors. Larger number ments. The eourt shall not disturb the minutes and records reflecting opera· c.. of representatives from each subdivision findings of the board unless the findings tion, management, and business of dis· c.. 
~ provides better user access. Bonded in- of the board are manifestl y dispropor- trict open to public inspection. 
-
ilebtedness requires vote approval. tionate to assessments imposed upon Any pr0fterty owner may file a peti-
;::I other property in the district. tion asking or amendments or repeal of 
c.. Expenditures for district water proj· resolution or actions. 
=: ects in excess of annual income and An appeal may be taken to the dis-
-~ .. revenue shall be submitted to the elec· trict court by any person aggrieved, by 
oS .S torate for approval or rejection. f'tling an undertaking. 
-
Boards within each river -basin meet >.c.. jointly at least twice a year for purpose i O of coordinating their efforts for maxi-
;::I t> mum benefit to the basin. 
1:: --g,o 
c..Q.. 
O~ 
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Table 1. Continued. 
OREGON WATER 
IMPROVEMENT DISTRICT 
Oregon Revised Statutes 
(45-552) 
Voters of a district shall elect a board of 
directors whose number shall be fixed by 
the County Board at the proceedings of 
formation at either 5, 7, or 9. Directors 
(3 year term) shall be owners of land in 
district but not req uired to reside in 
district. 
A governmental subdivision of the state, 
and a public body, corporate and politic, 
exerciSing public power. Full power to 
carry out the objects of its creation. May 
have perpetual succession, sue and be 
sued. May also acquire by condemnation, 
purchase, devise, gift or grant real and 
personal property located inside or out· 
side of district boundaries. May contract 
with United States, or with any county, 
city or state, or public district, for con-
struction, preservation, improvement, 
operation or maintenance of any works. 
can build all works necessary and ap-
propriate and acquire water rights and 
sell. lease and deliver water. 
May fix charges for water made avail-
able for any use so that the water system 
is self sustaining. 
May levy general tax, set service 
charges and user fees. All indebtedness 
to be paid from revenue collected. De-
liveries of water to lands upon which 
there are delinq uent 3ssessmen t is 
withheld. 
The board of directors manage and 
conduct the affairs of the district, em-
ploy and appoint agents and employees, 
establish rules and regulations for admin-
istration of affairs of district. Establish 
and maintain funds and accounts for 
funds, obtain an annual audit of books, 
fix the location of the principal office of 
the district, and keep and furnish to 
county a record of all board proceedings. 
Any land owner or qualified voter may 
bring proceedings in the circuit court of 
the county to determine the validity of 
any order or act of the district. 
Land owners may request construc-
tion of particular works. Completed 
plan of project must be subjected to 
hearing. After the nearing. board may 
issue order of approval with amendments 
or modifications. Land owners have op-
portunity to file written objections to 
the order. Owners of more than 50% of 
the land may reject the plan and kill 
project. 
SOUTH DAKOTA 
CONSERVANCY DISTRICT 
(Chapter 46-17, 
South Dakota Statutes) 
Seven persons serving 4 year staggered 
terms a ppointed by the governor with 
the advice of the senate. 
Board acts as principal a uthorit y for the 
Department of Natural Resource Devel-
opment. Reviews and approves water de-
velopment plans and supervises special 
resource project districts. Makes compre-
hensive evaluation and allocation of the 
total benefits and costs of all water fa-
cilities. Coordinates all federal, state, and 
local water resource project activities in 
the state. Presents req uests to legislature 
for carrying out recommended programs 
and projects. 
District assists in the organization of 
subdistricts including the conduct of ref-
erendums and elections. May cooperate 
with subdistricts/agencies as guarantor of 
payments. 
May sue and be sued; aCQuire by pur-
chase or lease all property as may be 
needed and to dispose of same as needed; 
exercise power of eminent domain; con-
struct, operate, and maintain water re-
source development works not within a 
subdistrict; contract with federal agen-
cies, public entities. local groups, and in-
dividuals; cooperate with other agencies 
in studying, investigating, and planning 
water resource projects; perform inde-
pendent investigations; accept gifts. 
The district board does not have au-
thority to generate, transmit, distribute, 
or sell electrical power. 
Close legislative oversight on policy and 
programs. 
Board makes annual report to the 
governor and legislature of activities, ac-
counting for all expenditures from the 
South Dakota water facilities construc-
tion fund. 
Board provides plan for financing of 
construction of projects to the legisla-
ture. Legislature determines whether 
proposed financing plan is appropriate 
and may authorize issuance of bonds. 
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SUBDISTRICTS OF SOUTH 
DAKOT A CONSERVANCY 
DISTRICT 
(Chapter 46-18, 
South Dakota Statutes) 
The South Dakota Natural Resources 
Development Board shall determine the 
number of directors (not to exceed 11) 
and fix qualifications to effect an eq ui-
table representation of all areas within 
the subdistrict. This first Board of Di-
rectors are elected at the time of cre-
ation. Subsequently, director candidates 
are then nominated by a petition of 25 
or more owners of real property in the 
area to be represented. The petition is di-
rected to the existing subdistrict board. 
If only 1 individual is nominated, the 
certificate of election is automatic. If 
more than 1 individual is nominated, 
names are then placed on a nonpolitical 
ballot at the next general election. Di-
rectors ~v elected serve 4 year terms. A 
majority of the directors constitutes a 
quorum. Vacancies are filled by remain-
ing directors from among any nominated 
candidates. Directors choose chairman, 
vice-chairman, secretary, and treasurer. 
May acquire by purchase or lease all real 
pro pert y necessary for the construction, 
maintenance and operation of any or all 
water resource projects. Ma y exercise 
power of eminent domain. May accept 
assistance, financial or otherwise, from 
federal, state, and other public and pri-
vate sources (excepting contributions or 
gifts of money from private sources). 
May enter into contract with United 
States of America or any agency thereof, 
public agencies of South Dakota, and 
private corporations or persons. May 
enter into contracts for supply of water 
and distribution facilities to furnish 
water for irrigation districts, persons, 
public or private corporations, state and 
federal agencies. May levy taxes not to 
exceed 1 mill for each dollar of taxable 
property after development contracts 
have been signed. May accumulate a re-
serve fund from aforementioned tax 
revenues. 
: Subdistrict keeps accurate minutes of 
meetings and boo ks of accounts; avail-
able during reasonable business hours 
for public inspection. An annual audit 
must be filed with the South Dakota 
Secretary of State. Must give notice of 
public hearings on granting the subdis-
trict board the authority to enter into 
contracts for payment of costs associ-
ated with water development projects. 
Hearings must be held at places deemed 
to give all persons, public entities, and 
interested parties, 0 pportunity to be 
heard. Must receive electoral approval 
for contracting authority. After entering 
into contract with United States govern-
ment, board must submit contract to 
circuit court for judicial exa mination. 
Judge will give notice of hearing. Bud~ 
gets related to contracts with Unit ed 
States government must be approved 
by the South Dakota Natural Resources 
Development Board. 
Table 1. Continued. 
UTAH WATER 
CONSERVANCY ACT 
(U.CA.73·9) 
General Taxing All taxable property 
within District is levied. Maximum gen-
eral property tax (Class A) rates estab-
lished by the legislature. Levy is 1/2 mill 
prior to any construction. After com-
mencement of construction limit is 2 
mills in areas of Utah served by water al-
lotments from the Colorado River Com-
pact to the Upper Basi nand 5 mills in 
area served by Compact allotments to 
the Lower Basin, and 1 mill in WCDs not 
using Colorado River water. Up to 1/2 
mill may be assessed additionally to meet 
indebtedness requirements. 
Special Taxing Qass B general property 
tax on property located within munici-
I 
~~.ti~les for contract':ld water services; pro perty tax on irrigation and 
districts; and Qass D property 
tax on individuals and corporations. 
The board has authority to raise 
taxes and assessments to meet indebted-
ness requirements. 
Bonding/Borrowing General obligation, 
and general obligation-revenue bonds 
must receive voter approval. Revenue 
bonds may be issued upon board resolu-
tion. May borrow from private or public 
lending agencies_ 
Miscellaneous May collect service 
charges, user fees, interest on invest-
ments, rentals, etc. 
No constitutional or statutory limita-
tion on the amount of debt that may be 
incurred. 
Wide discretionary authority to ex-
pend funds for any water or water re-
lated activities and projects. 
To study, inVestigate, and promote 
water development within the district. 
To adopt plans and speCifications for 
the wor ks for which the district was 
organized. 
No explicit requirements mentioned in 
the statute. 
ur AH METROPO LIT AN 
WATER DISTRICTS 
(U.CA. 73·8) 
~n~al Ta~ng All property taxable 
WIthin DIStrict. May levy up to 2 y, mills 
for administration, operation and main-
tenance of facilities. Tax rate for bond 
repayment and obligations to United 
States not limited. 
Special Taxing Permitted for identified 
purpose. 
Bonding/Borrowing General obligation, 
and general obligation-f'evenue bonds 
with voter approval; 50 year maximum 
matw:ity date. Reven ue bonds may be 
submitted to electorate at the discretion 
of the board. 
No explicit mention of planning respon-
sib ilit y. 
No requirements mentioned explicitly 
in the statute. While somewhat autono-
mous, the structure of the Board of Di-
rectors does creal e a de [acto coordi-
nating link between the MWD and the 
municipalities served. 
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ARIZONA MULTICOUNTY 
WATER CONSERVATION 
DISTRICTS 
(ARSA45·2601) 
Geneta1 Taxing The district levies an an-
nual tax to defray costs and expenses 
and for repayment obligation to the 
United States. Such tax shall not exceed 
10 cents per each 100 dollars (I mill) of 
assessed valuation of the taxable proper-
ty within the district. 
Special Taxing None specified. 
Miscellaneous The district further estab-
lishes and collects charges for water con-
sistent with federal reclamation law. 
May accept grants, gifts, or donations. 
Disbursement of funds is limited to 
meeting purpose of act which is to 
guarantee repayment of construction 
and operation costs of the CAP. Re-
serve account may be established and 
surplus funds may be invested as regu-
lated by laws pertaining to public bodies. 
Restrictions of reclamation law and 
Colorado River Basin Project Act also 
apply. 
None authorized. Subject to planning 
powers vested in the Arizona Water 
Commission. 
District is subordinate to the Arizona 
Water Commission and governed by 
contract provisions to the Secretary 
of the Interior. 
Table 1. Continued. 
ARIZONA AGRICULTURAL 
IMPROVEMENT DISTRICf 
(ARS Chapter 45-901-1041) 
General Taxing No authority. 
Special Taxing A tax to raise money to 
maet expenses can be assessed to all 
landowners on a per acre basis. District 
tax can be paid separately without pay-
ing other county taxes. (Statute has 
provisions for district to make contri-
butions to tax rolls in lieu of tax.) 
Bonding/Borrowing Bonds can be issued 
after approval by the landowners, and 
after testing for validity in superior 
court. Cannot be issued for periods long· 
er than 40 years. Become a lien on all 
land within district. Repaid from taxes 
assessed against land. If other reven ue 
of district is sufficient, the bonds may 
be paid therefrom and the tax may be 
remitted. District may incur short term 
debt as permitted by any municipal 
cor poration. 
Miscellaneous The district may collect 
service charges, user fees, interest on in· 
vestments, rentals, etc. on water service, 
drainage service, and electrical power 
service. 
The district may do planning as neces-
sary to successfully meet the needs for 
electric power and water service within 
the district. 
No requirement mentioned explicitly in 
the statute. Has heeded legislative blue 
ribbon committee recommendation that 
the district ma ke an annual contribution 
from earned revenues to the county tax 
roUs in lieu of taxes collected. A superi-
or court decision has stated the district 
function is purely business and econo-
mic and not political and governmental, 
and that it is owned by private land-
holders and not by the public. 
COWRADO WATER 
CONSERVANCY DISTRICfS 
(CRS 37-45) 
General Taxing Oass A general property 
tax on all property within the district 
not to exceed 1 mill except in event of 
potential default when mill levy may be 
increased up to 1/2 mill. 
Special Taxing dass B general property 
tax for special benefits accruing to prop-
erty within municipalities for which 
water is allocated. Oass C property tax 
for benefits accruing to public corpo-
rations (other than municipalities) for 
which use of water is allocated. Oass D 
assessments to owners of lands for which 
use of water is allocated. 
Bonding/Borrowing May issue bonds 
and interim notes. General obligation, 
and general obligation-revenue bonds 
must rezeive voter approval. 
Miscellanenll8 May collect service 
charges, user fees, interest on invest-
ments, rentals, etc. 
No statutory limitation on the 
amount of debt that may be incurred. 
Broad discretionary authority to ex-
pend fundS for any water or water re-
lated activities and projects. 
Required to deposit funds in special 
account established by state treasurer 
and to expend funds for district 
purposes. 
No specific mention of planning func-
tion. Adopts plans and specifications for 
the works for which the district was 
organized. 
No explicit req uirements in stat utes. 
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NEBRASKA NATURAL 
RESOURCES DISTRIcrS 
(Revised Statutes 2.3200) 
General Taxing Each district may levy 
and collect a property tax not to exceed 
1 mill annually unless a higher levy shall 
be authorized by a majority vote of 
those voting on the issue at a regular 
election. May levy an additional 1/4 mill 
for purposes related to groundwater 
management. 
Special Taxing May levy special assess-
ment in amounts and for periods of time 
needed for repayment of improvement 
projects. Assessment is on the basis of 
the val ue of water delivered. 
Bonding/Borrowing May issue revenue 
bonds for purpose of financing construc-
tion of facilities. Issuance of raven ue 
bonds must be approved by 2/3 of the 
board of directors. 
Miscellaneous May sc~k state funds 
available through the NRD Fund admin-
istered by the Natural Resources Com-
mission. 
Funds disbursed at the discretion of 
the board of directors. 
Each natural resources district shall pre-
pare and adopt a master plan to include 
but not be limited to a statement of 
goals and objectives for each of the pur-
poses stated in section 2·3229. The mas-
ter plan shall be reviewed and updated 
as often as deemed necessary by the dis· 
trict, but in no event less often than 
once each 1 0 years. 
Each district shall also prepare and 
adopt a long range implementation plan 
which shall summarize pl~nned district 
activities and inelude pr(,."ctions of fi-
nancial manpower, and land rights 
needs of the district for at least 5 years. 
Plans are for 1) erosion prevention 
and control, 2) prevention of damages 
from flood water and sediment, 3) flood 
prevention and control, 4) soil conserva-
tion, 5) water supply for any beneficial 
use, 6) development, management, utili-
zation and conservation of groundwater 
and surface water, 7) pollution control, 
8) solid waste disposal and sanitary 
drainage, 9) drainage iml?rovement and 
Channel rectification, 10) development 
of fish and wildlife habitat, 11) develop-
ment and management of recreational 
and park facilities, and 12) forestry and 
range management. 
All plans, facilities, works, and programs 
must conform to state water plans, state 
outdoor recrea tion plan, and the state 
fish and wildlife plan. Agencies have 30 
days to comment on proposed plans. 
Copies of rules, regulations, COfl-
tracts audits, agreements, etc. must be 
furnished to the Natural Resources Com-
mission. Rules and regulations must not 
conflict with municipal, county, or re-
gional land use regulations. 
Table 1. Continued. 
OREGON WATER 
IMPROVEMENT DISTRICT 
Oregon Revised Statutes 
(45·552) 
Genm:al Taxing Ad valorem tax levy on 
all property within the district up to 
limit speCified in the initiating petition. 
May also assess additional tax if needed 
specifically for bond debt service. Up to 
l'h mills of ad valorem taxes may be 
used to maintain a revolving fund for 
planning and construction of district 
works. The maximum rate of tax levy 
as stated in the petition cannot be 
changed except by voter approval. 
Spedal Taxing May also assess against 
lands to be benefited for all or part of 
c.osts for building, purchasing, operating, 
maintaining, and improving the district 
works. An owner of land is not consider-
ed a beneficiary unless under a contract 
with the district. 
Bonding/Borrowing May issue general 
obligation bonds as authorized by voters. 
Outstanding bonds may never exceed 
more than 2 'h% of true cash value of all 
taxable property within the district. 
Bonds must mature within SO years of 
issue date. May pledge as additional se-
curity any or all of net revenue. May 
borrow from state or federal loan agen-
cy under loan contract. 
MiscellallBoUB May levy and collect ser-
vice charges and user fees for operation, 
maintenance, and administration. 
The district shall prepare general plans 
of watershed improvement shOwing ex-
isting and proposed works of the dis-
trict and other public and private agen-
cies relating to water use and control. 
Plan may be in cooperation with the 
state engineer and shall conform to the 
state declared water resources policy. 
Project plans must be approved by state 
engineer if costing more than $5000, un· 
less developed by federal agencies. Dis-
trict shall demonstrate a basis for the co-
ordination and planning of future works 
to assure the maximum beneficial use 
and conservation of the water resources. 
Plans shall be based on inventory of 
water supplies and water needs and 
plans and programs -developed by the 
State Water Resources Board. 
SOUTH DAKOTA 
CONSERVANCY DISTRICT 
(Chapter 46-17, 
South Dakota Statutes) 
General Taxing No authority. 
Spedal Taxing No authority. 
Bonding/Borrowing Legislature may au-
thorize issuance of bonds for projects it 
has previously accepted. The board may 
at its discretion issue bonds in an amount 
not to exceed in aggregate of $5 million 
at any time for the purpose of financing 
projects. Bonds must not exceed matu-
rity date of more than SO years and may 
bear interest at rates determined by the 
district . 
District has power to req uire security 
in form of liens of income revenues and 
rentals: it shall create a reserve fund for 
prevention of default of its bonds by 
charging an insurance premium upon 
interest charged on its loans. 
The district may in no way cbligate 
debt on behalf of the State of South 
Dakota or make encumbrances not 
specifically provided by the legislature. 
Bonds issued by the district are not en-
forceable against the state, nor shall pay-
ment on bonds be from any income of 
the district except that pledged and as-
signed to the holders of district bonds. 
The special revolving fund is estab-
lished in the state treasury. Disburse-
ment is by warrants drawn by the state 
auditor pursuant to vouchers approved 
by the district. 
May borrow on interim notes with 
restrictions on duration and collateral 
security. 
Each project separately audited. 
Miscellaneous Board may seek legisla-
tive appropriations for meeting state 
share of costs and establiShing loan 
funds. 
Preparation of a comprehensive state-
wide water plan and development sys-
tem with yearly progress reports and up-
dates not less than once every 4 years. 
State Planning Bureau sets procedural 
guidelines and receives recommended 
components of statewide water plan 
submitted by Department of Natural 
Resource Development, Environmental 
Protection and Wildlife, and Parks and 
Forestry. Planning staffs of each de-
partment work jointly in developing 
proposed components. 
Board recommends to governor and 
legislature those portions of the state-
wide water plan considered necessary. 
For facilities established by legislature as 
part of state water management system, 
board ma y coo perat e wit h appropriate 
agencies and private interests in assessing 
economic feasibility and requesting legis-
lative authorization. Board must deter-
mine the priorit y of any or all such facil· 
ities and present findings of benefits, 
costs, cost-sharing and other pertinent 
factors to the governor and the legisla-
ture. Board req uests legislative appro-
priations and other means of financing 
state governments share of costs of 
water facilities as may be authorized. 
Board responsibility to both the state-
wide district and the State Depart ment 
of Natural Resources Development in-
tegrates state and district policies and 
programs. aose legislative oversight in 
approval of projects and funding a u-
thorization makes board responsive to 
legislative requirements. Liaison to 
statewide system of subdistricts having 
own procedures for board selection and 
policy formation provides consideration 
of local needs and desires. 
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SUBDISTRICTS OF SOUTH 
DAKOT A CONSERVANCY 
DISTRICT 
(Chapter 46-18, 
South Dakota Statutes) 
General Taxation All taxable property 
within a subdistrict may be levied. Prior 
to any contractural agreements, the 
limit is set at 1/10 of I mill on each dol· 
lar. After entering into contractural 
agreements, levy may be raised to a max-
imum of I mill on each dollar. 
Special Taxation No special taxing 
authority. 
Bonding/Borrowing Not mentioned in 
statutes. 
Miscellaneous May receive reimbursable 
funds from the revolving fund of the 
South Dakota Conservancy District. All 
monies collected shall be deposited 
either in accounts of the state treasurer 
to credit of subdistrict or depository ap-
proved by the board of directors. 
Mentioned only as "planning costs" 
which might be financed through use of 
the South Dakota Conservancy District 
revolving fund. 
Several of the aforementioned powers 
can be exercised only ,vith approval of 
the South Dakota Natural Resources 
Development Board. 
and transferring money to the federal government with no policy making 
powers. 
The Oregon Water Improvement District statute provides broad 
latitude in purpose including flood control, agricultural, municipal, 
industrial, and other water uses, as well as water management related 
to recreation and the enhancement of water quality and fish and wild-
life. The specific mention of flood damage prevention and water 
quality enhancement in the Oregon statute contrasts with the emphasis 
on water supply for irrigation, municipal, and industrial uses 
fied in the Utah, Colorado, and Arizona statutes. 
The Nebraska and South Dakota statutes stress the general public 
welfare objective in the establishment of their districts. However, 
the purpose of consolidating overlapping and duplicative organizations 
seems a clear intent also. The South Dakota act expresses particular 
concern for the sovereign role of the state in achieving the coordi-
nating and integrating objective sought. Nebraska and Oregon statutes 
reveal this concern also. South Dakota is unique in specifying that it 
is the legislative intent for any water resource projects developed 
under the act to relate cost burdens to benefits received by any 
beneficiary (including the general public). 
Procedure for Creation 
The principles of due process are generally a guide 1n developing 
the procedures for creating a districi. 
The creation of a special district with power to tax, to condemn, 
and to use property and natural resources carries the risk that in-
dividual property rights might be impaired or that the production 
capacity of some might be reduced. Special district governments 
are usually concerned wi th produc ts or services that are d iscernib Ie 
and measurable and somewhat predictable from the outset. However, 
adequate provision should be made for making the purpose and funct ion 
of the new organization known and the obligations under which members 
will be placed if created. 
The statutes generally require that after the intent to form is 
made known the following steps should ensue: 
1. Proper notice should be given to all persons likely to be 
affected. 
2. A hearing should be held. 
3. Arguments both for and against should be heard. 
4. A judgment should be rendered after all facts are in. 
Provision must also be made for continued input and surveillance 
by the governed. This is most ordinarily done through the election 
process. 
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Oregon and South Dakota adhere closely to the above principles in 
the formation of districts. The intent to organize can be voiced 
either by the board of county supervisors, who are probably listening 
to a vocal constituency, or by the property owners themselves who do so 
by signing a petition and delivering it to the county. A hearing is 
held to obtain citizen views and when these are considered, the county 
supervisors reject the plea or accept it and call for an election. A 
60 percent majority of all votes cast must be in favor for the new 
district to be organized. 
Utah and Colorado have almost identical statutes and requirements 
for creation, however, Utah has revised and added to the statute with 
time, generally to facilitate the creation. 
The intent to organize a district in Utah and Colorado must be 
made known by petitions filed with a district judge. The number of 
signatures required is very minimal. In Utah, not over 500 signatures 
of property owners living in unincorporated areas and not over 100 
signatures required from land owners living in each incorporated 
area are required regardless of the size of the county or city. 
When a district judge receives a properly signed petition to organize a 
district, the judge publishes notice that a petition has been filed and 
sets the time for a public hearing. After the formalities of the 
hearing are over the judge must rule on the technical correctness of the 
petition (number of signatures, whether from incorporated or unincor-
porated areas, and whether assessed valuation of property is correct), 
and take notice of whether a protest has been filed. If no protest has 
been filed by petition, or if protest petitions are incorrect in any 
way, the judge must rule in favor of the "for" petition and declare the 
district created. In order for a protest petition to meet the require-
ments of law, 20 percent of all land owners in both unincorporated and 
in each incorporated area must sign and these land owners must represent 
20 percent of the assessed valuation within the county. These signa-
tures must be collected within the time period from the date of filing 
the original petition and the date set for hearing, a period from 60 to 
90 days. Protest petitions are not received at the hearing. The 
hearing will only accept objections to the statements in the original 
petition. Due process may be served in that notice is published that a 
petition has been filed, but the authorizing agent, in this case a 
district judge, does not render judgment on the wisdom of creating or 
not creating a district or on the determined desires of the majority of 
land owners. The judge rules only on the technical correctness of the 
papers filed. 
Notable changes in the Utah WCD statutes over the years has 
been (1) to substantially reduce the proportion of property owners 
needed for a valid advocacy petition and to make the requirements for 
the protest petition more stringent; and (2) to make it almost impos-
sible for incorporated cities or towns to be excluded. Thus, the 
statutes appear to have been progressively changed to favor the adoption 
of WCD' s. Although the Utah WCD law was patterned after the Colorado 
WCD statutes initially, the Colorado statutes have maintained provisions 
to exclude larger municipalities from inclusion unless authorized by 
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governing bodies. Colorado statutes have also maintained a balance 1n 
signatures required for either a for or against petition. In Oregon, 
South Dakota, and Arizona (Agricultural Improvement District) where 
petitions begin with property owners the same as Utah and Colorado, 
voter approval is required to create a district. The Arizona Multi-
county Water Conservancy District is formed more in the manner of Utah 
and Colorado requiring a specified number of qualified voters to sign a 
petition in favor of formation. Instead of district courts scheduling 
hearings and declaring a district organized, the Arizona Water Commis-
sion performs this function in Arizona. 
Utah and Colorado use the district court as the authorizing body, 
while the other states use either the county board of supervisors or 
Some administrative branch of state government. 
The elements of district creation are summarized and compared in 
Tab Ie 2. 
Procedure for Termination or 
Withdrawal from District 
People organize to accomplish what could not be done individually. 
The organization is the means to the end. When the end has been 
realized, the organization should be terminated. Of course dissolution 
should not be a way of escaping commitments. Provisions for with-
drawals from a district or termination of its life are always condi-
tioned by requirements to satisfy all legal and financial obligations. 
Where special districts are created by a legislative act and 
are intended to be a permanent governmental entity, such as the natural 
resource districts in Nebraska, there is little need for a dissolution 
prOV1S10n. Should a change be desirable, the legislature could repeal 
the act and dissolve the districts. However, where legislation is 
enabling, and districts are organized by those sensing the need, there 
should be prov1s10n for withdrawal or termination if those residing 
within the district should conclude that it is no longer needed. 
Of the different special districts examined, only four have 
statutory prov1s10ns for termination, Oregon, South Dakota subdis-
tricts, Utah MWD, and Arizona MCD. Because the Arizona MCD is an 
agent organization having repayment contracts with the federal govern-
ment, the Secretary of the Interior must approve the dissolution of the 
Arizona MCD. Similar conditions are placed on the Utah and Colorado 
WCD's. The Colorado WCD statute provides for dissolution of a WCD if 
it has not been authorized to incur bonded or other undebtedness by its 
constituency. Utah makes no such provision. Utah has several WCD's 
created in anticipation of specific projects. In instances where the 
projects have failed to material ize, di strict organizations have con-
tinued with activities mostly directed toward promoting other projects. 
The Utah MWD can be terminated upon resolution of the governing 
board and when voter approval is obtained. 
The dissolution requirements are summarized 1n Table 3. 
35 
Table 2. Statutory method of creating special ,districts. 
Ordinance 
Signed or Legislative Notice Pub lie Voter Authorizing 
Petition Resolution Act Published Hearing Approval Body Notes 
Utah WCD 0 Yes Yes District ~ Protests must be 0 Court filed by petition. 
- Hearing wi 11 
accept objections 
but not protests. 
Utah MWD Yes CD Yes City Legis- ~ Ordinance is pub-lative Body lished one time 
Arizona Yes Yes Yes Yes Arizona State ~ Petition or reso-
Mul t 1. CD Water Commis- lution, not both 
sion 
Arizona Yes Yes Yes 0 County Board Voter qualifica-Agr. of Supervisors tion include 
ownership of 1 
VJ acre or more and Q'\ 21 years of age 
Colorado 0 Yes ill District Protests must be WCD Court filed by petition. 2 Hearing will accept 
objections only. 
Nebraska Yes State legis-
NRD 1ature 
Oregon Yes Yes Yes Yes County Board 
of Supervisors 
So. Dakota CD Yes State legis-
lature 
So. Dakota SCD Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Table 3. Procedure for district dissolution. 
Utah WCD 
Utah MWD 
Arizona 
Mult ounty WCD 
Arizona 
Agr. Impr. Distr. 
Colorado 
WCD 
Nebraska 
NRD 
Oregon WID 
So. Dakota CD 
So. Dakota SCD 
Fonnal 
Procedure 
for 
Dissolution 
x 
x 
x 
x 
Selection of Officers 
No 
Provision 
x 
x 
x 
x 
x 
Notes 
Requires a resolution by 
ci ty governing board and 
voter approval 
Requires approval of Arizona 
State Water Commission and 
Secretary of State 
Voter approval 
Voter approval 
Statutory provisions for the selecting of officers who govern 
the activities of a district show concern for proper representation 
of those to be served by the organization and accountability to them. 
Thus, qualifications for candidacy are often outlined and directors are 
nonnally selected through an election process. Colorado and Utah WCD's 
have been unique in providing for district courts to appoint directors 
to the governing board. Utah just recently altered its statutes to make 
the district board of directors appointive by the legislative and 
administrative branches of government. Since Colorado has a system of 
district water courts, the use of the judicial branch in the appointive 
process may have some credence in that state. Although Nebraska drew 
heavily on the Colorado water conservancy district act in providing for 
similar districts in 1947, it avoided use of the courts in its creation 
and officer selection process. The reclamation districts fonned under 
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Nebraska fS 1947 act have since been merged into the natural resource 
districts, organized under more recent legislation. 
For the statewide conservancy district in South Dakota, directors 
are appointed by the governor. South Dakota subdistricts, which are 
comparable to districts in other states, choose their officers by an 
election process. The Arizona, Nebraska, and Oregon districts select 
membership to their board of directors by election also. 
The 
director 
invo lved. 
be served 
Utah Metropolitan Water District Act provides for board' of 
appointments by the legislative bodies of municipalities 
Municipal officials are accountable to the constituency to 
by the MWD by having to stand for election periodically. 
The process is summarized 1n Table 4. 
Powers and Legal Rights 
All of the districts studied are corporate entit ies and have the 
same generic power and legal rights of most public corporations relative 
to water matters. Most are given very broad authority to act indepen-
dently and to have substantial disgressionary power. The Utah WCD, Utah 
MWD, Colorado WCD, Arizona AID, and the South Dakota subdistrict s are 
the least restricted by statute. The Arizona MCD is single purpose and 
limited in fiscal authority and project activity. The South Dakota 
statewide district is more of a coordinator of projects and water 
resource planning and development rather than their initiator. The 
Arizona AID is a municipal corporation with the tax immunities granted 
municipali ties. The district s in Utah are defined by the courts as not 
being municipalities and therefore not restricted in the amount or 
length of time of indebtedness. The powers and legal rights of dis-
tricts as outlined in state statutes are shown in Table 1. Multi-pur-
pose water districts of the kind examined in this study have taxing, 
bonding, and borrowing authority. They may enter into contracts for 
construction and operation of facilities and may fix rates at which 
water will be sold. 
States have differed 1n the granting of certain powers and rights 
to districts. For example most state statutes prohibit districts 
from generating electrical power for sale. However, the generation 
and sale of power is an important function of the Arizona AID and 
profits from the sale of power have been used to defray costs of pro-
viding water for agricultural lands. 
Most states allow districts to acquire water rights and to sell, 
lease, or dispose of them as well. The Arizona AID specifically 
prohibited from acquiring water rights. 
A significant difference between states is in the legislative 
preservation of political or electoral linkages to the executive 
or legislative branches of state and local government. In most states, 
water conservancy districts have direct administrative control by the 
state. This has been notably absent in Utah and Colorado, although the 
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Table 4. Selection of officers. 
Utah WCD 
Utah MWD 
Arizona 
Multi-county 
WCD 
Arizona 
Agr. Impr. 
Distr. 
Colorado 
WCD 
Nebraska 
NRD 
Oregon WID 
So. Dakota 
CD 
So. Dakota 
SCD 
Appo inted 
by Court 
x 
Appointed 
by 
Legislative 
Body 
x 
x 
lFor single county districts. 
Appointed 
by 
Governor Election 
x 
x 
x 
x 
X 
X 
X 
Notes 
South Dakota 
conservancy 
district is 
statewide and 
governed by 
the board of 
the Water and 
Natural Re-
sources 
Department. 
2For multiple county districts but with advice and consent of the 
senate from nominat ions provided by the board of county commissioners 
and cities in special cases. 
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new appointment authority (pertaining to multi-county districts) in Utah 
gives the gover~or a measure of state administrative control. 
Opportunity for Input/Approval 
of Policy Options 
Probably one of the most difficult things in government is to 
get appropriate feedback from the constituency so that officials can 
know if the things they are doing are right or acceptable to those 
paying the bills. General purpose government must respond to voter 
approval and lobbying pressure. Policy making in special districts does 
not normally receive the public scrutiny it deserves (Hawkins 1976). 
When governing boards are appointed by the courts as in Colorado (and 
previously in Utah) there is little opportunity for policy issues to be 
debated or discussed as in an election. It is more difficult for 
unelected or appointed board members to maintain the kind of constitu-
ency contact that would be ideal. 
There is no statutory language directing districts governing 
boards to keep the public informed, to hold forums or elections on 
specific decisions, or to sense the public mood on particular issues. 
If motivated, the public can attend open meetings and peruse the minute 
books and financial records which are open for public inspection. Some 
districts are required to file an annual report and some, on their own, 
promote public relations-type activities which emphasize engineering 
features and project benefits with little stress on possible disbene-
fits. 
Two states, Oregon and the South Dakota subdistricts require that 
projects receive the approval of the voters and hold public hearings 
to debate issues. 
The states are compared in summary form in Table 5. 
Sources of Funding and 
Financial Responsibility 
The method of acquiring money and the accountability for the 
spending of that money are important factors by which district govern-
ments may be judged and compared. 
Statutod ly, di strict s have several ways of obtaining revenues. 
The most distinctive method for the kinds of organizations reviewed in 
this study is the power to levy taxes. These can be general taxes, 
usually assessed to property owners on the basis of the value of the 
property, or special taxes assessed on a unit basis. Use of the 
general tax assumes that all taxpayers are beneficiaries either direct-
ly, or indirectly. The special tax recognizes the more specific 
benefit and collects only from those who are direct beneficiaries. 
Other revenue sources include tolls and fees collected for services 
rendered, and direct appropriations from state government. In addi-
tion, districts have the use of credit and can borrow or bond with 
repayment spread over short or long periods of time. Federal funds may 
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Table 5. Opportunity for input/approval of policy. 
Open Meetings Water Approval Individual Access Electoral Legislative Hearings on Hearings to 
Regularly of Debts or to Jud ic ial Sys- Selection of Oversight Projects Object to Tax 
Scheduled Contracts tern on District Officers Levies 
Contracts, etc. 
Utah WCD 1 annually, Yes Yes Annually 
special 
quarterly 
Utah MWD Regul ar Yes Annually 
meetings 
time fixed 
by directors 
Arizona Annual plus Yes Yes 
Mul t i. special as 
required 
Arizona Quarterly Yes Yes 
Agr. meetings, 
..,.. special as 
I-' required 
Colorado As needed Yes Yes Annually 
WCD set by board 
Nebraska Monthly Yes Yes 
NRD 
Oregon Annually, Yes Yes Yes Yes 
special as 
needed 
So. Dakota CD Quarterly Yes 
upon call by 
chairman 
So. Dakota SCD Annual Meet- Yes Yes Yes 
ing, others 
as set by 
directors 
also be managed by districts with repayments guaranteed through taxes or 
revenue. 
The WCDs ~n Utah and Colorado have multiple layers of taxing 
authority and frequently utilize a mix of taxes and rate charges for 
services rendered. This mixture is often influenced by the nature of 
the production process within the district. For example, large water 
development projects may see a great deal of time elapse between the 
initial expense and the availability of a marketable good. If the 
length of time is great enough, the district may be unable to utilize 
the normal financing tool of bonding and have to seek a financial 
instrument that will postpone the repayment obligation over a long 
period of time until the product is available. Other production pro-
cesses, such as well drilling, may show sufficiently short gaps between 
construction and product availability. Such short time periods could 
possibly accommodate better the use of bonding. Within the State of 
Utah, the Central Utah Water Conservancy District has faced enormous 
delays that span decades between the initial construction and the final 
availability of water. Thus, this district has utilized the general tax 
(Class A) to provide revenues until such time as a product is available 
to begin rate charges. The Salt Lake County Water Conservancy District 
uses a combination of rate charges and general taxes to secure revenue 
needed for operations. In 1976, the district obtained 76 percent of its 
total revenues from water sales, and 17 percent of revenues from taxes. 
The Weber Basin Water Conservancy District also utilizes a mixture of 
water charges and taxes to obtain needed revenues. 
The water conservancy district uses bonding 'as a financial tool 
under certain circumstances. The Salt Lake County Water Conservancy 
District had, in 1980, an outstanding bonded debt of $8,740,725 which 
represented various bond issues sold in the period 1953-1980. The Weber 
Basin Water Conservancy District had, in 1980, an outstanding bonded 
debt of $2,674,000 which represented various bond issues sold in the 
period 1971-1979. This bonded obligation compares to an outstanding 
1980 government contract obligation of $72,164,768. The Salt Lake 
County WCD had no such outstanding obligation. The Central Utah Water 
Conservancy District does not appear to have been active in using bonds 
as a financial instrument. While tax revenues may provide a sure way of 
meeting repayment requirements, taxes almost always redistribute cost 
and benefit burdens in ways that are difficult to follow. South Dakota 
district statutes state a legislative intent that financing should 
relate reasonably and equitably to the benefits received by each user. 
Since rate charges are most suitable for accomplishing this perhaps the 
use of taxing powers are to be sparingly used in South Dakota. 
The Arizona AID produces and sells electric power in addition to 
water and as a result has sufficient income to eliminate the need to 
tax. Electric revenues are used to subsidize the costs of water 
distribution and have been sufficient to allow the district to make a 
contribution to the county in lieu of taxes paid. 
The statutes of the several states are summarized in Table 6. 
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Table 6. Sources of funding and financial responsibility. 
Utah WCD 
Utah MWD 
Arizona 
Multi-county 
WCD 
Ar izona 
Agr. Impr. 
Distr. 
Colorado 
WCD 
Nebraska 
NRD 
Oregon WID 
So. Dakota CD 
General Special Bonding (G.O. 
Tax Tax Revenue, G.O. 
1,2,5 Yes 
mi lls 
2.5 mills Yes 
1.0 mill No 
No Yes 
1.5 mill Yes 
1.25 mill Yes 
CD 
Yes CD Yes 
No No 
Revenue) 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
o 
Yes 
@ 
0J 
So. Dakota SCD 1.0 mill No No 
User Reserve Debt Spending 
Fees Accounts Limitation Limits 
Yes Yes 
Yes Yes 
Yes Yes 
Yes Yes 
Yes Yes 
No No 
Yes Yes 
No Yes 
® 
No No 
None 
10% 
No 
CD 
No 
No 
Yes 
0) 
No 
No 
No 
Yes 
for CAP 
only 
No 
® 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
Notes 
Limited by bonding capacity 
which is secured by value 
of property owners 
21 Limited to prudent invest-
vestment 
Unless raised by majority 
vote. 
Revenue bonds only. 
Mill levy set by voters. 
G.O. only. 
Bonds are revenue only and 
not a state obligation. 
Reserve account for bond 
retirement and default. 
Bonding limit set by legis-
lature for each authorized 
project. In addition, dis-
trict may bond up to $5 
million to fianance con-
struction of subdistrict 
projects. 
Planning Responsibility 
The two states with statewide districts, Nebraska and South 
Dakota district statutes reflect a definite planning responsibility 
fitted to statewide water development plans. Oregon districts are 
required to mesh any project plans with state policy but other states 
make little or no mention of a planning function in enabling statutes. 
The Arizona AID operates more like a private-business corporation than 
do districts of other states. It makes independent projections of 
needs and plans to provide future service accordingly. Districts in 
Utah and Colorado have traditionally done little or no independent 
planning as such, but rely on plans developed by others, principally the 
Bureau of Reclamation. Districts not contractually obligated to Depart-
ment of the Interior financed projects have made plans and designs as 
needed or commissioned the work done. 
Requirements for Coordination with or 
Subordination to State, Regional, and 
General Purpose Government 
Three of the states studied have specific reference in the stat-
utes to statewide policies and goals and establish lines of authority 
to state government. Oregon has a water policy review board as part of 
its Department of Natural Resources which has power to issue policy 
statements to which all subdivisions of the state are subject. The 
legislation which created the policy review board also sets the guide-
lines for state policy and specifically states that, 
the principle of sovereignty of this state over 
all waters within the state [shall] be protected and pre-
served, and such cooperation by the board shall be designed so 
as to reinforce and strengthen state control. (536.310,(10» 
Any project plans made by Oregon districts must be submitted 
to the State Engineer for approval. 
Nebraska and South Dakota have a statewide perspective with 
regard to district organization. District structure in these states is 
designed to establish state sovereignty and to consolidate and coordi-
nate small governmental entities. Statewide oversight and cooperation 
is made more certain with regard to the operation of water conservancy 
districts in those states. 
There are no explicit statutory requirements given for Utah, 
Colorado, and Arizona with respect to formal coordination or subordina-
tion to state level agencies. There are no statutory ties to the state 
executive nor to local general purpose governments. The Arizona WCD is 
a contracting agent of the Secretary of the Interior subject to the 
control and supervision of the Arizona Water Commission. The Arizona 
AID is autonomous but has shown a relatively high sensitivity to public 
opinion and to the wishes of the Arizona legislature. 
The Utah and Colorado WCDs in the past have possessed substantial 
autonomy with no legal state executive control, nor any required coordi-
nation with local or regional governments. The recently acquired 
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authority of the governor of Utah to appoint board members of WCDs 
embracing more than one county will subject Utah's larger WCD's to a 
measure of state executive direction. 
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CHAPTER III 
ANALYSIS OF IMPEDIMENTS TO APPROPRIATE 
INSTITUTIONAL INTERACTIONS 
As new water management agencies come into being and as soc ial 
institutions, values, and circumstances change, interactive patterns 
between and among water related institutions are subject to change 
also. The form of these associations and interactions may be peculiar 
to a part icular set of circumstances and may be short lived. On the 
other hand, water management with long-term objectives and commitments 
may result in long-lasting linkages. It is difficult to generalize an 
optimal form or framework of interaction or to anticipate the form 
that will best serve the needs of future generations. It is reasonable 
to assume that each generation is capable of determining what framework 
of interaction meets its needs. The concern is whether the achievement 
of the desired framework is impeded or denied because of earlier deci-
sions and commitments. Recognizing that what is socially acceptable 
and effective at one point in time may come to be seen as cumbersome, 
counterproductive, and socially inefficient at a later point in time, 
the need is to maintain the capacity of a social system to self-adjust 
and change its institutions and their operating policies. What is 
desirable is to minimize the institutionalization of impediments that 
prohibit systems from self-correction. The kind of impediments which 
tend to become institutionalized and/or those which seem to be chronic 
over time are perhaps the most important to jdentify. 
Although most water management entities may have their jurisdic-
tions explicitly defined, those jurisdictions are not always mutually 
exclusive. Sometimes water-related legislation will anticipate or 
foster certain kinds of institutional linkages. At times, an operating 
po Hcy of a broad-based agency will set the pattern of re lat ionsh ips 
among organizations with cooperative ties. Factors of growth and 
change, i.e., urbanization, have a significant influence on the way 
water management entities choose to interact with one another. 
Impediments to mutually satisfying and effective interaction may 
result from structural arrangements which create unacceptable balances 
or conflicts of agency autonomy and power; from procedures or processes 
inadequate to maintain clear communicative channels and make all rele-
vant information available; from incompatible operating policies which 
obstruct the proper meshing of agency functions and activities; and from 
unpredictable and/or uncontrollable exogenous influences. 
The inquiry and analysis of impediments to effective institu-
tional interaction is largely confined to Utah examples ln the more 
rapidly urbanizing areas along the Wasatch Front. The information 
coming from interviews, discussions, and written materials were catego-
rized according to the evaluation criteria outlined in Chapters I and 
II. It appeared that the more predominant and persistent sources of 
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impediment to effective interaction among water management entities 
could be best presented under the following headings: 
1. Decision-making Processes 
2. Authorities and Functions 
3. Institutional Operating Policies 
4. Federal Program Relationships 
5. State Program Relationships 
6. Special Interest Group Relationships 
7. Financial Sources and Options 
Because identified impediments often 
than one of the above general categories, 
is inevitable. 
exhibit influence ln more 
some overlap in discussion 
An improportionate share of the problem examples within the above 
categories are related to the Central Utah Water Conservancy District. 
Being by far the largest WCD in the state, with a large and active 
construction program, and with negotiations in progress with many 
potential customers, it is inevitable that reference to interactions 
with that district are made by a large majority of those interviewed 
in Utah. As has been mentioned previously, interview responses have 
a time dependency and CUP issues are currently active. 
Decision-making Process 
As has been indicated, decision-making units, decision-making 
processes, and the nature of decisions faced are highly diverse. Some 
decisions are sequent ial; others are once and for all. Some decisions 
made independently have little impact on other institutions and their 
operat ions. Other independent decis ions init iate a significant ripple 
effect. Where decisions and actions of one entity may generate an 
adverse reaction from another, there is need for transmitting or ex-
changing knowledge and information not just to verify the original 
decision but to authenticate and modify it over time. 
Institutional interactions can be triggered by decisions of many 
different kinds. Put in form of questions, the following may illus-
trate some situations where decisions or actions of one entity may 
affect or be affected by those of another. How is the location, kind, 
and size of physical works (i.e., pipelines, reservoirs, treatment 
plants, etc.) decided? Are water service needs set out in city, 
county, or state master plans or must a water manager make independent 
decisions based on its own projections of use patterns? How do in-
stitutions responsible for land use planning and management and water 
planning and management obtain information about the intentions of each 
other and how do they provide comment and input to the decisions of one 
another? Do suppl iers of water in any given locale review or confirm 
projections for services with city and county planners? Must water 
service plans of the separate organizations be submitted to other 
entities for review and approval? What are the provisions for citizen 
48 
participation and feedback in the decision-making process? What is the 
impact of special interest groups (i.e., realtors, developers, land-
owners, etc.) on water management decisions? Are decisions influenced 
by federal programs or mandates? Are decisions influenced by state 
programs and controls? Do state laws authorizing cities and counties to 
carry out land planning and zoning activities influence operational 
decisions of water suppliers? 
The search for answers to such questions may reveal potentials 
for disputation when organizational decisions are made unilaterally 
and may point in the direction of measures to mitigate these potentially 
troublesome situations. 
Colorado River Development Priority 
and Its Effect on Institutional 
Decision Making 
The long held and broadly supported state objective to develop and 
use Utah's share of the Colorado River provides an example of how a 
single major decision can effect the evolution, character, and inter-
active patterns of many other water institutions. Driven by a convic-
tion that highly desirable social and economic transformations would be 
triggered by development of Colorado River water, and spurred by a 
concern that other states may somehow gain possession of Utah's entitle-
ment if not promptly put to use, getting Utah's share of the Colorado 
River developed and in use has been an accepted goal of every state 
administration. The Central Utah Project (CUP~ has been viewed as the 
ultimate solution for utilizing Colorado River water in meeting the 
growing water needs of a chronically water-short state. The project "has 
been pursued over many years with the expectation that there will be 
ready markets for the water to be made available. 
From its early conception, the CUP sponsors have sought to obtain 
Department of the Interior financing with the attractive subsidies 
obtainable under the reclamation program. The state has been willing to 
accept development under Department of the Interior ground rules and to 
allow the Bureau of Reclamation great latitude in the planning and 
design of project features. The acceptance of financing, planning, and 
cons truc tion within the framework of federal rec lamation law, together 
with an a priori presumption about the net public benefits of this 
development decision, has in turn set bounds and directions to the 
decision processes of a broad spectrum of water management entities. 
Certainly, those institutions within the geographic region of the 
Central Utah Conservancy District have experienced changes in their 
own decision-making processes. As an integral part of a large scale 
prescription for solving water supply problems, most affected entities 
must give significant consideration to policy and program directions of 
CUP as they grapple with their short and long term management problems. 
The acceptance of the CUP solution to water supply problems, pending 
complete feasibility analysis of its components and the determination 
of its correspondence to statewide development options, has constrained 
the examination of alternate ways of meeting water needs. 
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Decision Conflicts Arising From Incongruent 
Perspectives About Project Options 
The Central Utah Project in Utah provides an example of how 
general public endorsement of a development concept may wane and 
diverge as project completion approaches and specific conditions about 
water availability are made known. 
Utahns have generally perceived the Central Utah Project as a 
perpetuation of successful water projects of the past. They have been 
willing to embrace federal sponsorship and the agent multi-county water 
conservancy district (knowing that the resulting local participation in 
planning decisions would be more difficult to maintain) understanding 
that conceding some decision-making authority o~ self-determination as 
to the plan formulation and financing was a reasonably safe tradeoff for 
the expected benefit to be gained from the relatively inexpensive and 
abundant water supply promised. 
As the Bureau of Reclamation (BOR) and the Central Utah Water 
Conservancy District (CUWCD) have developed plans, designs, and cost 
estimates, and as certain local groups have become aware of project 
features and have assessed their implications, they have found aspects 
that run counter to local desires and expectations. The Bonneville 
Unit, with much of its supply earmarked for municipal and industrial 
purposes within commun1t1es along the Wasatch Front, provides some 
examples of the way decisions about meeting water supply needs under a 
large project option requ1r1ng many years to complete may become in-
congruent with more current plans and aspirations of local water manage-
ment entities. 
Consummation of water delivery and repayment contracts between the 
district and prospective water users is often impeded in the meshing of 
perspectives of BOR/CUWCD and those of local water management entities. 
The BOR has made evaluation of the water supply needs of each community 
in the Bonneville Project service area with the expectation that the 
project would be the means for meeting projected shortages. The CUWCD 
has suggested to prospective customers that their future needs could be 
conveniently and economically met by petitioning the district for 
the amount of water called for in the needs projection studies. The 
expectation that communities would subscribe for water made available 
from this large scale project is the financial basis for the huge 
investments in dams, tunnels, pipelines, etc. This is a crucial pre-
sumption because commitment to this capital intensive approach for 
solving water supply problems is very inflexible. Yet, the demand for 
Bonneville Project water will only materialize for a community if the 
price is competitive with other options open to communities for meeting 
water supply needs. Public entities are fiducially obligated not to pay 
more for water than is necessary. 
Although the Bonneville Project water is correctly referred to 
as I1supplemental" to present ly developed. and owned water s~p?l ies, its 
basis of availability and the accompany1ng repayment cond1t1ons w?uld 
suggest it to be equivalent to a firm or I1primary" supply. F1xed 
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amounts must be contracted for and paid for by each subscriber whether 
the water is actually used or not. The BOR properly maintains that the 
cost of providing all project facilities is the basis for establishing 
water rates. The capability of the CUWCD to meet its repayment obliga-
tions to the U.S. is jeopardized without contracts for definite and 
fixed quantities of water. WCD's supplying subdistricts and communities 
from large federally financed projects have difficulty providing a 
delivery system to meet supplemental and peaking needs from project 
water and still meet contractual commitments to the federal government. 
On the other hand, community water managers want to examine 
alternate sources for augmenting existing supplies and consider dif-
ferent management options to extend the utility of current supplies. 
Options may include acquisitions and exchanges that preclude the need 
for expensive treatment. They may also involve conservation measures 
such as delivery of indoor and outdoor supplies from separate distri-
bution systems so that outside uses do not draw from sources that must 
be maintained to drinking quality standards. Where communities have not 
contracted for water to the BOR/CUWCD, they will logically weigh the CUP 
option with other options or seek to integrate the CUP supply with other 
sources in ways not planned/programmed by BOR/CUWCD. Such incongruency 
in the deve lopment perspect ives of communities and BOR/CUWCD requires 
compromise. 
Another example of incongruent perspectives about project options 
is in connection with conjunctive use of surface and groundwater sup-
plies. Some supporters of large project solutions have lamented the 
lack of conjunct ive use of surface and groundwater sources suggest ing 
that water spilling from project reservoirs makes its way to the Great 
Salt Lake unused while at the same time communit ies meet their water 
supply needs through pumping from groundwater reservoirs. They contend 
that users should be compelled to take the project water in plentiful 
supply and reserve the groundwater for use in extremely dry years when 
project water may become insufficient. This perspective of conjunctive 
use starts from the premise that the large project solution is a given. 
Project configuration, use projections, and contractual conditions and 
arrangements are fixed. To the extent that these things are unchange-
able, it is true that conjunctive use considerations must be fitted to 
these realities. However, this is not conjunctive use planning in the 
normal sense of seeking that optimal mix of groundwater and surface 
water providing the least cost supply to an array of retail consumers. 
Communit ies often find that water needs can be met (at least in 
part) from wells at less cost than to satisfy them from large scale 
storage projects. Hence, an operat optimum for a municipality or 
subdistrict may be to pump local wells as a base load supply seeking 
supplies of project water for supplemental and peaking purposes. 
As an illustration of the "meshing" of perspect ives (or incon-
gruency) dilemma, some communities in northern Utah County have examined 
the use of dual water systems as part of a long run solution to their 
water needs. They have determined that this would allow them to accom-
modate considerable growth by us~ng a low cost raw water for outside 
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watering while cont inuing to rely on existing suppl ies of safe, high 
quality, and low cost spring and well water for inside uses. These 
communities have proposed that CUP monies scheduled for expansion of the 
district-owned Utah Valley Water Treatment Plant and construction of the 
Alpine aqueduct be used instead for construction of a regional dual 
water system. They reasoned that they did not need additional treated 
water which the district had planned to provide through the Alpine 
aqueduct, but only some additional irrigation quality water for an 
outside distribution system. According to community officials, the 
BOR/CUWCD response to this was that a community may purchase water to be 
used in a dual system for outside watering but it must pay the M&I price 
for the untreated water. The justification for this is that repayment 
commitments on the Bonneville Unit requires the marketing of municipal 
grade water at relatively high prices set for such water by project 
planners and analysts. 
This policy was not necessary in the Weber Water Conservancy 
District. Under the Weber Basin Project it was found advantageous to 
market a class of irrigation water for outside use in municipalities 
and subdivisions. Through the use of connection fees, a charge struc-
ture was developed which allowed higher charges for irrigation water in 
residential areas. Such sales helped make project repayment more 
secure. Such is not the case with CUP. The BOR/CUWCD must give careful 
consideration to effects on expected revenues in accommodat ing design 
changes. 
~rovo City has officially approached the CUWCD about treating some 
of its Provo River water in the Utah Valley Water Treatment Plant, 
expressing a willingness to pay the full costs associated with providing 
such a service. Although there is currently excess capacity in the 
plant, until very recently the district would only agree to such a 
request if Provo would purchase a prescribed quantity of CUP water. In 
connection with a commitment to build a water treatment plant in the 
Vernal area the CUCWD board reversed its policy decision about treatment 
of non-project water and has advised Provo of this change. 
The plan of BOR/CUWCD to serve northern Utah County communities 
with treated culinary water by means of the Alpine aqueduct apparently 
doesn't turn out to match the expectations or preferences of the commu-
nities in that region. Local entities are inclined to consider manage-
ment improvement measures as a means of extending the utility of present 
supplies as well as the acquisition of new supplies. Communities are 
aware of opportunities that are site specific but outside the BOR/CUWCD 
focus on the large scale capital intensive new development solution. 
The consideration of integrating the large scale regional system and its 
interbasin transfer features with existing local supply options and 
physical configurations requires periodic updating. If the district 
flexibility to meet needs is low because of the irreversible nature of 
certain commitments and protection of repayment capacity, then it seems 
to have no choice but to bring customers into compliance with its own 
perspectives of development and design. Compromise is difficult. 
According to community officials the district reaction to sugges-
tions and questions is to convince the questioners of the superiority of 
the centrally conceived plan. 
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The solution to Orem City's water needs seems to illustrate a good 
meshing of local and regional project objectives. Where a community has 
progressed in its development to the point that its next most cost-
effective supply option is the construction and operation of a water 
treatment plant, the operating interaction between communities and CUWCD 
is likely to be more compatible. The City of Orem, for example, did not 
even exist when the Provo River Decree was issued and older communities 
were adding to their supply sources. Orem's phenomenal growth and 
limited spring and well options made it a candidate for treated water 
earlier than many sister communities. 
Fitting Planning Decisions to 
Federal Budgeting Realities 
Projects constructed under federal sponsorship receive congres-
sional authorization based on design and cost information provided in 
agency definite plan reports. Appropriations for constructing autho-
rized projects are made on a year by year basis. However, appropria-
tions are based on agency requests with amounts justified according to 
planning and construction schedules. In the year to year appropriation 
process, compromises are made which force modifications in construction 
schedules to fit amounts of money made available. Because of the 
incrementalism of federal appropriations, project constituencies must 
accept what funding they can get and spend it on those features believed 
to be most appropriate within some general development strategy. 
Project planners are expected to follow a certain systematic logic 
in comparing a lternat ives, assess ing the ir economic, social, and 
environmental impacts, and arriving at choices through the political 
process. However, federally sponsored programs experience problems in 
correlating the planning and construction processes of the executive 
branch with the authorization and appropriation processes of the legis-
lative branch. The planning process, with its feedback and plan modifi-
cation through the impact analysis and hearings procedures is often out 
of synchronization with funding availability. Under such circumstances 
construction schedules are based on funding availability and may be 
advanced or slowed in ways that override careful planning and the 
opportunity for citizen involvement. Political expediency may operate 
to disenfranchise local sponsors in the design of their own project. 
Using a recent time period, for example, the environmental impact 
statement for the entire Central Utah Project with its participating 
units, contained very limited detail on the municipal and industrial 
facilities of the Bonneville Unit at the time it was prepared. The 
EIS of the Bonneville Unit municipal and industrial water came several 
years later. This might have created some confusion as to the role of 
the EIS. At the time the first draft of the M&I EIS for the Bonneville 
Unit was issued in 1979, the Utah Valley Purification Plant was under 
construction, I mile of the Alpine Aqueduct had been completed, 16 
miles of the Jordan Aqueduct had been completed, 12 miles of the 
Strawberry Aqueduct had been completed and 15 miles were then under 
construction. The construction of water treatment plants and sections 
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of aqueducts and tunnels may have been propelled by congressional 
appropriations and available revenues rather than adherence to a well 
structured plan. 
Effects of Information Dissemination 
and Communication on Decision Making 
Some institutional problems result from poor communication or lack 
of information. Informed and intelligent decisions regarding the 
choice of water use options rely heavily on cost/benefit information. 
The BOR/CUWCD has stressed the great needs for water implying that 
these could be best met under the CUP concept. Much less emphasis has 
been given to publicizing costs and, more importantly, how they will be 
distributed so that a citizen might sense his own liability. The focus 
on benefits and physical works that make them possible implicitly 
presumes that CUP costs will be comparable to other options for meeting 
water supply objectives. Without being able to make cost comparisons 
the general public cannot provide effective feedback to the district nor 
influence adjustments in project decisions. 
While arguments could be made that many aspects of projects are too 
complex for their features to be effectively described such that lay 
individuals could make meaningful inputs, simple information about 
projected water prices can provoke very useful feedback from prospective 
purchasers. Price information is a way of economizing on the knowledge 
a user must acquire in order to arrive at a useful judgment. With price 
information, prospective wat~r users can make more informed decisions 
about water use options available to them. Interviews indicate that the 
dissemination of this kind of information, so valuable in decision 
making and prospective user feedback, is not emphasized by the BOR/ 
CUWCD. 
Since the financial feasibility of the Bonneville Unit requires 
that water be sold to users who can pay a relatively high cost, the 
target market is municipal use. This being the case, there is need for 
close communication between the BOR/CUWCD and community leaders. Yet 
complaints voiced by community representatives in Salt Lake and Utah 
Counties are 1) lack of representation of municipal interests on the 
CUWCD Board of Directors, 2) lack of adequate information about project 
plans and design features, and 3) lack of information about costs and 
their distribution. 
A recent controversy regarding the location and design of an 
aqueduct (known as the Jordan Aqueduct or J-4) for bringing Bonneville 
Project water into Salt Lake County reveals some problems in institu-
t ional communication. Community leaders in northern Utah County say 
that the location and design of the aqueducts to serve their area and 
Salt Lake County were brought to final design stages without sufficient 
discussion and dialogue. On the other hand, district and BOR officials 
feel that both the Utah County and Salt Lake County interests were 
consulted and kept informed throughout the planning and design phases. 
The concern about aqueduct location and exposure has its roots in 
problems that have emerged from construction of a large canal coursing 
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through northern Utah County as a part of a previous project built many 
years ago. Communities have experienced certain drowning hazards and 
circulatory disruptions from this open channel which they would like to 
ameliorate. Since the new Jordan aqueduct to be constructed as part of 
the Bonneville Unit, CUP, would parallel the existing canal, the commu-
nities of northern Utah County saw a potential for considering existing 
and new conveyance needs jointly. They saw merit in combining the old 
and new supplies in a single facility that would minimize right of way 
requirements, eliminate some safety hazards, allow improved transport, 
and facilitate operation of drainage works. Since both the existing 
and new aqueducts were Bureau of Reclamation projects, the communities 
thought the redesign could be readily accommodated. 
However, the combined aqueduct f'oncept entailed addit ional costs 
and its reexamination could entail time delays in project construction 
schedules. Owners of the existing canal are reluctant to incur addi-
tional expense for capital or operat costs not considered needed or 
profitable. Salt Lake County interests to be served by the new Jordan 
aqueduct could not justify the added costs imposed by the design changes 
sought. Neither did the northern Utah communities wish to pay the cost 
differential to correct hazards and inconvenience arising from construc-
tion for the benefit of others. Hence, agreement on combining the 
old and new works became difficult to achieve. 
It is not the intent here to chronologize the Jordan Aqueduct 
problem. The point of interest here relates to the informational 
flow problem. Where an aggregation of public institutions is involved 
in a complex issue, and ~ communication involves the decision making 
apparatus of councils, boards, commissions, legal consultants, ad-
ministrators and citizen cons tituency, there is much opportunity for 
loss in the informational flow patterns. When problems of common 
concern become drawn out spanning a number of changes in institutional 
administration there is a certain amount of institutional memory loss 
which may hinder understandings as certain decision points arrive. 
In the instance of the Jordan Aqueduct, differing interpretations 
of information available and lack of information exchange seem to be 
a significant factor in the resort to political and legal avenues 
for resolving issues. Resolutions were passed by various organizations 
representing positions and points of view that were divergent. Special 
studies, municipal zoning ordinances, court actions, and appeals to 
political leaders are forms of informational exchange but may reflect 
absences or lapses of good informational exchange at earlier times. 
It is apparent that when project decisions are extended over 
long periods of time, that changes in demographic conditions and 
changes in institutional structures and governance results in institu-
tional memory loss that hinders full understanding and hence, effective 
communication. 
Some community leaders and municipal water managers complain of 
a "we know best" attitude on the part of BOR/CUWCD officials which 
has been a problem in establishing and/or maintaining a dialogue with 
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communities who are counted on to purchase project water. The com-
munities know they are already paying for a project water supply 
through the ad valorem tax but they have only vague notions of when and 
at what price CUP water will be available. These communities perceive 
they are "locked in" to a district from which there is no apparent 
extraction. Yet, they find it difficult to fit the CUP commitment into 
the normal planning and decision-mak process of optimally integrating 
the CUP source with existing supply sources and modes of delivery. 
Communities know how they would prefer the CUP water to be made avail-
able but these preferences may not coincide with the delivery plans of 
the CUP. 
Not only do communities express apprehensions about what might 
be "imposed from above" without their input and knowledge, they also 
have a perception that no one listens when they make overtures; buck-
passing and pigeon holing prevent questions from getting resolved. 
Taxpayers in both rural and urban areas of the Central Utah WCD are 
wondering more and more about decisions and policies of the Central Utah 
WCD. In urban areas, people complain of lack of voice and representa-
tion in proportion to population and property evaluation. People in 
areas of water origin feel they are inadequately represented or involved 
in decisions about water allocation and charge structure. They wonder 
if some of their ad valorem taxes are subsidizing costs of making water 
available to the Wasatch Front communities. The rural counties in the 
Great Basin part of the district are getting more restless about pro-
spects for their receiving water benefits from CUP while the ad valorem 
taK contributions continue year after year. In short, those from both 
urban an,d rural areas of the Central Utah WCD are wondering more and 
more about getting return on the monies collected. The District Board 
of Directors seems to be doing very little to mollify these concerns. 
There is little evidence on the part of the district to provide complete 
information about the way costs are being distributed throughout the 
district in comparison with the expectation of benefits. Complaints 
about lack of voice in district policies and decisions may not be so 
much a matter of imbalance in board representation as it is in lack of 
meaningful information dissemination to taxpayers in general. 
The district has opposed initiatives of certain communities to 
develop what they consider to be their own water resources and hydro-
power. It has also made suggestions that the preference customer 
status of certain communities for obtaining power from Bureau of 
Reclamation projects be eliminated so that the added income can be 
applied to project repayment. Actions of the CUWCD have been inter-
preted by some as opposition to desires to utilize groundwater resources 
and dual water systems. These actions nettle those affected. The 
motives and rationale of the district in taking positions in specific 
instances need to be better communicated if propitious interactions are 
to be preserved. 
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Institutional Authority and Responsibility 
The more prominent kinds of water management organizations in 
Utah, whose authori ties and responsibi li ties may occas ionally counter 
one another, are mutual irrigation companies, municipal water depart-
ments, special improvement districts, water conservancy districts, 
water sub-conservancy districts, metropolitan water districts, and 
private domestic water companies. Where warranted (as in joint project 
sponsorship) some of these different organizat ions may join to form a 
water users associat ion which can serve as agent and manager of their 
jointly sponsored project. For example, the Provo River Water Users 
Association was formed to be the agent organization for the Provo River 
Project with membership including many of the organizational types 
outlined above. Water service orgiinizations have tradi t ionally been 
given rather broad powers to achieve stated mandates. 
While these various kinds of water organizations commonly inter-
act with one another, ofttimes in cooperative ventures, they all have 
independent and broad powers to expedite the water management objec-
tives for which they were formed. Their interaction is not legis-
latively outlined or regulated. There is no formal operating relation-
ship required. Consequently, there is potential for occasional friction 
as they exercise autonomous powers under different authorities. A 
cursory examination of these authorities may help to appreciate sources 
and nature of problems that occasionally arise. 
State Organizations and 
Oversight Responsibility 
By state law, the Water Resources Division of the Utah Department 
of Natural Resources has the responsibility for statewide water re-
sources planning with a mandate to guide water planning and development 
so to assure optimum utilization of the resource. The statutes implic-
itly require that there be a planning, monitoring, and oversight func-
tion exercised by the Division and its policy making Water Resources 
Board so that all public interest gets properly reflected in water 
development and management matters of either inter- or intra-state 
nature. 
Similarly, the Division of Water Rights, under the direction of 
the State Engineer is expected to pursue equity, order, and stability 
in the allocation, reallocation, and use of water over time through 
a codified system of rules, regulations, and procedures for establish-
ing and transferring rights to the use of water. However, functions 
normally reserved to the Office the the State Engineer can be delegated 
under certain conditions. For ex amp Ie, the superior capabil ity of 
the Bureau of Reclamation in the design and construction of dams is 
recognized and given statutory exemption to normal State Engineer 
approva Is. 
Both of these state agencies--the Water Resources Division and 
the Water Rights Divison--encounter situations creating some concern 
1n the discharge of their responsibilities as they interact and relate 
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to the actIvItIes of large WCD's and MWD's. Both feel an overriding 
responsibility for water planning, management, and administration 
calling for a measure of oversight, especially over large and active 
organizations. While voluntary coordinating efforts and meshing of 
large district and state plans have been operative and helpful, the 
autonomy of water conservancy districts makes assurance of sustained 
state-district program compatibility tenuous. As state planning turns 
more toward consideration of extending the utility of water already in 
use through more innovative management measures, close cooperation with 
multiple purpose conservancy districts will be required to implement 
these opportunities. 
The broad authorities of Utah Water Conservancy Districts has 
been described in Chapter II. The point to be made here is that the 
enabling legislation specified no formal status for state government in 
the operation of WCDs. (Of course, WCDs must operate within the laws 
that govern organizations in general.) State agencies responsible for 
planning, management, and administration of Utah's water do not formally 
participate in the organization or operation of water conservancy 
districts. For example, these state agencies are not required to be 
given notice that districts are being or have been formed. Further, the 
statutes creating the state water agencies and outlining their powers 
and responsibilities provide no formal administrative control over water 
conservancy districts. 
Federal Government Relation-
ship to .Districts 
Legislative authority given to Utah water conservancy districts 
permits a strong formal linkage to the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation 
as a partner in water development. As a consequence, the Bureau has 
significant influence on management decisions of a district, and sub-
sequently. the interact ive relationships a WCD has with other organi-
zations. 
The BOR influences the decision process in several ways. First. 
the Bureau generally supplies technicians and technical support data 
for the design and construction of its own projects. As a result. 
where plans or designs are called into question, they must be resolved 
using Bureau information rather than information from an independent 
source. The high cost of obtaining and analyzing information relating 
to large and complex water projects, may, therefore, discourage some who 
might otherwise wish to challenge certain plans or policies. Inter-
actions, to be effective and equitable, must be based on a free flow of 
objective information to all participants. When the informational flow 
is obstructed, participatory decision making is restricted, and the 
total management process is likely to suffer (Sowell 1980). 
A second avenue of Bureau influence comes through financial re-
payment contracts. Under such contracts, the repayment obligation 
begins when water is made available and for the amount of water sub-
scribed for. As a consequence, the district decision process is often 
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directed toward s tabi lizing the repayment revenue 
consideration of socially desirable alternatives 
jeopardize that revenue flow. 
flow and limi ts the 
that may alter or 
Special state treatment of BOR-district projects with respect to 
due diligence requirements of water rights law is in recognition of the 
fact that major projects requiring many years to plan and build need the 
assurance that water will be available when the costly facilities are 
in place. Utah law permits water filings for such projects to remain 
valid far beyond periods normally allowed individuals and small projects 
for showing I1due diligence" in putting water to actual use. This is to 
prevent the long-term public interest from being negated through random 
allocations for small projects that could cumulatively reduce or nullify 
the benefits possible in larger more comprehensive development. While 
the justification for withdrawing certain appropriable waters from 
appropriation is certainly valid, the implementation of the policy 
through federal-district arrangements reveals some problems. Typically, 
the State Engineer allocates a block of water to the Bureau of Reclama-
tion for a somewhat vaguely conceived project as the Bureau begins its 
project studies. The filing is based on a general description of the 
nature and places of-contemplated uses. The BOR may in turn assign all 
or part of its entitlement to a WCD under a delivery contract. In turn, 
the WCD makes subcontracts to other districts or subdistricts and so on 
down to the ultimate user. While the State Engineer makes the initial 
allocation in the public interest as then perceived, there is no 
statutory provision for any further influence on the actual pattern of 
suballocation in accordance with changing current public interest. This 
is not to say that the State Engineer does not have continuing and 
general responsibility to protect existing rights in any such sub-
allocation. A district may protest an application to appropriate water 
filed with the State Engineer on the basis that no unappropriated water 
exists and then turn around and make the water available under purchase 
agreement from the district itself. District allocations are made 
according to WCD criteria and may not meet the ordinary tests and 
conditions the State Engineer by law applies to other applications to 
insure maximum resource utility and protect statewide public interest. 
The BOR-WCD ties are extremely close throughout the congressional 
appropriation process and the design, construction, contracting, and 
operating phases of new water development. The close working arrange-
ments between federal agencies and districts, neither of which are 
required to cons ider broader interfaces with other projects from a 
regional or statewide perspective, overshadow the relationship state 
water agencies have with either entity. The federal approval and 
funding authorization process is directed at individual projects and 
contractual arrangements with districts whose boundaries are drawn 
to encompass only the area served by a proposed project. 
Contractual obligations with the government of the United States 
binds the WCD to development planned, designed, and constructed by 
federal specialists and carried out under the general policies of the 
federal agency involved. Complying with these federally mandated 
requirements may significantly restrict the district from carrying 
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out the full range of its legislated authorities and prerogatives. 
For example, if the federal agency prefers a policy of developing 
surface water and marketing that water supply as a primary source to 
the water users, a contracting conservancy district might be unable 
to effectively seek out other sources such as groundwater or presently 
developed supplies of agricultural water. Even if such sources could 
be cons idered, the district may be compelled to market these other 
supplies as secondary sources even though marginal economic efficiency 
may favor their use as a primary source. 
When a weD is significantly dependent on federal water develop-
ment programs and projects, its responsiveness to local and regional 
political interests could become secondary. To the extent that the WeD 
is compelled to subordinate its authorities and prerogatives to those 
of the federal government, it becomes in effect a quasi-agent of the 
federal government. Yet, at the same time, its own operating policies 
cannot be strictly mandated nor monitored by national political repre-
sentatives. Thus, it is in a position of possessing some powers and 
authorities of local governments with no links or accountability to 
other state and local governments and acting as an agent of the federal 
government, again with minimal formal ties to local political over-
sight. 
Finally, the decision process is strongly influenced by the 
stipulations of Reclamation Law which binds the district with respect 
to transfers in use of water; with respect to ownership and operation 
of facilities; and with respect to management options in general. 
Operationally, conservancy districts may be without the advice and 
consent of other political subdivisions in its operation even though 
appropriate governmental interactions require a well ordered repre-
sentation of all affected parties. Moreover, linkages between the 
electorate and the district officials, a prerequisite of democratic 
government, are also tenuous. 
While the authorities and functions of the water conservancy 
district may become the outlets for federal policies and prerogatives, 
under certain conditions resulting in less responsiveness to local 
interests, it should be noted that the relationship between the dis-
tricts and the federal agency is voluntary. It is a contract willingly 
entered into by both part ies, both agreeing to abide by the terms. For 
example, in the contracts between the Bureau of Reclamation and the 
wen's, the WeD's have received the professional expertise of the Bureau 
staff, long-term loans, and significant de facto federal grants for 
the construction of local projects. The WeD's have, in turn, agreed 
to act as the local financing agent for the projects in addition to 
providing some management capacity. That local interests might become 
subordinated to federal interests might be seen as compensation for the 
inflow of federal grant money to subsidize the project construction. 
That certain local interests might resent this condition, yet be unable 
to change objectionable policies, may suggest statutory weaknesses 
regarding the formation and governance of weDs. 
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Water Conservancy District 
Creation Procedures 
A basic source of impediment to appropriate institutional inter-
action grows out of the district creation procedure. The water con-
servancy district in Utah is formed not by legislative action, popular 
majority vote, nor collective action of existing political subdivisions 
of the state, but by petition to a district court. Moreover, opposition 
to creation of a WCD faces structural discrimination since significant-
ly more protest signers are required than district advocates. Where 
organizations with broad authority can be initiated by minority inter-
ests, the lingering potential for serious impediments in later inter-
actions is obvious. 
The formulation of majority public opinion normally comes through 
a process of participation and compromise. This process establishes 
communication among diverse interests, educates them as to the trade-
offs and options available, and builds a broader base of understanding 
as a bas is for resultant act ions. Participants in this process estab-
lish both formal and informal bases for continual interaction. The 
process for creat ion of a water conservancy district does not follow 
this model. Not only is the broad based participation lacking, but the 
important element of compromise is eliminated. This resulting lack 
of pub lic unders tanding and potent ial for impos ing a minority wi 11 on 
the general populus clearly introduces seeds for jeopardizing future 
relationships among affected parties. 
Public Voice and Representation 
A distinctive feature of the water conservancy district organiza-
tion in Utah has been the selection of a governing board by a judicial 
unit rather than by direct election or legislative appointment. That 
feature may have been a major impediment to appropriate interactions in 
that it compromises the most traditional and effect ive communication 
channel linking a political subdivision to its constituency and to other 
political subdivisions of a state government. Officers selected by 
the court mayor may not be representative of the water district's 
constituency. The 1983 Utah legislature saw fit to change this pro-
cedure and remove the appointment process from the judiciary. 
Prior to the statutory modification, it had been often alleged that 
water conservancy districts operate with substantial immunity from 
pressures and direct ion of those over whom they have broad powers to 
tax. The justification cited for judicial appointments rather than by 
the executive or legislative branch of government or free elections is 
to "take politics out of water development. II Those intimately involved 
and knowledgeable about wen operations candidly admit that the court-
appointed mechanism cannot be free of politics but also find problems 
with alternative selection processes. For example, they point out that 
the elective process does not attract a meaningful number of voters. 
Voters lack knowledge of the qualifications most suitable for effective 
service on a board of a WCD. Voter apathy and low voter turnout make it 
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possible for an unqualified candidate to get himself elected to a board 
where his credentials would be found wanting by a wise judge or water 
executive. 
Some have observed that a district is more viable and effective 
where board members are respected leaders whose current role in commu-
nity or regional affairs make them sensitive and responsive to desires 
and preferences of the people they represent. Yet, it has been very 
common for reappointments to continue a board member in office long 
after his community role has diminished and he has lost close contact 
with those he was expected to represent. Unless the district court 
that makes the appointments was cognizant of such situations, reappoint-
ments were generally automatic. On the other hand, there is a point 
to be made about the value of experience and continuity brought to the 
board through reappointments. At any rate, consideration might well be 
given to limiting the number of reappointments, particularly in larger 
districts where a director may represent multiple counties. 
Sensing the citizens disapproval of the court appointed system, 
the legislature in 1983, during the period in which this document was 
being written, amended the law to remove board appointments from the 
judiciary and to place the responsibility upon the county board of 
commissioners or upon the governor when a district boundary embraces 
more than one county. The senate must also concur in the appointments 
made by the governor. It is assumed that this method will improve the 
linkage between board members and constituency and possibly solve some 
of the proble~s noted under the former method. At this writing there 
is little experience to indicate how effective the Qnew appointment 
method wi 11 be. 
Impressions gained from those interviewed indicate two different 
perspectives about what a director of the district should do and 
what his qualifications should be. Some were concerned about the 
court appointment as opposed to an election from the standpoint of 
appropriate representation. They felt that to be representative, the 
board members (directors) should speak for the citizens residing within 
a given geographic boundary and give allegiance to those who have to 
pay taxes to support the district. The directors should therefore have 
knowledge of the economic pressures within the area, should understand 
the effects the building of water projects would have on the area, and 
know the costs and the benefits that will be imposed upon their con-
stituency as result of actions taken. The director should have the 
courage of his convict ions and be able to listen and communicate with 
his "constituency." 
On the other hand, there were those who expect directors to sup-
press parochial concerns, and apply their judgment to district "busi-
ness," perhaps being informed and guided by agency staff and less led 
in their judgments by constituency concerns per se. Directors are 
expected to lend their distinct abi lity and influence in furthering 
the activities and programs of the district and in helping to overcome 
obstacles to the fulfillment of project goals. 
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District Taxing Authority 
The ability of the districts to levy ad valorem taxes generally 
throughout their boundaries, and in specific subareas such as munici-
palities through the Class "B" ad valorem tax, has caused some to 
complain about "taxation without representation." The statutory pro-
visions for utilizing the Class "B" tax adequately provide for taxpayer 
input as the commitments are first undertaken. However, once in 
operation there is little year to year publicity and the general public 
is poorly informed about changes that may be negot iated between the 
district and the municipal government. It is possible to utilize tax 
levy powers in lieu of bonding to provide construction funds without 
having to hold a bond election. 
After the petition for au allocation is accepted, the district 
board makes an annual determination of the amount of money necessary to 
be raised by ad valorem taxes on all real and personal property within 
the municipality in order to meet the water charges. The municipality 
may elect to pay a part of its assessment in cash in which instance 
the board modifies the Class B tax assessment downward accordingly. 
After the initial hearing, the city and the district negotiate 
on a yearly basis without any further formal public input. Class "B" ad 
valorem taxes are not limited as are the Class "A" taxes. The amount 
of this special levy appears on each individual tax notice as a dis-
trict (not a municipal) special levy so the user is informed of its 
magnitude. However, the average municipal water user would have 
difficulty converting his Class IIAII and Class "B" mill levies to dollar 
amounts for combination with his municipal rate charges to determine 
his total water bill. 
Relation Between Water Suppliers 
and Public Health Agencies 
Another point of interaction that is of importance with respect 
to water supply organizations is in connection with health related 
programs. Those providing drinking water services are monitored for 
compliance with standards prescribed by the Department of Health. 
Whether a WCD is engaged in wholesale or retail water services will 
make a difference in the particular kind of interaction necessary 
with the Department of Health. 
This study does not analyze the institutional interactions re-
sulting from water quality considerations. 
Metropolitan Water District Authority 
and the Interactive Process 
Once empowered, the board of directors of a metropolitan water 
district is given broad discretionary authority to carry out its 
necessary functions. However, any activity that requires the MWD 
to incur indebtedness for meeting obligations must be submitted 
to the electorate for approval by a majority. Furthermore, it is 
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legislative intent that the district pay its obligations, so far as is 
practicable, from water sales under a rate structure. Should rate 
charges not produce sufficient income to cover the operating and in-
debtedness expenses, a tax may be levied, but only until the indebted-
ness is repaid. This emphasis on the use of a rate structure is 
somewhat different than the taxing emphasis characteristic of many 
water conservancy districts. Where users pay for water or water 
services through a rate structure, both users and water managers are 
more sensitive to cost effective delivery. Where charges are a func-
tion of usage, costs are equitably borne. On the other hand, if costs 
are assessed through an ad valorem tax, the benefit received is not 
specifically required to have a direct relation to the tax burden of any 
given taxpayer. 
Although municipalities are commonly active 1n acquiring and 
protecting water rights, constitutional constraints about disposal of 
water rights make them cautious about pursuing opportunities for sale 
or lease of water to other entities even on a temporary basis. Free 
from this constitutional concern, a MWD can engage in exchange and 
lease arrangements that are advantageous to its constituency. If 
active and aggressive in such activities outside its immediate bounda-
ries, its interactions with other water management institutions may 
become extensive and cogent. 
Salt Lake City MWD and Provo City MWD have been more actively 
utilized in the continuing process of water acquisition, protection of 
water rights, financing system imprbvements, etc. With the passage 
of time, the Utah County MWD's serving the smaller municipalities 
have become fiscal agents accepting billings for Provo River Project 
water and receiving payments from the client community to make the 
annual payment to the Secretary of the Interior according to contract 
terms. MWD's are not generally involved in retail distribution of 
water. However, the Salt Lake MWD has constructed and operated water 
treatment plants, financed the drilling of wells, and constructed 
storage reservoirs for the benefit of Salt Lake City and County resi-
dents. The two large MWD's, Salt Lake City and Provo, have been rather 
prominent (Provo more recently) in interagency matters, and in pursuing 
strategies for meeting long-term supply needs. The interaction between 
municipalit and counterpart MWD's has been generally good. Although 
the MWD has rather substantial discretionary authorities, its exercise 
is tempered by ex officio appointments of city officials to the govern-
ing board of the MWD. The fact that both entities serve and tax the 
same public, have identical geographic bounds, and enjoy some overlap 
in managerial and' administrative personnel tend to keep the MWD 1n 
phase with policies and programs of the municipality itself. 
The Provo MWD has gone through a more recent metamorphosis of 
roles from merely being a sponsor of the Deer Creek Project to a more 
dynamic collaboration with the Provo municipal water department. The 
Provo MWD has been given major responsibility for looking at possibili-
ties for increasing water supplies and examining management measures to 
increase the utility of presently owned supplies. Matters related to 
water right purchases, identification of new development opportunities, 
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and interfacing with other organizations are receiving major attention 
by "the MWD. The municipal water department takes responsibility for 
operation and maintenance of all facilities and the delivery of water to 
all residents. 
The Salt Lake City MWD has been rather active in the management 
of waters held in its own name. Since its authority to market water 
is not limited to city boundaries, the MWD can hold, buy, sell, and 
develop with minimal restriction. Consequently, it has acquired water 
rights through purchase and exchange and has traditionally suppl ied 
a large portion of the water distributed by the Salt Lake County WCD. 
Since the Salt Lake MWD normally has excess water, it is alert to 
water needs throughout the Provo River Project region and has made 
water available on a year to year basis to some irrigation companies 
and has entered into service contracts for domestic water in certain 
summer home and resort areas. Thus, the presence of the Salt Lake City 
M\ID is very promi nent throughou t the Provo-Jordan River drainage. 
Since it owns the majority of Deer Creek Reservoir water, it exerts 
great influence on the management policies adopted by the Provo River 
Water Users Association. 
Conflict of Interest Potential 
The vertical relationship between water conservancy districts, 
metropolitan water districts, subdistricts, special improvement dis-
tricts, communities, etc., presents some interesting organizational 
interfaces which bear some comment. It is not uncommon to find an 
officer or board member of one such district also an officer or board 
member in 
operating 
legal or 
entities. 
ments. 
another district with which there are contractual ties and 
agreements. Similarly, it is not uncommon to find the same 
engineering counsel serving several contractually connected 
There is potential for conflict of interest in such arrange-
With such arrangements, there is a danger of limiting the perspec-
tive on water problem solutions to options found within the framework of 
a contract with the federal government. The potential for limitation of 
independent appraisal and evaluation of policy and project options in 
such arrangments should be of concern to retail users. There are some 
possible advantages to providing legal and technical advice to entities 
in the chain which comes from a good background of how all of the 
user-suppliers of the expanded system operate and relate. If counsel 
to a large project district is extended and multiplied throughout 
the lesser organizations subject to linkage by a series of contract-
ual arrangements, it can have a substantial cumulative influence on 
development patterns. If such counsel is ill-advised, then the result-
ing mistakes become large and costly. If there is too much reliance on 
a single option, then other attractive options may never be exposed. A 
greater diversity of advice and counsel at the different organizational 
levels may facilitate consideration of a wider range of alternative 
solutions. 
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While there is much potential benefit in single counsel based on 
a good understanding of the coupling nature and individual objectives 
of a set of related organizations, the potential consequences of in-
adequate independent checks on council recommendations would suggest the 
desirability of avoidance of even the appearance of conflict of interest 
situations. 
Institutional Operating Style/Policies 
Statutes, charters, and organizational constitutions and by-
laws set out the authorities, powers, and functions of institutions. 
However, the organization has choices and options as to how it exer-
cises its authorities as it operates on a day to day basis. Such 
operating policies vary with time and circumstance. Since a change in 
operating policy of one entity may directly or indirectly impact on the 
operation of another, any unilateral implementation of discretionary 
operating rules may be a source of institutional friction. Because of 
their size and broad and independent authority to finance and build 
water works for a multitude of purposes, the day to day actions and 
policies of WCD's are particularly important in this regard. Although 
WCD's operate under the same enabling statutes, their operating policies 
may be quite different at any given point in time depending on factors 
such as status with respect to new development, level of indebtedness 
and type of debt, character and capability of physical facilities, and 
supply sources with respect to demand patterns. 
This section identifies some 
discretionary operating policies 
Utah. 
Conflicts with Community 
and County Planning 
interactive problems 
of water conservancy 
stemming from 
districts in 
Community and county planning have received increasing attention 
in recent times, stimulated by availability of help and funding from 
state and federal sources. Some county and community planners suggest 
lack of sensitivity to a need for initiating close integration with the 
local planning process despite the central importance of water in such 
plans. Some have suggested that this is because of the strong political 
power base of WCD's which can assure their own plans and objectives will 
materialize regardless of what plans are made by local entities. 
Perhaps a factor also is that communities within a WCD are automatically 
sustaining the WCD planned allocation through their ad valorem tax 
contributions. Thus, whether the ultimate WCD supply matchup is com-
patible or not, community planning activities may be of lesser impor-
tance to a WCD. Yet, it would be poor use of citizen tax funds to have 
one agency support community planning whose implementation may be 
negated by another tax supported agency. 
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Salt Lake and Utah Counties offer some interesting contrasts in 
ins t itut ional interact ions assoc iated with the operat ional presence or 
absence of a WCD. The Salt Lake County WCD was created and placed in 
operation quite some time ago to provide a more adequate service to 
unincorporated areas and small but growing communities within the 
county. No such need has ever been given parallel expression in Utah 
County. Master plans in Salt Lake County, which originally sought to 
regulate growth patterns by strict zoning ordinances, have become 
rather severely compromised if not abandoned altogether over the years 
as communities have incorporated and initiated their own planning 
programs. Although the county does not permit indiscriminate and 
incompatible uses to take place as urbanization proceeds, it no longer 
attempts to confine growth to areas adjacent to existing community 
boundaries where it can be readily served by orderly expansions of city 
services. However, Salt Lake County still attempts to conLrol growth to 
areas which are practical, reasonable, and economically feasible. 
Planners have concluded that the total urbanization of Salt Lake Valley 
1S inevitable, although certainly not imminent. 
A factor in the relaxation of controlled growth policies in Salt 
Lake County may well have been the willingness of the Salt Lake County 
WCD to provide service wherever requested for municipal and industrial 
purposes. Policies of the Salt Lake City MWD in providing water to 
the southeastern part of Salt Lake County ~as a factor in the growth 
patterns that emerged there. The Salt Lake County WCD has provided both 
wholesale and retail water services. When expanding communities or new 
subdivisions requested additional water service, the Salt Lake County 
WCD was a visible potential for meeting that need. As service has been 
extended by laying new supply lines, additional access to water created 
by the pipeline itself has a tendency to attract development in proxim-
ity to the new pipeline. Salt Lake County government has adopted a 
positive stance with regard to providing municipal services to county 
residents of unincorporated areas. The policies of the county and 
the county WCD with respect to the providing of needed services has 
accommodated growth in unincorporated areas but with standards of 
service not greatly inferior to those provided by incorporated munici-
palities. In some respects, developers have been able to "shOp" between 
the cities and the county for needed utilities and services. 
On the other hand, Utah County 
development concept, although some 
between cities and the county are 
intent ions. 
has been able to hold to a cluster 
differences in operat ing policies 
now negat ing the original zoning 
Neither growth nor policies to regulate growth have led to expres-
sion of a need for a countywide water conservancy district such as that 
formed in Salt Lake County. Of course, Utah County is within the 
l2-county Central Utah WCD, but that district has restricted its 
perview to the marketing of yet-to-come CUP water. The Salt Lake 
County WCD has procured water from a variety of sources and over time 
has developed an extensive distribution network so that as domestic or 
industrial needs are generated the district is a prospective supplier. 
In Utah County, municipalities have not had such a wholesaler to turn 
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to, nor have unincorporated areas and subdivisions been able to look to 
any single major supplier of water services to meet either wholesale or 
retail need. 
In Utah County planning officials expected that zoning laws would 
confine residential growth to areas next to the cities and the cities 
would provide services. However, the Utah County municipalities have 
generally refused to provide water and sewer services unless the areas 
needing such services were annexed. The rationale for this policy is 
that providing water service beyond city boundaries will encourage 
development with inadequate standards for roads, sewer, sidewalks, 
water, etc. When the day comes that subdivisions want to annex, the 
city would be faced with a difficult task of upgrading utilities. 
Unless development in these transition (adjac€nt) areas could be served 
by municipal water and sewer systems, lot sizes in some areas would have 
to be enlarged to allow use of individualized water supplies and septic 
tanks. Since there is no "non-municipal" water supply organizat ion to 
turn to, individual wells and septic tanks must be employed. Thus, to 
accommodate requests to build, county zoning was changed to require 5 
acre lots. (A modification allowing I acre lots if there was an ade-
quate plan and provision for roads and drainage was made later.) A 
standard of 5 acres per lot for a res idence adjacent to a city has 
essent ially stopped residential development under the cluster pattern 
originally desired and expected. The cities would not extend water and 
sewer and the county has no water or sewer service to offer. 
The spectre of higher development costs with annexation to a 
city and moratoriums on growth by some cities has led to unexpected 
pressures for more development in areas zoned for rural residences in 
Utah County. The county has generally been willing to change zoning so 
that development could proceed if it could be satisfied that adequate 
water and sewage services would be provided. Since no areawide water 
suppl ier exists in Utah County, each subdivision has had to assume 
responsibility for acquiring and developing its own sources and facili-
ties for managing water supply and wastewater. This has led to the 
creation of water and sewer districts and several private water systems 
where subdivisions were contemplated. The special districts have not 
generally survived long, either being superseded by incorporation or 
abolished as result of inactivity. Many of the private water companies 
are being set up as mutual companies not subject to oversight and 
regulation by the Public Service Commission. Inasmuch as these mutually 
owned domestic water systems are not required to establish any depre-
ciation account nor set aside reserves for replacement, they may lack 
some of the user protections that a private utility operating under the 
PSC provides. 
The fact that some Utah County developments near the Salt Lake 
County-Utah County border may in the future obtain water service from 
the Salt Lake County WCD may be an indication that an areawide govern-
mental kind of water suppl ier appeals as a counterpart to a private 
water supplier or existing city. 
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Whether the presence of a countywide WCD, willing and anxious 
to provide water service, influences county policy about active and 
direct provision of other needed utilities and services, or whether 
greater willingness to provide services by a county favors the creation 
of areawide water service, is unclear. In any event one seems to 
influence and be compatible with the other. 
Yet, even if the county policy is to avoid direct involvement 
in providing municipal services in unincorporated areas, its zoning 
pOlicies or those of its municipalities may force development to unin-
corporated areas. When this happens, utility needs and services must be 
arranged on an individualized basis. The fact that many Utah County 
communities have entered into cooperative regional arrangements for 
managing wastes and wastewaters and are exploring similar kinds of 
cooperation in some instances with respect to water supply would suggest 
a recognition of advantage in a more integrated operation which a 
properly structured WCD might provide. In Utah County, one cannot point 
to a wen as being a contributor to the breakdown of planned growth 
patterns. But once the pattern of clustering growth around existing 
cities breaks down, the justification for a regional water supply 
organization is more readily appreciated. 
It may be that the several MWD's in Utah County could cooperate 
1n providing water supplies that would better serve the regional ne~ds 
of Utah County residents. Community leaders in Utah County feel that 
water availability and ownership will play a key role in future growth 
and development patterns. Many are apprehensive about depending on 
separate and independent private companies for meeting domestic water 
needs. The concern about the water supply function being outside the 
~ontrol of the city is at the root of apprehensions about both private 
water companies and the cuwen. 
The Weber County planning office indicates no formal interaction 
or review process with the Weber Basin WCD in planning functions. 
The planning commission must approve land uses and where activities of 
the wen require the construction of facilities on the land surface, 
permits are required. This process produces some information transfer 
as to contemplated services. However, water related activities in-
volving underground pipe are not required to go through the permitting 
process which involves the use plan and siting information. The county 
planning commission has greater involvement with municipalities and 
special districts closer to the retail water supply level. In other 
words, while the Weber Basin WCD engages in wholesaling to other water 
organizations who will retail the water, the focus of the Weber County 
Planning Commission is on "final water use" considerations rather than 
"regional water system" considerations. 
A consequence of the county planning commission's lack of respon-
sibility for subsurface pipeline construction is that it may not 
be advised of certain annexations based on water availability from 
pipelines which the commission knows little or .no.thing about. The 
responsibility for considering water needs and dec1d1ng on water s~p~ly 
options is left with the communities and the water management ent1t1es 
who supply culinary and industrial water. 
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Implications of the Central Utah 
WCD Water Treatment Plant Policy 
Under some pressure to demonstrate M&I water need by firm commit-
ments to purchase CUP water when available, the Central Utah WCD 
adopted a policy of constructing and operating water treatment plants 
where beneficiaries were willing to petition for CUP water for eventual 
use in the plant. While awaiting availability of CUP supplies, non-
project water is treated in the facility. 
The first water treatment plant constructed under this policy was 
the Jordan Water Treatment Plant located in southern Salt Lake County. 
The plant was sited such that CUP water supplied through the proposed 
Jordan aqueduct could be conveniently available to the treatment 
facility. In the meantime, Deer Creek Project water is purchased from 
the Salt Lake MWD (previously treated in MWD treatment plants) and 
is brought to the Jordan Water Treatment Plant via the Provo Reservoir 
Canal. The Salt Lake County WCD is the recipient of the water from the 
Jordan Water Treatment Plant and has subscribed for 50 ,000 acre feet 
of CUP water as it becomes available. 
The Central Utah WCD has subsequently cooperated with the Cities 
of Orem and Duchesne in building water treatment facilities. In each 
instance, petitions to purchase specific quantities of CUP water when 
available were obtained. 
The Central Utah WCD policy of constructing and operating water 
treatment plants has generated some significant institutional reactions 
and interact ions centering on equity and efficiency issues. Reques ts 
by other communities to rent use of available plant capacity to treat 
owned nonproject supplies, but without commitment to purchase CUP 
water, have been denied by the Central Utah WCD. 
Planning and financing of water treatment facilities are outside 
the traditional scope of Bureau of Reclamation projects. If project 
water supplies need to be conditioned for particular uses, the Bureau 
has left that responsibility to the user. In parallel, large WCD's as 
agents for BOR projects, have commonly restricted their service to the 
wholesaling of raw water. For example, the Northern Colorado WCD 
provides substantial quantities of water from the Big Thompson Project 
for uses in the rapidly growing region between Denver and Fort Collins. 
Responsibility for treatment and the financing of needed treatment 
facilities is left entirely to the local water using entities. Pur-
chasers who need water treatment provide the facilities and levy user 
taxes or rate charges to cover the costs. In contrast, the Central Utah 
WCD uses districtwide ad valorem tax collections to finance the con-
struction and operation of water treatment plants. In fact, the deci-
sion of the Central Utah WCD to provide water treatment plants was one 
of the justifications for seeking legislation allowing the doubling of 
the general taxing authority from one to two mills. since this in-
creased levy applied to all counties comprising the Central Utah WCD, 
the enabling legislation required that areas outside Salt Lake County 
(the immediate case) be treated similarly. 
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A "need to get our share" ripple has spread throughout the dis-
trict by this policy decision with regard to financing and operating 
munic ipal water treatment pI ant s. Wh i Ie dis tric t taxpayers have 
had the impression that their tax assessments were advance payment on 
some future benefit from the completed CUP, they also have observed that 
district-wide tax collections can be used to subsidize water treatment 
for a localized and well-defined set of water users. The realization of 
this has resulted in requests for district support for other non-CUP 
related projects such as cloud seeding, reservoir spillway reconstruc-
tion, and others. Using general tax monies to support local projects 
outside the general CUP framework leads to pressures for giving taxpayer 
groups throughout the district support for their worthwhile but non-CUP 
projects, also. Having set a precedent with support of water treatment 
plants, one could expect that the district will find it inrreasingly 
difficult and discriminatory to deny requests for financial support for 
other local projects. It would seem that such a policy, initiated to 
strengthen the financial integrity of the CUP, could result in a weaken-
ing of the overall repayment capacity. 
Where funds have been accumulated ostensibly for project repayment 
and then used to build localized projects outside the configuration 
of the project for which the tax collections were justified, it may be 
considered a disinvestment of part of the assets set aside for project 
repayment. Having started down this road with the construction of water 
treatment plants, the Central Utah WCD will have to convince taxpayers 
throughout its boundaries that they are receiving benefits commensurate 
with tax collections by the district. 
Water Rights Issues 
Of all the factors which could operate to impede harmonious inter-
action between organizations, disputes over water rights is one of the 
most sens1t1ve. Water right filings by the Central Utah WCD and Bureau 
of Reclamation for 300,000 acre-feet of winter water in the Provo River 
drainage has created apprehension and resentment on the part of certain 
Utah County communities and canal companies that may have diverse and 
lasting impacts on institutional interrelations. The filing was made 
without fully informing those who might be affected concerning the 
justification and rationale. Communities and canal companies owning 
large quantities of Class A water in the Provo River system feel that 
this legal action may result in curtailment of water entitlements so as 
to limit development potentials of their own. 
Utah County communities and canal companies are troubled to find 
themselves in opposition with an organization of which they are a part 
and which should be operating in their interest as their agent or 
surrogate. They view this assertion on the part of the Central Utah 
wen and Bureau of Reclamation as a legal strategy to obtain water for 
ultimate sale back to its present claimants as high priced CUP water. 
This legal action with respect to winter water has been a catalyst 
in unifying entities in Utah County to probe more deeply into .the 
objectives and potentials of the CUP/CUWCD as well as more broadly 1nto 
alternative potentials for satisfying projected water needs. 
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Community officials indicate that they are looking more closely 
at options for water transfers and exchanges as well as ~mprovements 
in administrative and management policies that could be initiated al-
though they still generally support the CUP. They point to an abundance 
of good quality irrigation water that could be obtained at a fraction of 
the cost of CUP water. They suggest a much greater use of what they 
term an excellent supply of underground water, but real ize that such 
utilization would hinge on some purchases or innovative exchanges 
with water rights holders below Utah Lake. . They also point to the 
advantageous use of dual water systems to extend the utility of high 
quality potable supplies. 
Some have also suggested that there is substantial opportunity 
to expand M&I utility of Deer Creek Project water through improved ad-
ministrative and management policies. Community leaders maintain that 
as long as these options and opportunities exist their constituencies 
will point them out. The relative abundance of local water and water 
development options is a fact that CUWCD must face in marketing project 
water and setting the price to be charged. Some communities feel that 
if they developed their options completely they would have surplus water 
to lease or sell. Yet, they feel that because of the seeming regional 
importance of CUP they should not criticize it in general. Some 
officials cite negative benefits from CUP in terms of district op-
pos1t~on to measures they propose as best solutions to meeting their 
own supply needs. They also point to the added cos t of solving their 
water supply problems independent of CUP since they must cont inue to 
pay the ad valorem tax while perceiving no benefit from that action. 
The attempt to obtain legal title to the winter water claimed 
by Utah County entities has brought unified opposition and has created 
a forum for comparing and reevaluating community relationships with 
the district and with each other. 
Federal Program Relationships 
Federal policies and programs have very substantial effects 
on state and local institutions and directly or indirectly influence 
their relationship with one another. The tracing of institutional 
impacts resulting from the implementation of exponentially growing 
federal programs allied to water is a task well beyond the time and 
fiscal resources of this study. The emphasis on stimulating economic 
development and/or reducing economic loss, which characterized fed-
eral programs during the first half of the 20th century, has more 
recently emphasized concern for protection and enhancement of environ-
mental values. Within the past two decades, a number of federal 
enactments, spawned by the environmental movement, have broadened the 
scope of federal involvement and have introduced regulatory features 
that have required varying adjustment in the operating functions of 
water management institutions. Some noteworthy examples of legisla-
tion having significant impact on water institutional structures and 
interrelationships are the Water Resources Planning Act, the wild 
and Scenic Rivers Act, the National Environmental Policy Act, the 
Federal Water Pollution Control Act (and amendments), the National 
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Flood Insurance Act, the Safe Drinking Water Act, and the Endangered 
Species Act. . The initiatives of the federal government under these 
acts not only effect institutional interactions but influence growth 
and development policies for the state as well. In addition to the 
regulatory compliances, conditions placed on the acceptance of federal 
dollars available in some of these programs commonly result in modifi-
cation of institutional operating policy. 
Many of these federal enactments are inadequately coordinated at 
the federal level and are oblivious to the policy and institutional 
impacts that implementation induces at state and local levels. Some 
recently initiated federal programs have been both duplicative and 
overriding of state institutional structures and functions and have 
triggered new kinds of institutional interactions not previously 
experienced. Where progr~ms nem~nd too much of institutions, and 
alter their customary relationships and roles significantly, the 
likelihood of smooth program implementation is low. 
Federal programs and policies often become internalized in the 
operations of local participating organizations. One of the best 
examples of this is the federal reclamation program which has been in 
existence since 1902 and its influence on water conservation districts. 
Water conservancy districts are a direct outgrowth of Bureau of Reclama-
tion programs, and policies of that federal agency are noticeably 
reflected in the operating policies of contracting districts. Federal 
contracts for repayment of project costs are for long periods of time 
and all water delivery contracts between the district and its customers 
must be endorsed by the Se€retary of the Interior. Thus, terms of the 
federal program with respect to project design and construction stan-
dards, operation and maintenance, water pricing, etc., are controlling. 
While it may seem inconsistent and contestable that one user from a 
given supply facility is charged $5.00 per acre foot for the very same 
water another user may be charged $100 per acre foot, development under 
reclamation law proscribes such differential charges. "Preferential ll 
water and power customers are specifically provided for in cost recovery 
policies which do not require full reimbursement according to purpose 
for costs associated with each beneficiary. Regardless of the social 
merits of such a policy, the ability to disassociate the cost burden 
from the point of benefit results in project configurations and water 
pr~c~ng patterns that are different than if economic efficiency were the 
primary measure of project feasibility. 
A commonly voiced criticism of federal programs is that policies 
and guidelines are made in Washington far removed from a knowledge 
of local realities. Some of those interviewed felt that the Bureau 
of Reclamation policies have become the perspectives and positions 
of an unquestioning Central Utah WCD. They believe that the singular 
focus of the Bureau on developing new water supplies has retarded 
the examination of potentials involving the use of groundwater and 
totally integrated management concepts. Solutions involving con-
junctive use of surface and groundwater supplies, interlinking of 
community systems, reuse of sewage treatment plant effluents, use of 
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dual systems for delivering potable and non-potable supplies, blend-
ing of supplies of differing quality, etc., are not adequately con-
sidered. 
The nat ional concern for protect ion and enhancement of envi ron-
mental values, as mirrored by some of the enactments alluded to pre-
viously, have stressed state and local institutional structures in many 
ways. The environmental impact evaluations and the review and comment 
process have slowed water development and necessitated modifications in 
management measures and project operation. The added federal regula-
tions and permitting authorities have certainly altered the operating 
interactions of state and local institutions in subtle as well as 
obvious ways. 
Federal water rights. Federal prerogatives extend into the area 
of water rights. The federal government claims rights to sufficient 
water to carry out purposes for which a land reservation was made and 
with a time priority dating to the date of the land reservation. 
Similarly, Indian water rights are claimed consistent with the needs of 
Indian Reservations. These implied rights have not yet been completely 
quant ified. In Utah, great efforts have been made to quant ify Indian 
water claims and fix these by negotiated agreements. While yet to be 
finalized, such agreements are viewed as vital to orderly development 
and management of water. Lack of quantification of water rights 
creates great uncertainty for state and local water managers, and 
especially those of the large water service districts. 
Congressional prerogative. Congress authorizes federal programs 
and then appropriates the funding to carry them out. Program recipients 
soon discover that authorization is one thing, appropriation of funds 
another. Thus, federally supported i nst itutions must face cont inually 
the possibility that the conditions of their contract with the federal 
government will change, especially as a consequence of the change in 
political administrations in Washington. 
The Central Utah project planning and construction has thus far 
spanned a period of nearly 20 years and completion is still many years 
away. The social demography of the service area has changed dramatical-
ly and certain demands that the project was designed to meet have been 
altered. These changes could logically require alterations in project 
design that would possibly require the securing of new permits for 
environmental modification. 
Congressional prerogatives also modify agency perspective. Threat-
ened changes stimulate the districts to accelerate project activities so 
as to minimize the probability of project disruption, and often to 
complete less valuable portions of the project first so as to build a 
more compelling case for project completion. Conversely, federal 
budgeting may result in a lengthening of project completion time. 
The CUP has been characterized by a drawn out completion schedule 
dependent on federal financial participation. This participation seems 
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to fluctuate with the mood of the White House, although there has been 
general support for its completion. 
With a drawn out construction schedule, if changing needs suggest 
major project modification, congressional re-authorization is re-
quired. Also, over time, the political coalitions which secured 
initial approval may have weakened and new coalitions may express 
strong reservation to the continuation of a public investment 'which 
they do not now feel to be in the public interest. Because of the real 
difficulties in making adjustments as may be incrementally desirable, a 
contracting district may be compelled to perpetuate inflexibility in 
its relations with other local entities . 
. Judicifll review. The pcssibility of project exposure to judicial 
review also introduces uncertainty in operations at the local level and 
affects interactions between water districts and other local entities. 
Induced uncertainty creates a demand to remove that uncertainty. The 
natural response is to reduce that uncertainty by keeping fact ions 
sufficiently satisfied so as not to initiate court action. For the 
district, it means gett ing commi tments for water purchases as soon as 
possible. Thus, the threat of judicial review may tend to lock de-
velopment and use configurations prematurely. 
The Reclamation Law. The Bureau of Reclamation has been the 
implementer of Reclamation Law. Water conservancy districts in 
Utah have been the favored agent for BOR collaboration in promoting 
projects, seeking federal authorization, and contracting for federal 
financing. This relationship between district and Bureau strongly 
influences the operating policies of the district. 
Observations of the Utah situation indicate a BOR-WCD prefer-
ence for surface development of water supply. 
A significant role of the Bureau in working with water conservancy 
districts is in providing information. Consequently, the public tends 
to see elements of water development through the eyes of the Bureau and 
its agent, the water conservancy district. Needless to say, this 
places other water management agencies at a significant disadvantage in 
questioning the policies of the district or suggesting modifications 
that are believed to reflect the correct pattern of social preference. 
Information is crucial to informed and effective interaction. A monop-
oly of such information has potential to impede productive interaction. 
Influence of State Programs and Policies 
State programs may be classified as either regulatory or mission 
oriented. The regulatory programs are carried out through the Office 
of the State Engineer and the Division of Environmental Health. The 
mission programs are carried out through the Division of Water Re-
sources. 
The state has emphasized financial aid in its mission programs. 
Three such programs have been imp lemented: the Revolving Construc t ion 
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Fund, the Cities Water Loan Fund, and the Resource Conservation and 
Development Fund. 
Under the Revolving Construction Fund, through June 30, 1978, 
the state had expended more than $27 million of which only $4.7 million, 
or 17 percent, had been spent in the Wasatch Front urban area. Of the 
$4.7 million, only about $1/4 million, or 5 percent, went to culinary 
water projects. A review of "the State of Utah Water-198011 indicates 
that the majority of this funding went for capital replacement in small 
irrigation companies. One exception was a $1,000,000 loan to the 
Central Utah Water Conservancy District to aid in the construction of a 
water treatment plant. This loan was repaid in two years and was the 
only participation of a large multi-purpose water district in the 
state's program to 1978. 
Loans made under the state RCF program are generally to user 
groups for renovation, repair, or replacement of facilities. Nor-
mally, the water rights of the organization seeking a loan are used as 
collateral. This lien could conceivably present some encumbrances in 
future collaborative arrangements with other users. However, there is 
little evidence that the RCF program introduces obstacles to effective 
institutional interaction in either horizontal or vertical directions. 
The loan approval process includes a series of sign offs which insure 
that local, county, and regional planning or management entities are 
made aware of the project and its implications. There are no explicit 
restrictions regarding transfer of equity interests in the water works 
over the life of the loan. Consequently, the program does not inter-
fere with the normal oper~tion of water markets. 
There is one type of project supported under the RCF program which 
has potential for generating institutional conflict. That is when a 
community wishes to install a separate system for outside lawn and 
garden watering. The Division of Water Resources supports the use of 
dual systems as a water conservation measure and a cost effective way 
of using available supplies. Many such systems are in use in all parts 
of Utah and their use is increasing. About half of the water delivered 
through municipal water systems ~s used for watering lawns, parks, 
gardens, etc. Such uses do not require water of drinking quality. The 
one area of resistance to the use of dual systems is in Utah and Salt 
Lake Counties which also happen to be the principal market areas for 
M&I water produced under the Central Utah Project. Dual systems pose a 
threat to the demand for municipal grade water. 
Under the Cities Water Loan Fund, through June 30, 1978, the 
CWLF had participated in only five projects in the Wasatch Front 
area. Of a total cumulative budget expenditure of $6,508,300, only 
$449,000, or 7 percent, has been spent in the Wasatch Front. This 
would seem to indicate the state's desire to emphasize assistance to 
the rural counties of the state instead of the more financially able 
urban areas. However, as additional monies have been added to the fund 
and as other funding programs have enlarged also, larger communities in 
the urbanizing Wasatch Front area have sought support. In fact Salt 
Lake City has applied for a $5 million loan to upgrade and expand its 
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water supply system. While there may be some institutional differences 
as to the preferred criteria for making this loan money available to 
cities, implementation of the program has not created any new or 
troublesome operating interactions within the institutional framework. 
The Resource Conservation and Development Fund was created in 
the 1978 legislative session for the specific purpose of funding 
large water development projects mainly in rural counties. This fund 
was enlarged in 1980 although few of the original or the subsequent 
large projects had undergone necessary feasibility tests. Conse-
quently, the State Board of Water Resources began opening eligibil-
ity to other projects not originally specified in the second bond 
($25,000,000). The policies which are being followed in the use of the 
RCDF monies are very much like those that have evolved under the federal 
reclamation program of the Department cf the Interior. The legislative 
intent of the RCDF is to support larger and more expensive projects 
having multiple water purposes. As these projects are evaluated some of 
the same issues about project feasibility criteria, distribution of cost 
burdens, applicable discount and interest rates, etc., are surfacing. 
Like the Bureau of Reclamation, and for the same reasons, the Division 
of Water Resources is recommending creation of water conservancy dis-
tricts as contracting entities for repayment of RCDF loans. Hence, one 
might predict the kind of institutional problems that could develop from 
the state financing program by examining the experience of existing 
water conservancy districts. 
Special Interest Group Relatio~hips 
The influence of special interest groups on the operation and 
interactions of the water service districts varies over time and 
with respect to issues. Special interests can serve a useful purpose 
in the airing of issues. However, it is important that they be recog-
nized for what they are as they strive for political advantages. Four 
major types of groups (commercial, environmental, governmental, and 
agricultural) seek to influence water policies and decisions. Some 
relate to the WCD's through contractual relationships, such as to 
purchase water; and others are only interested "bystanders" indirectly 
affected by district programs. 
The commercial interest group generally provides vocal support 
for the activities of the districts under a presumption that water 
availability fosters development opportunities. However, this group is 
seldom directly involved in the affairs of the WCD. To the extent that 
district actl.vl.ties influence urban growth rates, they simultaneously 
influence urban commercial activities. For example, the extension of 
water trunk lines into rural areas of an urbanizing county is often 
thought to encourage development of that area. Obviously, where such 
causation exists, those who engage in such commercial activities as 
home building, real estate market ing, retail market ing, and util it ies 
marketing may also be significantly benefited. While there is some 
disagreement as to whether the availability of a water supply can 
induce growth, there is little doubt that absence of a water supply 
constrains growth where other factors are favorable. 
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Environmental groups are generally in conflict with district 
goals. Those more amenable to water development, and who are generally 
in support of water projects, view the warnings and objections voiced 
by environmentalists as calculated not to facilitate wiser choices but 
rather to prevent making any choices at all. They have come to feel 
that much of the environmental activism is based on total acceptance of 
only those results that fit their preconceived prejudices. In dealing 
with "hostile" groups, the districts have a choice of postures. On one 
hand, they can take measures to incorporate the group's values into 
district decision processes and thereby bring about a working relation-
ship that minimizes the delay and expense of legal challenges. On the 
other hand, the districts might choose to develop a power base to 
oppose the activity of the environmental group. Such a power base 
begins at the local level and extends through the federal agencies to 
Congress. Differences are settled more by political appeal than by 
technical merit. 
The Utah Water Conservancy Districts have a tradition of a broad 
power base but have not successfully incorporated environmental groups 
into this power base. One problem is that the environmental group is 
generally not a local group, but rather an alliance of groups from 
across the nation. Moreover, these groups frequently express values 
that may not find support from the population of the local service area. 
Districts have difficulty in balancing such broad based concerns against 
the desires of the local populus whom the districts have been created to 
serve. One environmental concern of recognized importance ~s to do 
minimal damage to the scenic and recreational attractions" 
The interactions between a district and environmental group tend 
to occur during project planning and construction phases. Once the 
environment has been altered, there can be little satisfaction in a 
legal decision. Thus, districts not currently engaged in construction 
or planning for construction will face far less interaction with the 
environmental groups. 
Municipalities have no statutory standing in the conservancy 
district operation outside of those created through the water sale 
contracts. However, the municipalities possess significant powers that 
can be exercised to prosper their special interests. Communities are 
largely supportive of conservancy district activities and see the 
district activities as an "insurance" that water will be available for 
their growth. However, where plans run counter to municipal desires, 
they can exert substantial pressure for change, particularly if they 
join together. 
The WCD' s sometimes compete with the commun~t~es in the retail 
water market. While there have been some disagreements over the proper 
role of the various water suppliers in such instances, the communities 
continue their overall support for district activities. 
The agricultural interest group is perhaps the dominant "friendly" 
group supporting the water conservancy districts which provide agricul-
tural water. This ~s because the water conservancy districts were 
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created as local liaison for the national reclamation program which 
holds out substantial subsidies for agricultural water users. Municipal 
and industrial components were largely supplemental purposes to the 
original reclamation mission. 
Agricultural water was or inally the prime purpose of the Central 
Utah Project. However, changing social demography and the need for the 
project to sell water at higher prices have changed what once might have 
been considered equitable representation to overrepresentation. The 
districts have benefited from the political power of the agricultural 
interest group in Utah. Agricultural interests are active in Utah 
legislative politics and generally carry advocacy of district activities 
into the legislative arena. 
The way governmental agencies impede effective interaction amcng 
water institutions has been discussed in previous sections. However, it 
is proper to mention the role of governmental bureaus as special inter-
est groups. Governmental officials derive considerable political 
advantage precisely from their not being recognized as interested 
parties. Possession of certain data and knowledge gives the bureaucrat 
a decisive advantage in stating a case or position. The influence of 
governmental officials greatly exceeds their numbers because they are 
generally perceived as being objective experts occupying high moral 
ground. We commonly attribute to governmental officials a public 
watchdog role in which they more nearly represent the "public interest." 
However, it should be kept in mind that bureaucrats have preferred 
options just like any other special interest group. They are dependent 
pn the backing of a political power to impose their preferred options on 
the people. 
Financing Sources and Options 
It has been said that water flows down hill and toward money. 
It has also been alleged that when people turn to government for 
water development financing it is likely an indication that develop-
ment cannot be sustained from local resources. The lure of federal 
financing for water projects in Utah has been a very major factor 
in shaping the pattern of water development and the character of 
water institutions. For example, the Bureau of Reclamation was largely 
responsible for the original water conservancy district legis lation. 
WCDs have become the "agent" organization for the acquisition of invest-
ment capital available through the Bureau of Reclamation program. Thus, 
WCD's have come to be esteemed in Utah for their favored status with the 
BOR which could offer low cost (subsidized) investment capital and a 
reservoir of technical expertise to plan, design, and construct water 
projects. Perceiving financial and economic advantages from the federal 
program, state policy has been to avoid political controversy which 
might jeopardize congressional funding possibilities. 
Acceptance of project financing under the reclamation program 
means acceptance of certain conditions under which marketing and 
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sale of water must be made. Subcontracts for sales and/or service 
must be in accordance with legislation and agency rules and regula-
tions. Therefore, the conditions imposed on the "agentll institution 
(the water conservancy district) must be reflected in any subsequent 
subcontracts cascading on down to the user level. 
A master contract between a WCD and the Secretary of the Interior 
makes the U.S. a party of all subcontracts. wnile the master contract 
IS in effect (and this is for a long period of time) no changes In 
exclusion of taxable lands, consolidations, mergers, dissolution, or 
assignment of control can be made except upon consent of the U.S. 
Water cannot be sold or otherwise disposed of without the approval of 
the Secretary of the Interior (the State Engineer is not a necessary 
party). Generally, the federal government expressly absolves itself 
from ani responsibility for the distribution of water after delivery to 
some specific point. If the district does not utilize the contracted 
amount of water it does not relieve the obligation to pay for the water 
in the same manner as if the water had been delivered. The expenditure 
of funds and performance of work by the BOR under the government-
district contract is contingent on the congressional appropriation of 
money. While no liability accrues to the U. S. in case such funds are 
not appropriated, the district is not relieved of obligations to pay for 
water committed by block notices. Water rights are generally acquired 
in the name of the BOR. However, the contracting district is required 
to defend those rights in any legal action if requested to do so by the 
BOR. 
Thus, bound by the federal master contract, with repayment a 
paramount concern in fixing the terms, the WCD must reflect these 
conditions into its subcontracts. Similarly, subdistricts and muni-
cipalities must incorporate into their policies, management, and 
rate structure the constraints of their own subcontractual arrange-
ments. The rigidity with which the above contract ing arrangements 
set the pattern of use and development creates problems in adapting 
to changing situations and in maintaining the optimal mix of project 
and nonproject water at the user level over time. 
The contractual obligations between the Bureau and the district 
are made with the expectation that prospective users will in turn 
petition for the supplies made available. However, except for general 
expressions of intent, communities generally wait until the availability 
of project water can be realistically predicted before proceeding with 
the petition. In its "middle man" position, the district obligates 
itself to the Bureau with the expectation that the obligation will be 
conveyed to the actual users. Making certain that this financial 
obligation gets assumed by users is a paramount concern of the district. 
In a sense, the district has guaranteed to the Bureau that the water 
use projection patterns used to plan and build the project will indeed 
come about. Yet, if development drags, use projections may change as 
result of demographic changes and intervening independent water develop-
ment. As charges for project water become more clear, the demand for 
project water will adjust accordingly. Thus, the operating policies of 
the district are closely related to what threats it perceives to the 
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repayment structures it must secure. If the charges the district must 
make for p~oject water are less than users would need to pay for alter-
native sources of supply, there is little problem in maintaining finan-
cial integrity. If district supplies are not least cost to a prospec-
tive buyer, the district may embrace operating policies designed to 
capture water markets in spite of cost disadvantages and/or to obtain 
repayment monies independent of water subscriptions. 
Property Taxation 
A characteristic of water conservancy districts is their power to 
levy general property taxes. Revenue from taxes is viewed as the key to 
maintaining the financial integrity of district projects. Securing 
needed revenues by taxing allows cos ts to be borne by taxpayers--not 
necessarily water users. A rationale for use of general property 
taxation is that everyone benefits, directly or indirectly, from a water 
project. Therefore, everyone should help pay. However, since the point 
of the tax is disassociated from the location of the benefit it 1.S 
difficult to tell whether benefited parties pay their true costs for 
services received. A problem for the district is to try to balance out 
the benefits or services provided to its members whatever their uses or 
location may be. 
For geographically small districts serving homogeneous water 
markets, maldistribution of costs and benefits through use of tax 
revenues may be inconseCiuential. Problems of inequity are greatest in 
larger multi-county conservancy districts. _ Some portions of large 
districts have little immediate hope of benefit from tax contributions. 
Certain cities located within district boundaries continue to pay the 
general ad valorem tax but have adequate sources of supply from other 
sources. Even though supplies appear adequate for the foreseeable 
future, some of these communities view the CUP potential as an "in-
surance" against possible acceleration of water needs should higher than 
expected growth take place. Some water managers have indicated that the 
year by year tax payments to the district become a "sunk cost." Such 
payments are viewed by some as an investment, the return on which can 
only be secured if the community opts for district water supply when 
available. 
The assessment of special taxes (i.e., B, C, or D) can have a 
substantial influence on the character of interaction between institu-
tions, also. This has been quite clearly demonstrated in the concerns 
expressed by CUP officials as Salt Lake County voters considered 
consolidation of governments within that county. Officials noted that 
repayment obligations of the Bonneville Project of the CUP could not 
possibly be met with the maximum allowable Class A levy and that the 
special assessment in the form of additional ad valorem taxes for those 
subscribing for municipal water will be necessary. The authority to 
impose the Class B tax is operative for any district, subdistrict, or 
municipality whose petition for an allotment of water has been accepted 
and notice of water availability has been given. Since only the Salt 
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Lake County Water Conservancy District had petitioned for CUP water, a 
large part of the county represent ing a major part of the county's 
assessed valuation could not have been subject to the Class B tax. 
Also, there were some communities within the present boundaries of the 
Salt Lake County WCD, and thus subject to the Class B tax, that were to 
be excluded from the new unified government. Thus, there was a question 
as to whether the Class B tax could be imposed on those communities 
after the unification. This unloosing of a taxing potential already in 
place, coupled with what could be serious obstacles to qualifying the 
balance of the region for imposition of the Class B tax, was considered 
a serious problem toward getting the financial guarantees needed to 
meet the Bonneville Project commitments of the Central Utah WCD. Since 
the steps needed to assure the possible use of the Class B tax through-
out the area of the new unified government was not taken prior to the 
move for unification, the financial underpinnings of the Bonneville 
Project were believed to be threatened and the proposed governmental 
unification was actively opposed by project advocates. The importance 
districts attach to protecting a tax base as the preferred mechanisms 
for project repayment is quite obvious. The need for preserving and 
enlarging ad valorem taxing potentials can and does become an important 
factor in the positions and policies districts follow in their dealings 
with other entities. 
Another feature of district taxing is that taxes collected in 
any given year and not needed for current obligations may be carried 
over. Thus, unlike municipalities and others, districts may accumulate 
funds, hold them in reserve, invest them until needed, etc. This is 
a decided advantage to the district in managing its fiscal and finan-
cial affairs and providing flexibility to collaborate with other 
entities in ventures of mutual benefit. For example, reserves ac-
cumulated from ad valorem taxes pending availability of project water 
have been used to finance water treatment plants and other projects. 
Although WCD' s have authority to issue revenue bonds and general 
obligation bonds their use is seldom considered. Ad valorem taxes are 
the preferred measures for raising needed revenues to insure repayment. 
For sound projects universally supported by project beneficiaries it 
should matter little which financing alternative is used. The choice 
of method used to generate income to repay project costs obviously 
relates to the district's appraisal of palatability to those who must 
pay and risk of default problems over the repayment period. Persuading 
an investor that a steady stream of revenues will be forthcoming to pay 
off revenue bonds may be difficult if the charge rate structure must be 
unusually high. General obligation bonds must be voted on by tax 
payers and, if there are project vulnerabilities, approval may be 
denied. Once people have embraced a district, the least painful and 
most secure mechanism for deriving repayment revenues is by taxing. 
While the general taxing authority (Class A) is limited, the Class B 
tax is not. 
Municipalities may favor payment of obligations to a WCD through 
use of the Class B tax imposed by the WCD. The advantage to this to 
municipal officers is that the citizen user rate structure can be lower 
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as payment from proceeds of metered water is less and/or general fund 
allocations to water departments may be less by the amount collected in 
taxes by the WCD. Thus any poli tical liabi lit ies that result from 
water charges are passed from municipal officials to WCD officials. A 
disadvantage may be that the municipality must pay for an agreed upon 
quantity of water whether actually used or not. However, the use of a 
Class "B" tax as a general lien on subscribing municipalities may reduce 
financing costs for a district such as a Salt Lake County Water Conser-
vancy District. If municipalities are purchasing water for future 
growth, a purchase which requires immediate financial commi tment, the 
use of the Class "B" as an act ive source of revenue may allow the pur-
chase of such supply insurance while distributing the costs evenly among 
all residents. Neither the Central Utah Water Conservancy District nor 
the Salt Lake County Water Conservancy District have yet collected 
revenues from a Class B tax. 
Municipal residents may enjoy an income tax advantage if water 
services are partly or wholly paid by taxes in that such taxes are a 
deductible item. 
A decision as to what financing mechanism a municipality may 
desire to use in financing water service needs depends upon the water 
service situation of the community. To meet current needs, direct 
financing provides an excellent tool. If, however, the municipality 
h as pur ch as ed water for future use, as provi s ion for an tic ipa ted 
growth, the advantage shifts to using an indirect method of financing 
such as taxation. And if taxation is selected, the municipality has an 
incentive to pass on costs, both political 'and financial, to the 
district and county governments. 
District income from water sales to individual municipalities 
remains the same regardless of the financing options that cities select. 
However, some districts prefer the use of the Class B property tax so as 
to encourage municipalities to purchase the district water as an in-
surance policy against ant ic ipated growth. Revenues for the sale of 
future water can begin immediately and aid the district in its current 
development activities. The economic impact is to transfer costs from 
the future to the present generation. This transferred cost becomes, in 
effect, an insurance premium paid by the residents of the municipality 
to prevent future water shortages. 
Financial autonomy allows the water service districts to carry 
out the mandate of their creation, the development and management of 
water. Some degree of autonomy is necessary; however, it is customary 
to link the financing powers of any governmental entity to either the 
immediate political constituency or to the elected representatives 
of that constituency. 
The metropolitan water district preserves, somewhat indirectly, 
this control mechanism through close links with the legislative bodies 
of the participating municipalities. No such feature is present in the 
case of the water conservancy district. This omission in and of itself 
mayor may not affect interactions between the districts and the other 
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land and water management agencies. However, the greater security of 
its tax revenues facilitate passage of financial constraints from the 
conservancy district to other interacting agencies. 
If, for example, a water conservancy district places high priority 
on maintaining a high degree of financing stability, there is litt le 
purpose in negotiation with other water and land managers. The district 
is restricted to explanation of its policy and activities which will 
foster public acceptance of that position. This problem is often 
intensified when a project requires a long completion period. The 
society that authorized construction evolves into patterns having 
different needs and preferences. Yet, the contract must be honored. 
The lack of financial oversight may significantly reduce a dis-
tricts incentive to cooperate with other units of state and local 
government. It may foster more restrictive contracts between the 
district and its customers, and perhaps most importantly, it may 
concentrate responsibility for financing to the district and sub-
sequently limit the involvement of other, perhaps state level, actors 
devising creative alternatives to current financial schemes. 
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CHAPTER IV 
MEASURES TO OVERCOME IMPEDIMENTS 
In the previous chapter, examination of points of inst itut ional 
interact ion revealed some problem areas. Many of these impediments 
to appropriate interaction have been recognized and measures have 
been introduced by affected entities to overcome them. Measures to 
improve communication, make governing boards more representative, 
integrate the operation of separately owned water supplies and facili-
ties, and other measures have been successfully initiated as outlined 
below. 
Decis Process 
Integrated Management 
The Salt Lake County Water Conservancy District is, according to 
its general manager, a "water company's water company," primarily a 
wholesaler of water serving unincorporated towns, cHl.es, industries, 
and other agencies. The district initiates programs or develops facili-
ties upon specific requests for service. Some of the cities served have 
local sources of supply, and the district provides supplemental water. 
District water lines to provide wholesale serVl.ce have become 
convenient sources of water for individual users so that the district 
has provided retail service on request and now serves about 7,000 
homes. As cities annex these unincorporated areas, the district has 
been faced with two kinds of situations. One is a request by the city 
to purchase the system. Sandy, Murray, and South Salt Lake have made 
purchases. Alternatively, the city may annex an area but lack the 
capital or inclination to purchase the water system and request the 
district to continue to retail water. Such situations are found in 
Murray, Midvale, and Sandy. When and if these cities indicate a desire 
to purchase the water system and distribute their own water, the dis-
trict and the community simply negotiate an agreement. The district has 
been willing to work out financial arrangements allowing the community 
to pay over a number of years at the interest rate charged on the 
district's bond of indebtness. 
Often, the water line sold to a city has a debt obligation which 
the district must repay. The only means to amortize that debt is 
through the sale of water. Therefore, before the district sells the 
system, it may stipulate that the community agree to purchase a speci-
fied amount of water. This kind of agreement has been no problem. 
Neither have there been jurisdictional problems between communities and 
the district as the communities have grown and wished to change the 
character of the service required of the district. The district 
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attempts to specify realistic water amounts in its contractual arrange-
ments, but does require a "minimum purchase" of 1ncome in order to 
provide security for bond holders. 
Subdividers have created some problems by going to the cities 
and indicating that if they cannot get the needed water from the city 
they'll go to the district. When developers come to the district with 
an approvable subdivision, they cannot be refused if there are supplies 
and facilities and if they are within the district boundaries. If the 
property in question is contiguous with a city, the district advises the 
developer to go to the city to work out arrangements. However, if the 
developer insists the county water district has little option but to 
provide the water but may require the developer to participate in the 
costs af extending waterlines and facilities to his development. 
The Salt Lake County Water Conservancy District utilizes a variety 
of water sources which provides flexibility in meeting needs efficient-
ly. The district has wells, springs, and a supply available from the 
metropolitan water district. The county WCD integrates these supplies, 
and makes exchanges with communities served where this results in more 
efficient sendce. For example, the City of West Jordan has a well on 
the east side of the valley. The pipeline which formerly transported 
water from the well to the city deteriorated so the district now 
operates that well, utilizing the water wherever appropriate, and the 
city is given credit. West Jordan is delivered water through WCD 
facilities with a charge for transporting the water through district 
lines. At the present time this carrying charge is about $25 per 
acre-foot. This exchange operation and carrying charge is presently in 
operation for the cities of West Jordan and Sandy, as well as Taylors-
ville Bennion Improvement District. 
The district expects to utilize these kinds of cooperative ex-
changes to a greater extent as time goes by. This kind of function 
seems to be especially appropriate for a large district whose customers 
have partial supplies of their own. However, the exchanges require 
considerable metering. For example, Sandy City has a series of wells. 
Pumpage is reduced greatly in the wintertime, but in the late summer, 
all pumps are operating. The district installs dual meters on key wells 
where the water might be utilized within the city system or alter-
natively diverted into the district system. The meters are read, and 
the district pays the municipality for whatever water has gone into the 
county district system. This works well because the county system is 
large enough to absorb a fairly substantial amount of water. The 
district can alter the pumping rates at its own wells to accommodate 
the input from these city owned wells. 
Integrated management of water supplies throughout Salt Lake 
County has been given both formal and informal consideration over the 
years. Attempts at unifying city and county governments on two recent 
occasions included combining the present operations of the Salt Lake 
City Water Department, the Salt Lake MWD, and the Salt Lake County WCD 
into a single management entity. Although consolidation of general 
purpose governments was voted down, the managers of the three major 
water supply agencies operat ing in Salt Lake County have cont inued 
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informa 1 meetings and discussions aimed at improving cooperation and 
coordination. These three major water supply organizations have 
initiated areawide studies of potential development opportunities from 
all supply sources. 
There have also been discussions about legislative enactments 
permitting the establishment of a regional or countywide authority. 
Such an authority would concern itself with nonagricultural water 
supply. It would retain many of the broad powers of present WCD and 
MWD organizations with modifications in the selection and composition 
of governing boards and in the organizational and functional relation-
ships with member municipalities. 
Improved Communications 
When water management agencies take unilateral actions; they 
frequently interfere with facilities or operations of other entities. 
To avert conn icts in the cons truct ion of new faci 1 it ies in Salt Lake 
County, local agencies exchange annually a schedule of intended faci-
lities installation and maintenance activities. Information on private 
development plans are commonly sought from newspaper articles, chambers 
of commerce, or industrial promotion agencies who are apprised of 
developer's plans. However, county and city planning commissions are 
often the first point of contact by private developers. Good communica-
tion with such offices can be of substantial benefit to water managers 
trying to anticipate future growth patterns. 
State Participation ~n Board Meetings 
Since state agencies have no ex officio relation to WCD 's, they 
watch agendas of the major districts and send representatives as 
deemed appropriate. Because of the greater statewide implications 
of the Central Utah WCD decisions and actions, the Water Resources 
Division has recently made board meet a matter for regular at-
tendance. This more nearly assures that programs can be coordinated and 
potential problems resolved at the onset. 
Authorities and Functions 
Improving the Composition 
of District Boards 
Some districts have implemented measures to counteract some of 
the criticism about the manner of selection of board members. While 
district officials have not suggested statutory changes in the court 
appointment process, they have taken steps to make appointments some-
what more competitive and more representative. 
The Salt Lake County WCD, for example, identified 10 geographical 
subdivisions of approximately equal population (40,000), each of which 
is represented by a director on the board. Although appointments have 
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been made by the court as prescribed, the district has encouraged 
municipal officials in each subdivision to make recommendations to the 
court regarding appointments. As city councils and mayors made nomina-
tions to the court, the appointees become representatives of local 
units of government and more answerable to the electorate. 
The Central Utah WCD devised a method to provide opportunity for 
citizens to have more input to the appointment procedure, also. As 
the term of office for each board member approached the expiration 
date, public notice of this was given in a newspaper inviting those 
desiring appointment to submit their qualifications to the district 
Court. The court then scheduled a hearing at which time candidates or 
others could make comment. Following this, the court determined whether 
the present member would be reappointed or whether a new member would be 
appointed as a replacement. 
Joint Planning and Manage-
ment Arrangements 
Operating Policies 
To avoid conflicts among several jurisdictions operating inde-
pendently in an area, cities and counties can join together in an 
integrated approach to planning and management. The Timpanogas Sewer 
District and the Wasatch County Sewer Improvement District are ex-
amples. With this form of organization, the sewage disposal operations 
for several cities are provided by districts governed by boards made up 
of councilmen from the cities served. 
Experience wi th int erlocal agreements regional cooperat ion in the 
handling of municipal wastewater and solid wastes has been quite 
positive within the Mountain Lands COG region. The cooperation in the 
regional management of wastewaters has provided a forum and a unifying 
vehicle for neighboring communities to consider water supply problems 
jointly. Communities are finding that regional systems offer the 
benefits of scale economies without great sacrifice in community policy 
if properly s truc tured. Community res pons ibili ty with respect to the 
service within their own boundaries is little changed, and the answer-
ability to community citizenry remains the same. Yet elected officials 
have a voice in overall policy and operating decisions of the region of 
which their community is a part. The Mountain Lands COG believes such 
cooperative endeavors in the provision of services will increase with 
efficiencies impossible to achieve where many separate jurisdictions go 
their own way. 
Mediat ion 
One measure to cope with the recognized impediments IS found in 
mediation. Through this process, a third party possessing Some degree 
of informal authority (in that particular situation) is brought into 
the negotiation process to facilitate the appropriate communication 
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and act as a diplomatic intermediary. 
make any decision affecting the final 
mediator is not a judge. 
This party is not called on to 
outcome of the conflict; the 
One recent example of the use of mediation in resolving the 
disputes among Utah water institutions can be seen in the involvement 
of the state's chief executive, Governor Scott Matheson, to settle 
a dispute between the Central Utah Water Conservancy District and the 
Timpanogas Planning and Water Management Association which represents 
several northern Utah County communities. The policy in dispute was 
that of aqueduct placement by the district within the corporate bounda-
ries of several of the communities. Aspects of that particular dispute 
have been discussed elsewhere in the report. 
That the governor of the state has the informal authority neces-
sary to successfully mediate such a conflict is not in question. The 
appropriateness of using the state's chief executive as mediator of 
first resort does raise some questions however. 
Arguments that the office of the governor should normally be above 
such involvements may be challenged by arguments that when timely 
resolution of significant problems is called for, the luxury of starting 
at the bottom and slowly working through other available channels for 
conflict resolution cannot be offered. Both lines of argument are 
highly relevant, but miss the essence of the problem as it applies to 
the specific area of Utah water institutions. 
The essence of the aJ;jove statment is that when the legislature 
allows or encourages the creation of governmental entities outside the 
normal general purpose government structure, it abandons the mechanisms 
which can usually provide effective conflict resolution within that 
sphere. Such mechanisms are rooted in the elec toral process and some 
quasi-hierarchical formal relation. Either these same mechanisms must 
be recreated in the water institutions or some similar process must be 
substituted to bring about the same relationship. 
One function of elected legislative and executive officers is to 
act as mediators for the numerous factions which compete for public 
attention and sympathy. To the degree that they are successful, they 
maintain support from the general public and retain their positions. 
When they fail, they are generally replaced. One function of the 
territorial separation of authority and responsibility 1S to place 
inter-city, inter-county, and city-county relationships into a well 
ordered sphere linked by contract and general statute, while maintain-
ing a general policy responsiveness to the immediate constituents. 
Such elements of traditional government lend themselves to intermediate 
levels of mediation or legal remedy to solve disputes. 
If a water district is created outside this sphere of order, the 
natural mediators and coordinators are lost. Those issues which might 
have legal standing can be placed before the court, but many of the 
general policy issues do not have such standing. Without the oppor-
tunity for legal remedy and without elected bodies acting as formal 
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mediators between contending parties, facilitating conflict resolution 
1S not without difficulty. 
Thus, the recent experience shows that mediat ion can be a viable 
tool in adaptation and coping, but the involvement of the staters 
chie f execut ive of ficer should be regarded only as an expedient or a 
mediation of last resort. Moreover, this suggests that future legis-
latures should be cognizant of such a revealed need and take the 
necessary steps to make available a lower level mediator for such 
disputes. Such mediation can be far less time consuming and expensive 
than the avenue of legal remedy for conflict resolution. 
Coordination 
Related to the role of mediation 1S the problem of appropriate 
coordination of various functions of government including water supply, 
sewage disposal, planning and zoning, fire and police protection, public 
roads and other familiar services rendered by local government. Special 
purpose districts usually serve one interest to the exclusion of others. 
Their directors seldom occupy the statesman r s role of coordinating, 
integrating and compromising the perceived needs of various gQvernmental 
services. When the legislature allows the creation of special purpose 
districts they do it at the price of reducing the integrating and 
coordinat ing role of general purpose local government unless require-
ments are imposed to submit to the coordinating role of general purpose 
local governments or other integrating devices. 
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CHAPTER V 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
States have a variety of institutions involved in the development, 
management, and distribution of water. They operate under state 
statutes and interact with each other and with other private and 
governmental organizations in various ways. Perhaps the most signi-
ficant of these organizations in terms of the breadth of interaction is 
the water conservancy district. 
There is variation from state to state in the authorities and 
powers given to organizations of this kind, in the linkage to state and 
general purpose local government, and in the legislative purpose for 
their creation. However, because of their size, scope of activities, 
and taxing authority they playa pivotal role in the kind of institu-
tional interactions that take place as water problems are addressed. 
Providing a safe and sure water supply in the most cost-effective 
way often requires cooperation and coordination between and among the 
various ent it ies engaged in that object ive. The need for harmonious 
interaction is most apparent in urbanizing regions where there is 
progressive need to upgrade and expand supplies and services. 
It is apparent that agencies of state government should have 
oversight responsibility over multi-purpose water- organizations whose 
geographical and funct ional domains are broad and interact ive. There 
should be state involvement and approval in the creation of such 
organizations. The state should formulate standardized procedures 
for maint aining budgets and account s, and for reviewing fisc al manage-
ment. The state should also coordinate the plans and programs of 
multiple-purpose water districts with the programs of other units and 
levels of government. Certainly, the water distribution and allocation 
plans of districts should be visible to the state regulatory agencies 
who have responsibility for monitoring water rights and water quality. 
The state role in coordinating and integrating institutional activities 
is prominent in most states examined in this study. However, the 
water conservancy districts 1n Utah and Colorado lack some of the 
structural ties that reflect the need for state sovereignty in water 
management matters. 
Water conservancy districts should be fitted to general purpose 
local governmental structure as well as state governmental structure. 
Allowing the creation of governmental institutions outside the tradi-
tional city-county-state pattern precludes Some important linkages that 
could insure better visibility and accountability. It would also 
provide a better avenue for mediating differences that may arise 
between the WCD and other entities. 
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Water conservancy district statutes (or counterpart organizations) 
in most states contain procedures for creation which assure citizen 
voice and approval by the majority in order to establish a district. 
Democratic procedures for the adoption of a district and in the selec-
tion of its officers should be standard. However, statutory provisions 
for creation of WCD's in Colorado and Utah are weighted to favor their 
formation. A small minority may successfully init iate a WCD through a 
court pet lt loning process. To oppose format ion is more di fficul t. In 
Utah, statutory changes have been made over time that make it almost 
impossible for municipalities to remain outside a WCD when formed. All 
other states provide for the voluntary inclusion if requested by munici-
pal authorities or vote of the residents. The assessed valuation 
subject to WCD ad valorem taxes is attractive in making municipalities 
a part of the WCD. The statutory process for making appointments to 
the governing boards of WCD's should be elective OJ: appointive through 
legislative or executive branches of government. 
The need for district interest and involvement in local planning 
activltles may vary with operational status. Where a district has been 
formed as an agent-manager for a particular project and that project is 
completed and its water fully subscribed, the district may playa 
more passive role in the various kinds of planning undertaken by 
ci ties, counties, COG's, etc. However, if the district is sponsor of 
projects being' planned or in the construction phase, there is need for 
active participation in planning activities. 
In meeting expanding water needs, the decisions and actions of one 
organization may induce countering, accommodating, or complementary 
reactions from another. In exploring various options for meeting the 
next increment of water need, institutions often find it advantageous 
to develop formal or informal cooperation. As urbanization proceeds 
and situations change, institutions customarily find their affinity 
diverging from original expectat ions. In such instances, the oppor-
tunity to adjust understandings and commitments may be needed for 
cont inuance of good cooperat ion. Part ies seek adjustments which are 
advantageous to them and permi ts continuanc e of cost effect ive service 
to their constituency, 
The dec ision-making and policy-making process of a water manage-
ment institution is strongly influenced by its connectives to federal 
agency programs. An institution, acting as an agent, may become an 
outlet for federal policies and prerogatives and become progressively 
less responsive to local interests and ideas about water development. 
WCD's need to consider carefully the role and objectives of other 
institutions as they exercise their own broad powers. Institutional 
harmony is assured when WCD's complement the functions and activities 
of others as much as possible. In this context it would seem a general 
veri ty that a clearly appropriate role for a WCD is that of a water 
wholesaler. Retailers are legion. District authorities and revenue 
generating capability qualify them for undertaking larger scale proj-
ects and integrating a variety of supply sources. If water development 
options are carefully evaluated and selected there should be no problem 
in finding retailers. 
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Where WCD's get involved in act1v1t1es that are traditionally and 
logically the province of others there is greater likelihood of institu-
tional friction. The financing and operation of water treatment plants 
by the Central Utah WCD is a case in point. The construction and 
operation of water treatment facilities are typically a municipal 
function that may be particularly questionable for a large district 
serving both urban and nonurban needs. Treatment plant construction by 
CUWCD has led to reques ts for financ ial support for local proj ect s of 
different kinds as locals seek to get "their share" of such localized 
largesse. Where tax monies have been collected for the ostensive 
purpose of project repayment, and then used to build localized projects 
outside the original understanding of what tax collection would be used 
for, it may constitute a disinvestment of part of the assets set aside 
for project repayment. 
Municipal interests within the Central Utah WCD have suggested 
that the weD consider divesting itself of treatment plants it has built 
and is operating. Equitable arrangements could be made to turn these 
over to those benefiting from their use. Maintain a water whole-
saling posture and avoiding the buildup of local pressure to "get our 
share" should defuse potential sources of dissatisfaction 1n future 
relations. 
Where institutional bonding stems from a water buyer-seller 
arrangement, institutional expectations are realized as the selec-
tion and sequenc of development/management options for satisfying 
projected needs are decided u~on and implemented. Because of in-
creasing uncertaint ies as planning horizons are extended, deve lopment 
in modest increments within relatively short time frames offers greater 
assurance of making expectations converge with reality. More frequent 
opportunity for reevaluat ion of needs and opt ions to sat isfy them, 
makes it possible for cooperat ing entit ies to more readi ly negot iate 
changes which make for compatible continuance of the collaboration. 
Incremental development allows the cooperating parties the kind of 
periodic assessment and opportunity for "mid-course correct ions" that 
assure more optimal solutions. 
Where the institutional affinity is in connection with a large 
federal water development project, maintaining congruent institutional 
expectations is at least an order of magnitude more difficult. Large 
projects which may be undertaken once in the lifetime of a community 
and involve large and complex physical works, require long lead times 
to plan, design, work out financing and contracting commitments, and to 
build. UI t imate cos ts and compl et ion dates are unpredictable. The 
evaluation of the social and economic consequences of large scale 
development become much more difficult to project. Yet, it is impor-
tant to have good projections because of the tremendous investments 
involved and the irreversible nature of the scheme once implemented. 
Technological change, changes in interest rates, unpredictable environ-
mental constraints that emerge during the long construct ion period, 
deviations from projected population distributions, and many unforeseen 
exogenous events that· directly or indirectly effect social priorities 
can cause institutional perspectives to change between the time of 
project initiation and completion. The physical works of a large water 
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project are permanent and limited in operating adjustment to better 
meet demand configurations that materialize out of synchronization with 
projections used for design decisions. Because large projects are 
capital intensive, financing and contracting arrangements are more 
complex. The huge financial burdens and contract commitments associated 
with large projects must be honored even though intervening changes 
of the kind noted above may render the large project solution in-
efficacious. Inst itutional reconciliations may be frequent and di f-
ficult under such circumstances as each institution strives to limit 
its liabilities and preserve its operational credibility. 
Utah's approach to developing its share of the Colorado River 
provides good illustration of the institutional problems that emerge 
as many institutions mingle their expectations around a large and drawn 
out prcject. The steadfast state support of the lar-ge project solution 
has had profound influence on local development policies and the 
consideration of alternative solutions to particular water supply 
problems. This decision seems to have been made with an expectation 
that water developed from this CUP source would be a least cost solu-
tion and therefore markets would exist ln a chronically water short 
region for waters developed. Where other options turn out to be less 
costly and better fitted to existing supplies, expected markets may not 
materialize. However, financial integrity is maintained by the sub-
stantial and continuous accumulation' of tax revenues which are in-
dependent of water sales. Nevertheless, where customers do not peti-
tion for project water as expected, relationships are often strained in 
the inducements used to consummate contracts. 
The repayment commitment for a large federally financed water 
project places the district organization which serves as the con-
tracting agent in the position of major risk taker. In a dynamic 
society where perspectives may change dramatically between project 
initiation and completion, the district may have difficulty translating 
its repayment commitment to ultimate users through purchase contracts. 
With its financial risks minimized, the federal agency is anxious and 
willing to move full steam ahead. Yet potential purchasers of project 
water generally cannot make firm commitments until conditions of 
availability are more definite and actual costs are better known. 
Thus, the agent district's policies and actions are motivated by the 
need to shift its own heavy risk burden to ultimate water users or 
taxpayers. Institutional controversy often arlses out of this root 
cause. The federal agency exacts a firm repayment commitment up front 
from the agent organization (WCD) but at that time the agent organiza-
tion has only moral commitments from its only source of contract 
backing, local users. Where capital intensive and drawn out projects 
are used to provide water services to a dynamic society, institutional 
interactions will be strongly motivated by concerns about averting risk. 
The need to maintain financial integrity as seen by the agent institu-
tion will inevitably clash with the need to maintain flexibility in 
adopting management measures and supply options to meet needs as they 
emerge as seen by ultimate users. Where policies of the state have been 
instrumental in bringing on the problem, perhaps consideration should be 
given to involving the state in risk sharing. Where state policy has 
encouraged a federally sponsored "big project" solution with all its 
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physical and financial rigidities, and it later turns out that condi-
t ions of water availabi li ty and costs are keeping the agent organiza-
tion and potential water subscribers at odds, then the state may need 
to fill a mitigating role in modifying project parameters to obtain a 
more acceptable fit with local desires. In accomplishing this, the 
state would need to consider its own risk obligation as a participant 
in a process of allocating risk more equitably among an enlarged! 
updated pattern of potential beneficiaries. 
For large undertakings that require institutional accommodation, 
education and information dissemination become extremely important 
if interactions are to remain amicable. Too often institutions on 
the "selling" end of the water system emphasize the great need for 
water with the implication that the large federally planned, financed, 
and constructed project is the ultimate solution. Institutions on 
the "buying" end desire information about costs and, more importantly, 
how the costs are distributed so that they might sense their own 
liability. Those on the buying end also want the alternatives for 
meeting needs fully evaluated and displayed. Those commit ted to the 
big project solution tend to thwart or downplay the examination of 
water supply alternatives available to local entities. The issue of 
adequate appraisal of project alternatives is directly related to the 
issue of contractual commitment. Institutions with early-on contractual 
commitments have, in effect, settled on their "best" option while those 
institutions not yet under contractual ties feel their options are 
still open. Mechanisms for dialogue and information exchange are 
critical to resolving institutional differences that stem from the 
selection of options and the distribution of cost burdens: 
The interactions of the Central Utah WCD with other organizations 
and institutions seem to be controlled or documented by a paramount 
concern for maintaining the financial integrity of a project whose 
economic viability continues to experience challenge. Policies and 
pos~t~ons adopted by the CUWCD and the way it reacts and interacts with 
other institutions seems to be closely related to perceived threats to 
the financial integrity of the CUP. Where the CUWCD registers opposi-
tion, or when it takes a position counter to what is believed to be a 
reasonable initiative by another entity, confidence by that entity in 
the motives of the district is eroded regardless of the merit of issue. 
As such instances multiply disaffection grows and solutions to con-
troversy are more frequently sought in the context of political persua-
s~on. 
As a possible way of stemming the progression of such political 
and legal confrontations, state leadership might be exercised in 
causing an open and full reappraisal of the financ ial and contrac tual 
problems of the CUWCD. Such an appraisal would need to address the 
economic integrity issue of the CUP and see if there are some modifica-
tions which could improve profitability without abrogating present 
contractual commi tments. Because of the statewide impl ications, any 
reevaluation should be accomplished by a team of professionals having 
no vested interests or agency prede!ictions about Utah water matters. 
The study should be structured and conducted so as to avoid any criti-
cism of being a governmental evaluation designed to reinforce predeter-
mined conclus ions or previous po !icy pronouncement s. Rather, study 
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participants should be selected on the basis of their national or 
international professional reputations. The team should be uncon-
strained in the kind of open and searching inquiry to be made so that 
the general public could have confidence in the results. 
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APPENDIX 
INTERVIEW GUIDE - PROJECT WG257 
Institutional Interactions in Formulation and Implementation 
of Land Use and Water Development Policies and Programs 
Decisionmaking Process 
1. How is the locatio~, kind, and size of physical works (i.e., 
pipelines, reserV01rs, treatment plants, etc.) decided? Are 
water service needs set out in city, county, or state master 
plans or must a water entrepreneur make independent decisions 
based on its own projections of use patterns? 
2. How do institutions responsible for land use planning and manage-
ment and water planning and management obtain information about 
the intentions of each other and how do they provide comment and 
input to the decisions of one another? 
3. Do suppliers of water in this area review or confirm projection 
for services with county and city planners? 
4. Must water service plans of this organization be submitted to 
other entities for review and approval? 
5. What are the provisions. for citizen participation and feedback 
in decisionmaking? 
6. What 1S the impact of special interest groups (i.e., realtors, 
developers, land owners, etc.) on water management decisions? 
7. Are decisions influenced by federal programs or mandates? How? 
8. Are decisions influenced by state programs and controls? How? 
9. Do state laws authorizing cities 
planning and zoning activities 
of water suppliers? 
and count ies to carry 
influence operational 
out land 
decisions 
Institutional Authority and Responsibility 
1. Is there jurisdictional overlaps in 
between entities within your service 
lap problems addressed? 
funct ion and responsibility 
area? How are these over-
2. How broad is the planning and/or managerial responsibility of 
your organization? 
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3. Does this organization have regulatory responsibility? 
this overlap with such responsibility of others? 
Does 
4. Does this organization have a supervising board, 
committee? Is that board governing or advisory 
membership achieved? 
commIsSIon, or 
only? How IS 
5. What is your involvement or responsibility In water quality 
planning/management? 
6. Does the issuance of permits to locate or build in specific areas 
depend on prior arrangements for water service or the acquisition 
of water rights? 
7. Does your organization get queries and suggestions from industrial 
promotion organizations? 
8. Can your organization deal independently with large industries 
in the provision of water supplies? 
9. What is the vertical line of accountability of your organization 
to city, county, multi-county or state agency? 
10. Are there problems in these relationships? 
11 . Is your organizat ion prevented from doing some things it want s 
and needs to do because of statutory organizational or institu-
tional constraints? 
12. To what extent does your organization give guidance and help to 
smaller entities? 
13. Is this organization limited as to the kinds of water service 
it may provide (potable only, for example)? 
14. If your organization provides both potable and nonpotable water 
service through dual water systems what problems and benefits 
does this combination of service entail? 
Institutional Operating Style/Policies 
1. Are your jurisdictional boundaries permanently fixed or are they 
subject to change as the needs for water or wastewater serVIces 
change? 
2. Do other entities provide similar services within your geographical 
service area? 
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3. As boundaries change as result of urbanization (i.e., annexation, 
etc.) do the resulting changes in governmental jurisdiction or 
responsibility create new questions about who should provide 
water and wastewater services? 
4. How are these jurisdictional problems handled where growth is 
rapid and community boundaries are changing from time to time? 
5. How does annexation affect the efficiency or effectiveness of 
your operation? 
6. Does annexat ion -expand or reduce your obligat ion/ opportunity for 
water services? 
7. Are boundary changes sufficiently predictable that water serV1ce 
entities can plan ahead to accommodate any change in service 
requirement? 
8. When annexation processes introduce optional provisions for water 
services, how are the determinations of an entrepreneur made? 
9. What policies or criterion does your organization use in deciding 
whether your own or another ent ity should provide water service 
when situations require a choice? 
10. Does your organization have sufficient developed water to satisfy 
needs for new requests? 
11. What sources of information are used to project water needs? 
12. What is your policy with respect to providing service to meet 
anticipated growth: 
(a) in incorporated areas? 
(b) in unincorporated areas? 
13. What is your policy with respect to providing total water service 
and/or supplemental service? 
14. Are there peculiar and troubling problems 1n providing supple-
mentary service? in physical operation? in the joint accom-
modations of separate management perspectives? fragmentation of 
delivery systems? realistic allocation of delivery costs? 
15. What problems does your organization face with respect to making 
commitments for constructing facilities and equipment to satisfy 
anticipated needs while at the same time securing commitments 
from these potential users that the water will indeed be purchased 
when available? 
16. Does your organization provide serV1ce on an individual basis? 
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17. What is the basis of organizational policy about clientele served 
(i.e., wholesale or retail service)? 
18. In responding to needs for new water service, who has respons i-
bility for determining whether proposed use is in harmony with 
any relevant city/county codes, ordinances, master plans, etc.? 
19. Are the customers for which your organization provides service 
under standard service agreements or are contracts specially 
tailored to fit particular desires? 
20. Do customers occasionally ask to be relieved of contractual 
service commitments? What situations lead to such requests? 
What policy must your organization follow in reacting to such 
contractual changes? 
21. Does this organization have an operating policy for short term 
sale or rental of water that is in temporary surplus? 
22. Does this organization have access to sources of supply that can 
be purchased or rented on a temporary basis when normal supplies 
may run short? 
23. Are these arrangements for temporary sale or purchase of water 
a satisfactory solution for meeting infrequent water supply 
problems? 
Federal Influences on Policies and Programs and the 
Opportunity to Coordinate and Integrate Them 
1. Does your organization obtain loans or grants directly from 
federal agencies? 
2. What is the nature of federal programs 1n which your organization 
part icipates? 
3. Do the terms of agreements with federal agencies constrain your 
services in any way? (Limitation on kind of water service, 
facilities design approvals, repayment obligation, etc.) 
4. Are your contractual agreements with federal agencies short 
term or long term? 
5. How do the terms of federal contracts affect the service contracts 
your organization negotiates with its customers? Must service 
contracts be written so as to not jeopardize terms of a repayment 
contract or a regulation imposed by a federal agency? 
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6. Which federal regulatory agencies have jurisdiction over your 
act ivi ties? 
7. What is the impact of these regulatory agencies on your operation? 
8. Have federal programs resulted in new institutions and institu-
tional arrangements with which your organization must relate and 
interact? Have you been able to accommodate to these new arrange-
ments sat isfactorily? So far as your own organizat ion ~s con-
cerned, have these new institutional arrangements proven helpful 
(i.e., better coordination, communication, cooperation, etc.)? 
Financial Influences 
1. Does your organization obtain its operating capital from user 
fees? ad valorem taxes? bonding? state or federal loans/ 
grants? 
2. What do you see as the advantages and disadvantages of these 
methods for your particular operation? 
3. Are the financial resources of this organization constrained by 
law or by organizational policy with respect to permissible 
services and/or functions? 
4. How has inflation affected your financial policies and repayment 
obligations? 
5. How do repayment terms of any debt incurred effect your latitude 
to develop operating policies and programs? 
6. How do repayment terms effect the terms and conditions of your 
service contracts with those to whom you provide water service 
(either wholesale or retail users)? 
7. Does this organization participate/cooperate in financial arrange-
ments with related management entities? 
8. Are such cooperative financing arrangements constrained by the 
financial resources of this organization? 
9. Can this organization effectively use the authority of an inter-
local agreement to enable joint financing? 
10. In cooperative financial arrangements would the contributions of 
this entity take the form of cost-sharing, loans, grants in aid, 
subcontracts, or expenditures internal to the organization? 
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11. For revenues generated by sale or services or user fees, how are 
the price levels and fees determined? 
12. How are system expansion costs distributed among clientele served? 
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APPENDIX B 
List of Individuals Interviewed 
Arizona 
Jack Bale 
Pima Council of Governments 
Zada Darter 
Central Arizona Water 
Conservancy District 
Steven Davis 
Tucson Water Department 
James DeCook 
University of Arizona 
Kathy Ferris 
Arizona Groundwater Study 
Commission 
Bruce Johnson 
Tucson Water Department 
Dick Juetten 
Salt River Water Project 
Laurence Linser 
Arizona Water Commission 
Colorado 
Fred Anderson 
Colorado State Senate 
Raymond L. Anderson 
Ag. Econ., Colorado State 
University 
Henry Caulfield 
Political Science Department 
Colorado State University 
Duane Davis 
Ft. Collins City Water 
Department 
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Sol Resnick 
Arizona Water Resources Center 
Gloria Sandvik 
Arizona State Land Board 
Gerald Smith 
Arizona State Land Board 
Wesley Steiner 
Arizona Water Commission 
Larry K. Stephenson 
Bureau of Water Quality Control 
William L. Warekow 
Salt River Water Project 
Don W. Young 
Arizona State Land Department 
Norman Evans 
Colorado Environmental Resources 
Center 
Phillip D. Foss 
Political Science Department 
Colorado State University 
Roger Krempel 
Ft. Collins City Water 
Department 
Conrad McBride 
Political Science Department 
University of Colorado 
Colorado (continued) 
Buie Sewell 
Colorado Energy Conservation 
Office 
Thomas Smart Jr. 
Attorney at Law, Denver 
Nebraska 
Gary Krumland 
Nebraska Policy Research Office 
Robert Kuselka 
Assoc. of Twenty-four Nebraska 
Natural Resource Districts 
Larry Kyle 
Nebraska Natural Resource 
Districts 
Gary Lewis 
Nebraska Water Resources 
Institute 
Ralph Marlette 
University of Nebraska 
Oregon 
Peter Klingeman 
Oregon Water Resources 
Research Institute 
Roger Kragnich 
Oregon State University 
Wesley Kvarston 
Department of Land Con-
servation and Development 
Harold L. Sawyer 
Department of Environmental 
Quality 
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Robert Smith 
Northern Colorado Water Con-
servancy District 
James Nelson 
Division of Water Quality 
Lee Orton 
Nebraska Natural Resource 
Districts 
Hal L. Schroeder 
Lower Platt So. Natural Re-
sources District 
Robert Wall 
Nebraska Department of Environ-
mental Control 
Herb Stovener 
Oregon State University 
Palmer Torvend 
Tualatin Valley Irrigation 
District 
Chris L. Wheeler 
Deputy Director Oregon Water 
Resource Department 
South Dakota 
Delvon Broz 
Department of Water and 
Natural Resources 
Robert Neufield 
Department of Water and 
Natural Resources 
Utah 
James Ash 
Sandy City Water Department 
Craig Barker 
Weber County Planning Office 
Merrill Bingham 
Thurgood and Associates, Provo 
Edward Blaney 
Wasatch Front Council of Governments 
Carl Carpenter 
Central Utah Water Con-
servancy District 
Homer Chandler 
Mountainlands Council of Governments 
Alten B. Davis 
Weber State College 
Joseph Dawson 
Roy Water Subconservancy 
District 
Robert Eldard 
Odgen City Planning Office 
J. L. Green 
American Fork 
Max Greenhalgh 
Bagley and Co. Developers 
Wayne Hillier 
Provo City Municipal Water 
District 
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John Smith 
Office of Attorney General 
John Weirsma 
South Dakota Water Resources 
Institute 
Lee Hooper 
Hooper Water Improvement 
District 
Robert Huefner 
Institute of Government 
University of Utah 
Daniel F. Lawrence 
Utah Water Resources Division 
Lavere Merritt 
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APPENDIX C 
REVIEW COMMENTARY AND AUTHOR RESPONSE 
At the suggestion of the Bureau of Reclamation, reviewers of this 
report were invited to have their comments appended. It is hoped that 
their inclusion will provide the reader with a more complete perspective 
of the authors' conclusions and how they were perceived by others. 
Those providing comment and criticism on the first draft of this 
report were provided copies of the final draft with the invitation 
to submit comment they would like to have included as a part of the 
final publication. This Appendix contains the received in 
response to that invitation along with a response from the authors. 
Comments are placed in alphabetical order by reviewer. 
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City of Pleasant Grove 
Town of Cedar Hi lis 
City of Highland 
City of lindon 
TIMPANOGOS PLANNING AND 
WATER MANAGEMENT AGENCY 
20 North Main 
Alpine, Utah 84003 
(801)756 9550 
August 8, 1983 
Mr. Jay M. Bagley, Professor 
Civil and Environmental Engineering 
Utah State University 
Logan, UT 84322 
Dear Jay: 
City of Amerim Fork 
City of Alpine 
City of lehi 
We have reviewed your report entitled "Impediments to Effective Interactions 
Between Mu I t i purpose Water D i str i cts and Other Governmenta I I nst I tut ions In 
Urbanizing Areas". The context of this report Is very timely considering the 
serious problems that have been exposed during the past two years with metro-
po I I tan and conservancy d I str I cts. We find the report very I nformat I ona I and 
factua I. 
Considering the extreme political pressures that can be brought to bear 
concerning such controversial Issues, this report Is a bold challenge to all 
water districts. The report should greatly assist those who seriously evaluate 
these sensitive Issues, many of which have been kept from the public. Included 
below are a few comments concerning specific areas of the report. 
1. Decisions (Pages 50,55, & 56) 
The "we know best" att I tude I nd I cated on page 55 has been a ser lous 
contention with Utah County Cities for years. In 1978, the Central Utah 
Water Conservancy District (CUWCD) .iQld. the Cities how much water they 
wou I d need from the Project. The D I str i ct eva I uatl ons were done with 
almost nQ ~ from the Cities. Many of the Cities disagreed with these 
evaluations, and nQ commitments were made. Even so, the District pro-
ceeded with the construction of a treatment plant (Utah Val ley) that was 
overs I zed I n many areas to accommodate North Utah County, and aqueduct 
designs were completed for North Utah County. This was done even though 
there was nQi £ single signed or committed user from North Utah County to 
purchase the Project water. 
From 1978 to 1983 (5 years), there h as not even been an attempt by the 
District to obtain Central Utah Project water user commitments from North 
Utah County Cities. This is a prime example of the "we know best" pol icy, 
as we I I as an I nd I fferent att i tude toward the water users based on the 
assumption that the Cities are locked in to the project anyway through ad 
valorem taxes. 
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Page 55 also out! ines the serious problems that the proposed Jordan 
4/Alpine 3 Aqueducts would impose in North Utah County. Contrary to what 
Is indicated in paragraph two, the combined conveyance facility (lined 
open cana I) Is actua I I Y a much cheaper cost fac i I I ty and a I so reta I ns a 
9,000 KW power facil ity that wll I otherwise become obsolete. The plan was 
the original U.S.B.O.R. plan for water conveyance through North Utah 
County. 
One of the most serious problems the Cities encountered was the delay 
tactic. "Let's talk" was their slogan while, at the same time, proceeding 
rapidly with the design. Under this procedure, they were able to spend 
mill ions of dollars while delaying us and then showing those dollars as 
sunk costs against the alternative proposal, as well as pointing to the 
read I ness of the plans for construct Ion. Our exper I ence with these 
problems indicated a total lack of communication and responsiveness from 
the District to Its constituents. 
2. Water ApproprIations 
A typical example of the District protest pol Icy (page 59) on water 
appropriatIons was Provo City's latest court battle with the District and 
others to retaIn the use of 2.5 cfs of water they had acquired for use in 
Provo City. 
The statement on page 59 "a D i str i ct may protest an app I r cat I on to 
appropr I ate water f I led wIth the State Eng I neer on the bas is that no 
appropriated water exists and then turn around and make the water avail-
able under purchase agreement from the DIstrict Itself" was the basis of 
the Provo City case. Fortunately, the courts ruled in favor of Provo 
City. 
3. Representation 
We, along with many others throughout the State, have felt as Indicated on 
page 63 that we have been taxed without representation. This was very 
apparent a year ago when the Councl I of Governments from Utah, Salt Lake, 
and Wasatch Counties fully supported a re-evaluation of the Jordan 4 Aque-
duct proposal, and there was no response from the Central Utah Water Con-
servancy District until the Governor Intervened. The latest legislation 
for District Director appoIntments wII I change this situation. However, a 
fully representatIve board (selected by elected offIcials) wll I take 
severa I years to accomp I Ish since ex I st i ng d I rectors w I I I rema In unt i I 
their term of office is complete. 
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4. Planning Conflicts (Pages 66-69) 
The context here seems to indicate that another water supplier Is needed 
in the County areas since Cities have been reluctant to annex adjacent 
properties, and the County planning Is aimed at expanding the Cities 
versus broad County development. We strongly support municipal expansion 
throughout the County. Within the last few years, the communities In 
North Utah County have spent mill ions of do I I ars to e I 1m i nate sewerage 
problems. If a .llill'i. ~ purveyor were available in the County areas, 
then extreme pressures wou I d be exerted on the County for deve I opments 
utll izing septic tank/drain field sewage disposal, particularly, since the 
developers do not have to construct a sewerage system and its associated 
costs. 
All of the Cities support annexation but require that the area be provided 
with City services, among which Is a sewer system. Many times, this may 
not be econom I ca I I y feas I b I e for a few years unt II add I tiona I growth 
occurs. To al low septic tank/drain fields on a prolific basis throughout 
the unannexed areas undermines the careful planning and large Investments 
that have taken place. It also makes It virtually impossible at a future 
date to I nsta I I a sewer system due to the aspha I t and improvements 
replacement costs and the lack of support from the homeowners since they 
have already spent several thousands of dollars for their individual 
systems. 
5. AlternatIyes (Pages 49.51,52,54.56,72,76, & 95) 
As indicated on page 49, alternate ways of meeting water needs have been 
constrained by the Central Utah Water Conservancy District. The U. S. 
Environmental Protection Agency in Its comments on the "Central Utah 
Project Bonnevi lie Unit M. & I. System Final Environmental Statement" 
(pages 16-24, Vol. II) adequately addressed the lack of thorough eval-
uation of alternative water sources. These comments received only cursory 
response, and the alternatives have never been fully displayed. 
Such alternatives as dual water systems have been promoted by the State 
for years as a conservation measure (page 76), yet receives no attention 
from the District. In fact, It makes the comparisons of such a system 
with the present District pol icy of treatment plants almost Impossible. 
Both methods are a means whereby Project water could be used; however, the 
treatment plant construction cost Is fully subsidized by District taxes, 
and the dual water systems construction cost must be paid directly by the 
users. 
Therefore, a city that bui Ids a dual system is actually doubled taxed: 
once to construct Its dual system and once to pay the District Tax which 
goes to construct a treatment plant elsewhere. We feel that the Cities 
must have the opportunity to fully explore alternatives in order to best 
serve their citizens. 
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6. Wholesale Water 
We tota I I Y agree with the conc I us ions on page 93 that treatment p I ants 
should be a municipal function. As Indicated on page 70, the massive Big 
Thompson Project in Colorado wholesales untreated water and leaves the 
choices to the user as to treatment, etc. As mentioned ill the text, 
wholesaling water would eliminate the problem that now exists with some 
communitIes being provided treatment facl I Itles and others with no 
ImmedIately perceivable benefit from the tax dol lars that have been paid 
In to the District. 
We appreciate the opportunity to provide comments concerning this report. 
tds 
Very truly yours, 
TIMPANOGOS AGENCY 
~rlstlansen 
Chairman 
113 
Authors' Response to Mr. Christiansen's Commentary 
Mr. Christiansen, speaking in behalf of an organization of seven 
northern Utah County communities, offers some contrasting perspectives 
to those presented by Ludlow, Clyde, and Novak with respect to decision-
making, communication, representation, water appropriations, alterna-
tives, and treatment plant policies. Christiansen makes no specific 
suggestions for modifying the manuscript but provides additional ex-
amples in support of particular findings. 
Christiansen's comments with respect to conflicts with community 
and county planning ~ugments what we have said with respect to Utah 
County situation but perhaps draws some inferences we didn't intend. 
Our impression was that the municipal expansion approach to growth which 
had been mutually supported by both cities and Utah County at one time, 
had more recently given way to development in unannexed areas as result 
of changing county policy. We had noted that the county had been 
willing to change zoning so that development could proceed in unannexed 
areas if it were satisfied that adequate water and sewer services would 
be provided. The problem comes in whether or not these services turn 
out to be truly adequate. Problems were reported to us in this regard, 
just as Christiansen observes. Was the fact that the Salt Lake County 
WCD had been requested to annex land across the border into Utah County 
an indication that a regional supplier was considered preferable to the 
options of either privafe water development or annexation to an existing 
Utah County city? If so, could the regional organization that had been 
successful in addressing wastewater problems in northern Utah County 
direct its attent ion to addressing water supply problems of the same 
region? Noting that there are severa MWD's and a WCD already in 
existence in northern Utah County, we thought some consideration might 
be given to utilizing these in a more active way if it might offer a 
means of providing good water supply service without encouraging the 
problem Mr. Christiansen wants to avoid. 
From Christiansen's comments it is clear that the Timpanogas 
Planning and Water Management Agency is well aware of the potential 
problems that a water suppliers might induce with respect to sewerage 
and sewage disposal. Hence, that agency might take some initiatives to 
make sure that problems are addressed in an integrated manner. 
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Professor Jay M. Bagley 
Civil and Environmental Engineering 
College of Engineering 
Utah State University 
Utah Water Research Laboratory UMC 82 
Logan, Utah 84322 
Dear Jay: 
I have read the draft of your paper entitled "Impediments to 
Effective Interactions Between Multipurpose Water Districts and 
other Governmental Institutions in Urbanizing Areas". It is, of 
course, a biased attack on the Central Utah Project, but I have 
been aware for a long time of your opposition to that project. 
Opposition on your part as an individual is, of course, p+oper, 
but I question the propriety of your using the Utah State Uni-
versity or the Utah Water Research Laboratory to support your 
personal views. 
As you probably know, I was on the governing board of the 
University of Utah for nearly 18 years, both as a Regent and 
later as a member of the Institutional Council. I was chairman 
of both organizations covering a total of about 14 years. In 
that capacity I never objected to professors becoming involved in 
any kind of a cause, but I did object if they purported to do so 
on behalf of the University. Policy generally is a matter for 
the President or for the Council. If a law professor wanted to 
become involved on one side or the other of a volatile issue, 
like for example, abortion, it was our request that he do so as 
an individual and not with University letterhead, and that he not 
otherwise imply that he was speaking on behalf of the University. 
If your paper is intended to be a research paper, it is in-
accurate in many respects. If it is intended as a policy state-
ment, I do not believe that it should be done in the name of 
either the University or the Research Laboratory. 
With the above observation, I turn to the draft. 
First, by way of overview, there unquestionably is water, 
such as underground water, which we could develop next and at a 
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price per acre-foot less than Central Utah Project municipal 
water, but all sources will ultimately be needed. My grandchild-
ren or their grandchildren can develop our underground water, but 
it is my firm opinion, after 42 years of concentrated practice in 
the water law field that this is our best opportunity to develop 
our Colorado River water. 
The concept of the Central Utah Project i~ at least as old 
as 1903. I have seen a map prepared by a Utah State Engineer by 
the name of A. F. Doremus, which reasonably well outlines the 
project. For at least 60 years it has been the official policy 
of the State of Utah to first quantify our Colorado water entitle-
ment by compact and then to get proj ects authorized by Congress 
to put that water to use. The first compact dividing the water 
between the two basins was negotiated in 1922 and implemented 
wi th the building of Hoover Dam and the adoption of the Boulder 
Canyon Project Act in 1928. 
The State of Utah and the federal government made a recog-
nizant type survey of the five units of .the Central Utah Project 
in the 1940s, but the Bureau in 1946 advised the Upper Basin 
states that it would not proceed to develop projects in the Upper 
Basin until the states negotiated a compact dividing the Upper 
Basin water. This was done in October of 1948. We then spent 8 
years trying to get development authorized. This occurred 
when Congress enacted the Colorado River Storage Act in April of 
1956. It is this Act which authorized the construction of the 
Central Utah Project. The Vernal Unit was almost immediately 
cons tructed, but it took an addi tional nine years to get con-
struction money for Bonneville. The repayment contract was 
signed in 1965 and construction started that year. Eighteen 
years later we are about 40% completed; the federal government 
has invested over $400 million and the Central Utah Water Conser-
vancy District probably another $100 million. 
The suggestion in your paper that the public officials of 
the State are not in communication with the District on this 
proj ect is nonsense. Governor Clyde provided the leadership to 
get the Central Utah District organized and to get construction 
started. He appeared prominently in the campaign to get voter 
approval and to get congressional approval. We have never had a 
Governor who opposed the proj ect; in fact, year after year they 
go to Washington to testify in support of funds. He have never 
had a member of our congressional delegation who opposed it, but 
to the contrary, our congressional delegation and all of our 
Governors have been in the forefront of Utah's efforts to build 
this project. The project has been submitted to the Utah State 
Legislature for an approving vote on eight different occasions. 
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On seven occasions support for the project by the Utah State 
Legislature was unanimous and on the eighth occasion it was 
unanimous in one house and had only one dissenting vote in the 
other. When it was submitted to an approving vote of the people, 
the vote was overwhelmingly in favor of the project. The cis-
ion to build it was made years ago by both our elected officials 
and by the people. 
It seems to me irresponsible at the present stage of devel-
opment for an institution like Utah State University and/or the 
~vater Research Laboratory to be urging that this proj ect be 
abandoned. The decision to go forward with the project did not 
have its origin with the Central Utah District, and the District 
is not a "voice in the wilderness" supporting the project while 
the elected officials of the State oppose it. When the project 
was put on President Carter's hit list, it was the Governor of 
the State who organized our efforts to reverse that decision. It 
seems to me that it would be foolhardy for the State and federal 
government, after having spent $500 million, to stop half-com-
pleted construction or to abandon the project. Utah is the 
second driest state in the Union and it is the fifth fastest 
growing state in the Union. It seems certain to me that we will 
ul timately need all of our water. We are not able to turn a 
project of this magnitude and on like a light switch. It is 
nearly 30 years since the project was authorized and if we stay 
on our present construction schedule, it will take another 20 
years to complete construction. A town in need of water can get 
permission to drill a well and can do so in a matter of months, 
but a project of this magnitude takes half a century. 
The official position of the State of Utah through its 
elected officials, is to build this project now. To me that 
makes considerable sense. First, I think we are coming to the 
end of an 80-year old era of federally financed reclamation 
projects. If these large mUlti-purpose projects are to be con-
structed in the future, there will almost certainly be a require-
ment for large cost-sharing at a state level and it is unlikely 
that interest will be subsidized. Since this project was auth-
orized under federal reclamation law, as it existed in 1956, the 
agr icul tural water is subsidized by power revenues. Municipal 
water probably also can be subsidized by power revenues. In any 
event, M&I water only pays interest at 3.222%. ~ve have the 
assistance of the Colorado River Development Fund in paying for 
the project, as well as the power revenues from dams heretofore 
constructed, such as Lake Powell. For Utah to pull away from 
this program and defer development of the Colorado River until we 
have exhausted all of our other supplies and to then start the 
long process of a different project makes no sense at all to me. 
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There is a lot of unused water in the Bear River that we 
ought to develop, but my experience would indicate that if vie 
started right now with a concentrated state effort to develop the 
Bear River, it would be decades before the projects could be 
constructed. Presently we have aqueducts in place which were 
built to receive Central Utah \vater. We have treatment plants in 
place for the same purpose. I can understand somebody back in 
1956 urging that we defer development of the Colorado River and 
go to some alternative supply, but I have difficulty seeing any 
merit in the contention that we abandon the project at this time, 
or that we defer it while we drill our wells and start a new 
project on the Bear River, etc. Since we will ultimately need 
the water, why not complete the project on which we have already 
spent $500 million? 
I am fully aware that water costs have gone up, but we are 
taking what I think will prove to be effective steps to bring the 
costs back down. One is through the use of the power revenues, 
which I think the 1956 Act set aside for Utah to help pay the 
cost of municipal water. Secondly, a decision has been made to 
install a 1,000 megawatt plant on the Diamond Fork Power d~op. 
The LP.P. Plant, 'which will only produce 1,500 megawatts, is 
apparently going to cos·t something like $6.5 billion. The Dia-
mond Fork Power drop, which will develop 1,000 megawatts of more 
valuable peaking power, will be built for less than $1 billion. 
The use of these power revenues would bring the cost of M&I water 
down to completely acceptable levels. 
If the 1,000 megawatt plant is constructed, it will warrant 
a reallocation to power of a great deal of the cost of common 
facilities, like Soldier Creek Dam and the Strawberry Aqueduct. 
To the extent the costs are thus allocated to power, it will 
resul t directly in a reduction in the costs allocated to M&I 
water. Thus, I am hopeful that we can hold the M&I costs down to 
reasonable level s. Efforts to do this make sense; efforts to 
kill the project do not. 
Now a few comments on the specifics: 
1. On page 3, the paper implies that because conservancy 
and metropolitan districts are operating under statutes which 
were enacted decades ago, they are out of touch. I personally 
see the fact that we have operated under these statutes for more 
than 40 years successfully to indicate exactly to the contrary. 
The Conservancy District Act was adopted about the time I came 
out of law school some 40 odd years ago. The Utah statute was 
borrowed from Colorado, which in turn followed Ohio, so that we 
have had a long-time experience with these statutes and they 
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work. The 1902 Reclamation Act is still the backbone of federal 
reclamation law, and the fact that it is 80 years old, and is 
still working is a plus. 
2. On page 4 you indicate that municipalities have found 
water from large projects to be the most expensive. This simply 
is not true. Deer Creek water purchased by Sal t Lake City in 
1938, or thereabouts, is less expensive t~day than any other 
al ternative source, including production from either new or old 
wells. As I am sure you know, ci have a period in July and 
August where the peak demands "move off the scale". At that time 
streams are going dry and wells simply do not have adequate 
peaking capacity. What cities need is exactly what these large 
projects provide: Stored water on call, large aqueducts and 
treatment plants to put this water into the cities' systems and 
distribution storage. In my opinion, there is no practical way 
that Salt Lake County can meet its peak demands from the local 
streams and wells. Even with the 175 c.f.s. Salt Lake Aqueduct 
and the 270 c.f.s. Jordan Aqueduct, we will have problems meeting 
the peak demand on a hot summer day. This 445 c.f.s. of capacity, 
backed up by stored water, should be compared in capacity with a 
pretty good well which might yield 3 c. f. s. The v'leber Basin 
Project, built by a conservancy district as a part of a large 
mUlti-purpose project, is indispensable to the water supply of 
those counties and it is not the least cost effective. The 
Scofield water plays a similar role in Carbon County. The water 
is cheap and they did not have better solutions. The failure of 
the paper to recognize the enormous benefits from these projects 
in the past is part of the reason I state that it is not properly 
characterized as a "research" paper. 
3. On page 7 the paper indicates that the law permits two 
kinds of public water districts. This is wrong. Improvement 
districts are in wide use. They are water districts. 
4. On page 8 the paper indicates that the Carbon Water 
Conservancy District was organized to build the Gooseberry Proj-
ect. I haven't taken the trouble to check it, but I think that 
is wrong. I think the Gooseberry Proj ect would take water to 
Sanpete County and that it is bitterly opposed by the Carbon 
County District. I think that district was organized to build 
the Scofield Reservoir. 
5. Also on page 8 you indicate that many of the conservancy 
districts overlap. Again, I may not be sufficiently advised, but 
I do represent many of the conservancy districts. I drafted the 
statute permitting one district to overlap another and have the 
impression that the.only conservancy district that overlaps other 
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conservancy districts is the Central Utah District. However, 
there are some sub-districts. I am not aware of a single case 
where Metropolitan Water Districts overlap. 
6. Also on page 8 you indicate that the District Court is 
appointing directors. This was true yesterday, but was changed 
by the last legislature. 
7. Also on page 8 you say that the specific powers of con-
servancy and metropolitan water districts are "essentially" those 
of a municipal corporation. I think that is wrong. Municipal 
corporations have broad legislative powers. They can adopt 
ordinances making certain conducts criminal. These districts 
have no such governmental powers. Their ability to legislate is 
essentially limited to the establishment of water rates and rules 
and regulations for the use of water. They are referred to as 
quasi-municipal corporations, because their powers are signifi-
cantly less. 
8. On page 25 you suggest that the articles of these dis-
tricts are written by the incorporators. I do not think that is 
correct. I think the "charters" for- these districts are con-
tained almost exclusively in the statutes and that it is essen-
tially impossible for the incorporators to change these powers. 
Since these districts are special purpose districts, they have 
only the powers granted to them by statute; they have no other 
charter. 
9. On page 26 the paper talks of these districts as being 
"independent" government. Again, I disagree. They are creatures 
of the legislature. The legislature retains jurisdiction over 
them and exercises it. Statutes, such as control over the method 
by which they solicit bids for construction, their budget process, 
building and zoning permits, etc., govern and control these 
districts. In my opinion, they are not independent, except in 
the narrow field of facilities to be built and in their rates. 
Even these are subject to court review. 
10. On page 33 the paper states that the districts seem to 
prefer taxes to water rates as a source of revenue. If you have 
researched this and have a basis for the statement, the paper 
does not reflect it. The Utah Supreme Court has frequently 
reviewed the rate-making powers of cities and districts. The 
court recognizes that the sources of revenue include taxes, 
connection fees, charges for water sold, etc, and has expressly 
held that the mix is basically for the district, not for the 
court; nevertheless, the courts occasionally set aside rate 
schedules where they discriminate against a particular class, 
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such as newcomers. I f you have researched the matter and have 
evidence that these districts prefer taxes, it would help the 
paper to note it. My own opinion as to policies of the several 
districts I represent would be to the contrary. 
11. On page 37 the paper states that these districts have 
great autonomy, with no tie to local or national government. 
Again I disagree. I think these districts are subject to zoning 
and building statutes, general state statutes governing budget 
and budget hearings; are subject to ehe open meeting law, uniform 
accounting systeMs, etc. Their autonomy is basically in the area 
of rates for the sale of water and rules and regulations for its 
use. Even here they are subject to court review. 
Further, the charge that the districts are isolated from 
local government is certainly not true in the districts I repre-
sent. In the case of the Salt Lake County Water Conservancy 
District, the subdivisions used for selection of directors gen-
erally follow political boundaries. Sandy is one subdivision, 
Midvale is another, South Jordan and Riverton are combined in one 
district, etc. Other subdivisions involve local improvement 
districts that distribute water on a retail basis. The board 
ini tially was comprised of the mayors of these towns and the 
presidents of these improvement districts. Over time, the mayor 
elected not to stand for reelection, but the town has neverthe-
less urged the district court to continue to have that individual 
represent that district. In any event, the board members are 
tied very close to the cities, water companies and water improve-
ment districts that buy their water. 
In the case of the Central Utah Water Conservancy District, 
the initial board was largely made up of the same type of repre-
sentative people. In the Vernal area, Lawrence Siddoway, who is 
the manager of the Uintah Basin Water Conservancy District, has 
served from the inception. Bryant Stringham was the Mayor of 
Vernal. In Duchesne County, we have had members of the County 
Commission and presidents of the dominant irrigation companies. 
In Wasatch County, Clyde Ritchie and Thomas Baum have both been 
County Commissioners. In Utah County, Sterling Jones and Marion 
Hinckley carne on the board at the time they were County Commiss-
ioners. Ross Garrett is chairman of the Juab County Commission. 
John Lambert from Summit County was a state legislator. Herbert 
Smart was the City Commissioner of Salt Lake City who headed the 
water department and when he chose not to run for reelection to 
the City Commission, Charles Wilson, Superintendent of the City 
Water Department, was chosen. 
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These peop Ie have from time to time changed, but the charge 
that the boards are comprised of individuals isolated from other 
local or regional government is simply not true. 
Further, water rights are not a matter of control by these 
districts. They are controlled by the State Engineer. The dis-
tricts themselves are not water users. They develop a water 
supply for sale to others and the relationship between a conserv-
ancy district and every city, improvement district, water utility, 
etc., wi thin the district is contractual and voluntary. Debt 
beyond one year's taxes has to be submitted to the approving vote 
of the people. 
12. On page 41 the paper states that the Central Utah Dis-
trict has "blunted or retarded" the examination of other alterna-
tives. Again, I sharply disagree. It was never the intent of 
the Central Utah plan to develop all the water needed for the 
next 30 to 40 years. It has always been contemplated that there 
would be simultaneous development of other sources of supply. 
Numerous wells have been drilled in Salt Lake County. None has 
been: protested by the Central Utah District. The Salt Lake 
County Water Conservancy District has recently issued a $22 
million bond issue to build a water treatment plant and to gathe~ 
up water supplies from small streams in Southeast Salt Lake 
County. The rv1etropolitan Water District of Salt Lake City is 
doing a half a dozen things to develop additional supplies, 
including the building of Little Dell, and the making of an 
exchange called the Jacob-Welby Exchange on the old Provo Reser-
voir Canal. It has filed applications to drill wells and for a 
reservoir site on Little Cottonwood water. 
There have been protests by the Central Utah District of 
well applications where the applicants seek to appropriate water 
which we think has already been appropriated by the project, but 
there is no general opposition to the development of other local 
supplies. The Salt Lake County Water Conservancy District has 
even assigned well rights and sold water systems to the local 
water agencies. In no way does it retard other water develop-
ments. 
13. On page 41 the paper suggests that there is going to be 
a problem marketing the Central Utah water and that also is not 
true. It may well be that the Utah County cities north of Provo 
will decide that they do not want to buy any. On the other hand, 
Salt Lake County has only been allocated 70,000 acre-feet and it 
wants more water. Heber City and Wasatch County want more water 
and landowners in North Utah County, located outside cities, have 
applied for water. In my opinion, there is no possibility that 
the water cannot all be sold. 
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14. On page 43 the paper suggests that fixed amounts must 
be paid--as though that were a problem. Reclamation law, which 
is now a well developed body of law some 81 years old, has gener-
ally required a repayment contract and like any standard contract 
for the acquisition of a product, there are fixed payments. The 
comment that building the Bonneville Unit is tantamount to clos-
ing out all other options is simply wrong. The two largest 
purchasers of municipal water, the Salt Lake County Water Con-
servancy District and the Metropolitan Water District of Salt 
Lake City, will purchase 70% of all of the water of the municipal 
project and both are presently engaged in large projects to 
develop additional water supplies and have in fact been doing so 
continuously while Bonneville has been under construction. 
15. On page 44 the paper suggests that muni.cipal grade 
water must be sold at municipal prices and that is not true. The 
136,500 acre-feet of water brought to the Wasatch Front from 
Strawberry Reservoir is all of a municipal qual i ty, but only 
about 16,000 acre-feet of that water will be used for municipal 
purposes now. At some future date it can be converted. 
16. On page 44 the paper states that Provo approached the 
Central Utah District for water treatment in the Orem plant and 
that the District has refused to treat Provo's water. Initially, 
the board developed a policy of only treating project water, or 
water for cities which had subscribed for project water, but that 
policy was abandoned two or three years ago. Provo City has been 
specifically told that it can put its non-project water through 
the Orem plant. 
17. Also, on page 44 the paper refers to a "decision" to 
serve North Utah County communities only with treated culinary 
water. Again, this is not true. If we install Alpine 3 (A-3) 
and all of the cities want untreated water, they can receive 
untreated water through Alpine 3. There is absolutely no mandate 
that it be treated. On the other hand, if one or more of the 
cities want treated water and the others want untreated water, we 
have the ability to meet the needs of both. A-3 can deliver 
treated water and we can deliver untreated water through the 
Provo Reservoir Canal. The canal owners have objected to putting 
municipal water for Salt Lake County in the canal, because it 
will be there year around, will causing freezing problems in the 
winter, will require that the canal be enlarged and otherwise 
modified, etc. We have not encountered resistance to furnishing 
untreated water which is going to be used by exchange for irri-
gation or in dual systems. Thus, we will be able to furnish 
either treated or untreated water to North Utah County. The 
District has not reached a "decision" that the North Utah Coun-
ties must buy treated water. 
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18. On page 45, the paper again makes the erroneous state-
ment that the District will not treat non-project water, except 
under a "piggy back" arrangement. That just is not right. The 
District does recognize that it does not have sufficient money to 
build a treatment plant for every community in the 12-county 
district, and it has given a priority on the available funds for 
treatment plants which will ultimately treat project water, but, 
for example, in Vernal, where they have an immediate problem with 
their water, we do not have any Central Utah District water to be 
treated. Steinaker Reservoir was built under the Vernal Unit and 
it was constructed under contract with the local conservancy 
district. The Central Utah District does not have one drop of 
water in Steinaker. The Jensen Unit also was contracted for by 
the local conservancy district. Ultimately the Central Utah 
Project will buy 4,000 acre-feet of water in the Jensen Unit when 
they develop the next phase and install the contemplated pumping 
facilities. In other words, the available municipal water is 
controlled by the Uintah Water Conservancy District, which has 
contracted with Vernal and the other water agencies. The Central 
Utah District is committed to build a water treatment plant in 
the Vernal area to treat the waters of Ashley Creek/or Spring and 
the waters of Steinaker and Red Fleet Reservoirs, which are not 
owned by the Central Utah District. It was at the time this 
decision was made that the board reversed its decision on Provo 
and concluded that when it has funds to build facilities or where 
it has facilities in place, it would treat non-project water and 
Provo has been so advised. 
19. On p. 47 the paper purports to outline the dispute over 
the Jordan Aqueduct and it does so only by stating the position 
of the North Utah County communities. Jordan Reach 4 (J-4) is an 
aqueduct badly needed by Salt Lake County and the Salt Lake 
County agencies were consul ted. The Bureau of Reclamation con-
cluded, I believe in 1978 or 1979, that the initial plan to use 
the open Provo Reservoir Canal should be abandoned and a closed 
aqueduct should be constructed. It so advised the Central Utah 
District and the District concurred. The Bureau then took the 
matter to the board of directors of the Salt Lake County Water 
Conservancy District, which will be the major agency making 
repayment of this facility, and it concurred. Charlie Wilson, 
who had been the longtime superintendent of the Salt Lake City 
water system, and Bob Hilbert, who is the general manager of the 
Sal t Lake County vlater Conservancy District, were both on the 
board of the Central Utah District and they both agreed. Three 
public hearings were held and a rather clean-cut decision was 
made to abandon the proposal to use the canal and to build A-3 
and J-4. The Bureau then proceeded to design the works. It 
also started the acquisition of rights-of-way and we were pretty 
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far downstream on the project before the suggestion was made by 
the North Utah County group to combine the Central Utah municipal 
water with the irrigation water for some 44,000 acres of land in 
a single closed conveyance facility. The Bureau engineers and 
the Central Utah District engineers looked at the costs in a 
cursory way and concluded that this would cost approximately $100 
million more. Certainly the North Utah County communi ties have 
not volunteered to pay for this extra cost. The matter was sub-
mitted to the Metropolitan Water District of Salt Lake City, 
which is the other purchaser of Salt Lake County municipal water, 
and by a vote of four to one, it approved J-4. Mayor Wilson was 
the dissenting vote. At the recent hearing of the new board of 
the Central Utah District, the Metropolitan Hater District manager 
told the board that if it brought the water to Salt Lake County 
in an open canal, Metropolitan would probably not subscribe for 
the 20,000 acre- of water allocated to it. At the instance 
of the North Utah County communi ties, the Governor ini tia ted a 
study, which basically confirmed the significantly greater cost. 
The Salt Lake County Water Conservancy District adopted a resolu-
tion advising the Central Utah District board that it would try 
to repudiate its contract to buy 50,000 acre-feet, if the Central 
Utah District did not get some water available by 1985. This is 
a date which we can approximately meet by building J-4 and by 
making an exchange of project water with Deer Creek, but we could 
not even get under construction if we go back to Square 1 to 
negotiate our way into the canal, then start design, file new 
environmental statements, etc. Thus, delay became important. 
The Bureau, throughout the entire period from 1978 to date, has 
strongly favored the closed J-4/A-3 system. I also support it 
for what I consider to be legal type exposures and problems. 
I will not prolong this by further stating the argtunent in 
favor of J-4, but the decision was not made in a vacuum. The 
people who will have to pay for J-4 were consul ted in advance 
(three years or so ago) and concurred. Your so-called "research" 
paper, has researched the negative, but has basically ignored 
what I think are cogent reasons for building J-4. 
20. Again on page 47 the paper indicates that it will be 
the Central Utah District that will require the rights-of-way and 
the zoning and permitting of the facilities. It is this kind of 
statement that makes me characterize the paper as shallow. The 
project is going to be built by the Bureau. It has acquired the 
rights-of-way and it is settled law that the federal government 
is not subject to the building permits and zoning requirements of 
counties. The U. S. Supreme Court squarely so held in the very 
first Arizona v. California case, where Arizona tried to stop the 
construction o~Boulder Dam because of non-compliance with Arizona 
law. 
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21. The paper emphasizes the fact that Mayor Wilson, who 
was a candidate for the u. S. Senate, urged further considera-
tion, without noting that he was overruled four to one by his own 
Metropolitan Water District Board; and while he was a candidate 
for the Senate, he did not get elected. The man who did, Senator 
Hatch, strongly supports the District and the Bureau, although I 
do not know why either is material to a "research" paper. 
22. On page 49 the paper makes the flat out statement that 
the Central Utah District is opposed to ground water development 
and dual systems. If you have any research to substantiate that, 
I would certainly be interested in seeing it. I am not aware of 
any such a policy decision. I am not aware of anything the 
District has ever done to oppose dual systems. We are not pro-
testing wells, except where they seek to appropriate water which 
we think we have already appropriated for the project. For 
example, we have appropriated all of the remaining water in the 
Strawberry River and a well drilled in that watershed would take 
project water. we have protested those wells, but only as new 
applications to appropriate. We have generally accommodated the 
developers by selling project water and letting them use the 
Provo water from a well by exchange. In any event, the statement 
that the District opposes dual systems and ground water develop-
ment is simply not true. 
23. You also state that there is no initiative on the part 
of the District to provide complete information. We are spending 
tens of thousands of dollars trying to get the story out. When 
we have a controversy like J-4 it gets picked up by the media, 
but again the statement that we have taken no initiative to 
provide complete information is not true. 
24. The paper states that the District is doing little to 
answer the people's concerns and that is not true. In the loca-
tion of the water treatment plant in Vernal, which was the sub-
ject of serious local dispute, the board held a special meeting 
in Vernal to hear all of the divergent views. When Heber Valley 
opposed getting storage on the Provo by raising the height of the 
Deer Creek Dam, the project backed off and sought another site. 
This repeated statement of the negative, while totally ignoring 
what the District is in fact doing, presents a badly biased "re-
search" paper, which really is not worthy of your talents. 
25. You complain on page 51 that special treatment is 
afforded in the water code to the Bureau. That is a legislative 
function which has nothinq to do with this District, but I think 
special treatment is justified. The State Engineer does not have 
capability, for example, in dam safety, which is superior to the 
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Bureau. In fact the contrary is true. The Bureau has built more 
dams than any other agency in the world and deference by the Utah 
legislature to that experience and special talent makes a degree 
of sense. 
26. The statement on page 53 that these districts are 
another arm of the federal government is erroneous. 
27. On page 66 the paper indicates that the independent 
central district is requiring people to pay ad valorem taxes 
without receiving any benefit from them. Again, this wrong. 
There are few areas in this district that have not already re-
ceived great benefits and all will benefit before we are through. 
Thus, I inquire as to the source of your If research" that demon-
strates to you that there is a significant problem of people 
being taxed without benefit from the project. 
In going through the report, I checked perhaps another 100 
places where I thought the "research" was loose and the state-
ments inaccurate. It is my judgment that the "research" has been 
poorly done and that the document is not worthy of publication as 
a "research" document. As a policy statement, I, of course, have 
no adverse comment about your opposing the project personally as 
vigorously and as emotionally and as publicly as you desire. I 
do object to you doing so in the name of Utah State University. 
Very truly yours, 
~~~ 
EWC:ML 
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Author's Response to Edward W. Clyde Comment 
General 
Edward W. Clyde prepared extensive comment and criticism of the 
first draft of the report. He was out of the country when the final 
draft was delivered to him and could not provide a response to that 
version within the specified time frame. Upon his return, Mr. Clyde has 
been engrossed in other urgent matters and has asked that his original 
comments be included with our report with proper recognition of the fact 
that many of the comments may have been satisfied in the current draft. 
The first three paragraphs of Clyde's letter expresses some 
general impressions that 1) the report represents a biased attack on the 
Central Utah Project, 2) that the senior author harbors a long time 
opposition to the CUP and uses the report as a vehicle to thus express 
his personal views, and 3) that the authors' unsupported and inaccurate 
statements are an attempt to imply Utah State University/Utah Water 
Research Laboratory policy. 
It is certainly true that the preponderance of examples of institu-
tional impediments described are associated with the Central Utah Water 
Conservancy District who is the sponsor of the CUP. This was not 
anticipated as the work plan was organized and the study initiated, 
although in retrospect perhaps we should have foreseen this. After all, 
the CUWCD comprises 12 counties whose residents are expecting benefits 
from the several units of the large and complex CUP. The CUWCD and the 
BOR are actively interacting with many different organizational entities 
on a variety of problems and issues whose resolution is not simple. The 
CUP is in an active stage of design, evaluation, and construction. 
These activities involve much citizen and institutional interfacing. 
As we began to summarize our interview information and sort out the 
meaningful examples, that fact became clear. The authors did not create 
the impediments identified nor manage their geographic or institutional 
distribution. If they tended to be concentrated regionally, that may be 
an interesting and meaningful fact, but we were primarily interested in 
the identification of the impediment and the analysis of their nature 
and mitigation potential. 
Clyde expresses an awareness of the senior author's long time 
opposition to the CUP and questions the propriety of using the Univer-
sity or the UWRL to support personal views. Clyde does not produce 
facts or evidence illustrating the senior author's opposition to CUP. 
Can he cite membership in any organization openly opposed to CUP? Has 
he made statements in opposition at any of the many hearings and other 
forums that have invited that opportunity? Has he implored state 
government officials, local, state, or national legislators to oppose 
CUP? Where in his publications, papers, or presentations has he stated 
"opposition to that project?" It seems that an occasional question 
about some aspect of the CUP is sufficient for proponents to brand that 
inquirer as an enemy of CUP. 
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Clyde's characterization of the report as an inappropriate policy 
statement in the name of the University or UWRL is discussed further 
in the authors response to Mr. Novak who made similar assertions. 
Universities don't take sides on external policy issues and everyone 
understands that university staff cannot and do not speak for the 
university. 
Clyde's opinions about the opportunities and proper sequence 
for water development are noted. Such opinions need to be debated and 
discussed. They bear direct lyon one of the main points coming out of 
our study, viz., that differing perspectives about the rationale and 
approach to solve water supply problems is leading to institutional 
incompatibilities. One interpretation of Clyde's commentary is that 
since all "later sources m1 st be l.lltimately developed, no water proj2ct 
should be considered an alternate to any other. This being so, Clyde 
argues that the factor that should determine the development sequence is 
opportunity and that the CUP opportunity is now. 
Of course, Clyde's development logic could only hold true if water 
from all potential sources or projects could be made available to the 
user at the same cost. That is not a valid assumption. Clyde himself 
points this out in saying "there is unquestionably water that we could 
develop next and with more cost effectiveness than the CUP." 
Assuming capital is rationed, capital budgeting considerations 
alone would suggest building least costly projects first even if the 
cost per acre foot for different projects were the same. However 
economic rationale'would suggest evaluation of the full range of alter-
natives for development recognizing that need could be met not only from 
the development of new supplies, but also from market transfers of water 
from lower to higher valued uses and better utilization of water already 
developed. Under a presumption that we should add those increments of 
new supply which are least cost, the basic questions are: which sup-
plies should be developed? In what amounts? What should be the time 
sequence for development of specific options? From the perspective 
Clyde outlines, these questions are immaterial. 
If development proceeds under the assumption that there is no 
better project option and no better development sequence than Mr. Clyde 
recommends, and yet if indeed this were not true, then it is possible 
that better alternatives may never be considered. Certainly better 
options cannot be selected if they are never considered. 
AlthouEh Clyde is satisfied with the development logic he outlines, 
the authors found many others who feel the need for evidence that there 
has been an objective examination of options in the light of changing 
situations. The justification any municipality has for purchasing CUP 
water is that such water can be provided at a cost no greater than if 
the needed supply were acquired from an alternate source. 
Mr. Clyde's comments on pages 2, 3, and 4 of his letter certainly 
help to illustrate the incongruent perspect ives that we note in our 
report as being a root source of institutional friction. This is most 
evident in the CUWCD region. A bel ief that water supply creates its 
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own demand; that there is really no choice between projects because all 
will be ultimately needed; and that the development sequence of projects 
is immaterial, is in stark contrast to the notion that water demand is 
a function of cost, that development alternatives do vary in cost 
effectiveness, and that, therefore, the sequence of development 1S 
indeed important. 
It should be noted here that the above extrapolations are correct 
only to the extent Clyde's commentary is correct ly interpreted. The 
authors are not fully agreed as to what extent Clyde's comment might 
permit inferences about his development perspectives. 
Clydes historical accounts are interesting and if he could simply 
avoid using them to create strawmen to knock down, the statements 
would be more valuable. By alleging that the authors are recommending 
abandonment, Clyde goes to cons iderab Ie length to argue why the CUP 
should not be abandoned. The intent of the study was to observe inter-
actions between special purpose water districts and general purpose 
local government and state government. It was not intended to raise the 
question, "CUP: To Be or Not to Be?" 
Specific Comment 
Note: Mr. Clyde's page references are to the first draft. The 
page location where the comment applies in the final draft is given here 
1n parentheses. 
1. (p. 3) The implication that Clyde sees here is pec1,lliar to 
his review. We have made some slight modifications of subsequent 
sentences in the paragraph which may be helpful. 
2. (p. 5) Clyde raises a number of points here which deserve 
comment but space and prudence may limit what we say. There is certain-
ly much more to a cost comparison than Clyde's conclusions would imply. 
The description or foundation we lay in this section is believed 
necessary or helpful in understanding why different water entities 
may encounter impediments as they collaborate in meeting water supply 
needs. We try to point out that "best" solution perspectives will 
differ among various water supply entities at any given point in time. 
Clyde senses in this description some wrongful implications, viz., 
that water suppl ies derived from large federally sponsored projects 
is the most expensive. He further suggests that our failure to recog-
nize the enormous benefits from such projects is an indication of 
biased research. (Neither do we recognize the benefits that are derived 
from non-federal smaller projects. But Clyde finds no fault with that 
omission). 
Clyde's statements point up the fact that highly subsidized 
federal projects may reorder the normal development sequence for any 
given community and we certainly agree that that may happen. Clyde's 
comment about peaking problems, large project advantages over other 
options in terms of cost, indispensibility, etc., are interesting but 
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unless they can be accompanied by objective analysis, we would withhold 
our judgment. 
3. (p. 10) Clyde leaves off the important part of the sentence 
with general taxing authority. See revised text in final draft. 
4. (p. 10) Clyde notes an incorrect association 
berry project with the Carbon Water Conservancy District. 
rectified in the final draft. 
of the Goose-
This has been 
5. (p. 10) We have modified the description of overlapping districts 
in the final draft. 
6. (p. 11) Parts of the manuscript affected by this change have 
been made accordingly. 
7. (p. 11) Changed to quasi-muncipal corporation. 
8. (p. 23) Modifications have been made l.n final draft. 
9. (p. 33) See substitute wording in final draft. 
10. (p. 40) Modifications made in final draft. 
11. Clyde disagrees with our statement that Water Conservancy 
Districts have great autonomy. Our state by state comparison of 
statutes, our evaluation of the Utah statute in particular, and our 
evaluation of operating policies and experiences certainly do not 
lead us to Clyde's conclusion. Utah I s enabling s tatutes pre~erve no 
formal status for state government or local general purpose government 
in the operation of a WCD. Clyde's description of a policy adopted 
by the Salt Lake County WCD to improve Board representation is also 
described by us on page 87-88 as a measure adopted to overcome the 
representation problem. Readers may find it helpful to consider 
Clyde's other comments in the context of our discussion on opportunity 
for input and/or approval of policy options on page 40, and our dis-
cussion on public voice and representation on page 61-62. 
12. (p. 49) Clyde sharply disagrees that the acceptance of the 
CUP-Bonneville Unit has "limited or retarded" the examination of other 
alternatives. Although we have made changes in the manuscript to make 
the point less forceful, we cannot alter the conclusion that the focus 
on CUP has constrained the examination of alternate ways of meeting 
water needs. The examples Clyde cites of other options going ahead 
despite CUP are the kind of options that should have been considered as 
an integral part of the overall planning including the CUP potentials. 
The active consideration of the option Clyde identifies has most 
certainly been deferred because of CUP expectations. Without the focus 
on CUP, their feasilibity would have been explored long ago. The fact 
is, that total water management concepts have not been basic to BaR 
project planning unt il very recently. Thus, options outs ide the BaR 
solution have been seen by BOR/CUWCD in a competitive rather than an 
integrative light. 
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13. (p. 51) We have removed the paragraph pointing out that water 
demand is a price phenomena and that high costs for water may lessen 
demands for CUP water. This was an unnecessary postscript to the main 
point of the section noting the effect of the Colorado River Development 
priority on the institutional decision making process. We have to 
agree with Mr. Clyde that the CUP water may all be sold but there 
are indications that large parts of the cost may have to be shifted 
to power consumers and other nonwater users before that happens, and we 
realize there are plans in process for accomplishing that. 
14. (p. 51) Clyde incorrectly assumes that we take issue with 
contracts being for fixed quantities of water. 
We have deleted the statement that "from the standpoint of the 
BOR/CUWCD the decision to proceed with the Bonneville Unit is tantamount 
to the c losing out of all other options for meeting the same water 
supply objective." The next paragraph is a more clear expansion 
of what that sentence implied. 
15. (p. 52) Clyde says it is not true that repayment commitments 
on the Bonneville Unit requires the marketing of municipal water 
for which higher prices can be charged, as we have stated in the 
report. This isn't corroborated by any information we have and 1.S 
a puzzling contradiction to statements Clyde himself has made in the 
past. How can Clyde IS refutat ion of our statement be reconc iled with 
his own that " ..• the Central Utah District cannot possibly meet its 
obligations to the Bureau from its limited taxing power. Irrigation 
sales are below cost, and will not produce significant amounts of 
income. The financial integrity of the project mandates the sale of a 
large amount of M & I water." (Letter of Nov. 2, 1977 to Mr. Robert B. 
Hilbert) 
One author, Dan Hoggan, takes exception to this interpretation 
of Clyde's comment on the marketing of municipal grade water at munici-
pal prices. He feels that the statement in the report text and Clyde's 
comment are taken out of context and the above reply is to a broader 
question. 
16. 
policy 
plant. 
(p. 52) Clyde notes there has been a change in the District 
regarding treatment of Provo City water in the Orem treatment 
We have made the appropriate changes accordingly. 
17. (p. 52) The plan to serve, rather than the decision to serve is 
more correct. Clyde's amplification of the availability of either 
treated or untreated water to the northern Utah county area is very 
helpful. 
18. (p. 52,53) The comment also relates to no. 16 regarding the 
policy to treat non-project water in District treatment plants. 
Clyde provides background on the reason for earlier policies and the 
adoption of the present one. We have modified our draft to reflect this 
change. 
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19. (p. 54,55) Clyde believes our outline of the Jordan Aqueduct 
dispute only states the position of the northern Uta.h County communi-
ties. We might just comment here that reviewers on both sides of the 
issue seemed to feel that we were describing the merits of the case. 
Our message was that inadequate communication and dissemination of 
information can create impediments to good institutional interaction. 
The text has been modified to (hopefully) make the lat ter point more 
clear. Commentary by Clyde and Christiansen should provide readers with 
a better perspect ive of the issues and reasons for building or not 
building the J-4 aqueduct in particular ways. 
20. (p. 55) Modificat ions in the text may have made this comment 
moot. Our statement was that the northern Utah County communities were 
resorting to their zoning and permitting authority to deny the aqueduct 
right of way if they could not otherwise get consideration of some 
alternate solutions. Clyde makes an issue over the fact that it was 
the BOR not the District that would build the aqueduct, and that the 
federal government is not subject to building and zoning permits. 
Clyde's comment expresses better than the authors the attitude that so 
upsets people. Resort to the negotiating process may be superior to the 
bold assertion of authority. 
21. (p. 55) The quote of Mayor Wilson has been deleted in the final 
draft. Clyde chides the authors for failing to note that Mayor Wilson 
was overruled by his own board. That fact was noted in the next para-
graph of the draft report. Clyde infers that Senator Hatch supported 
his position on the aqueduct issue. We know of no statement of such 
endorsement, but agree with Clyde that neither the Wilson or Hatch 
statements coming in the context of an election compaign are very useful 
to the discussion. 
22. (p. 56) The flat out statement about CUWCD opposing groundwater 
deve lopment has been de leted. Some of the act ions of the BOR/CUWCD 
have been interpreted that way, even though no direct opposition 
may have been intended. For example, the BOR filing for many wells in 
Utah County a number of years ago was interpreted by many as an attempt 
to deny further access by others to that source but to direct them to 
seek water through the District. Many are aware of an earlier Weber 
Basin WCD filing which had been made under that motivation. Some people 
perceive that filings of the BOR/CUWCD in the upper Provo had been used 
(as Clyde described) so that groundwater (or other) could only be 
obtained by purchasing district water under an exchange or replacement 
concept. 
The early emphas is on groundwater development by the Salt Lake 
County WCD with approved applications for over 200 cfs led to a rather 
vigorous program of groundwater development up until the late 1960s. 
However, the creation of the CUWCD and its promise of water from 
the Bonneville Unit resul ted in expectat ions and encumberances which 
appear to have greatly altered earlier management decisions about 
groundwater use in Salt Lake County. While such decisions cannot be 
said to be an outright result of CUWCD opposition, the enticing policies 
(i.e., providing water treatment plant) have certainly been a factor in 
whether or not groundwater options have been exercised. 
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Clyde's own express ion as reported in a 1981 Newsletter of the 
Utah Environment Center of wanting to discourage Ted Arnow, USGS ground-
water expert, from making public statements about vast groundwater 
resources beneath the Salt Lake Valley is interpreted as opposition to 
groundwater development, also. 
23. (p. 56) Clyde takes exception to our statement that the 
CUWCD is showing little ~nltlative in providing complete information 
about the way costs are being distributed throughout the district in 
comparison with the expectation of benefits. If Clyde has some informa-
tion to refute this statement it would be welcomed by the authors and 
many others who have not seen such. Clyde's examples in this comment 
constitute oblique effort to counter a statement he fails to refute 
directly. Regardless of the many good things the CUWCD may be doing to 
mollify people;s concerns, the fact remains that motives and rationale 
of the District in adopting policy and in taking positions must be 
better communicated if good institutional collaboration with others is 
to be preserved. 
24. (p. 56) Covered by 23 above. 
25. (p. 58, 59) We do not "complain," we merely state the fact. We 
also provide justification for this policy, as well as to point out a 
potential problem with it. The BOR expertise is not at question in our 
statements. 
26. (p. 60) Perhaps "quasi-agent" is a more correct term than 
"agent." 
27. (p. 72) We identify in this paragraph of the report a number 
of concerns that have been expressed to us. Clyde selects a phrase 
from the last sentence, contorts its usage and ascribes his distortions 
to us, with the inference that bona f ide research would have revealed 
the truth according to himself. Perhaps Clyde should ask himself why so 
many counties of the CUWCD are openly asking how they might get out of 
the District. Certainly they would not entertain such notions if they 
are "already receiving great benefits" and are convinced that "all will 
benefit before we are through." The fact that the last session of the 
Utah Legislature was induced to materially alter the appointive process 
for Utah water conservancy districts and especially the Central Utah 
Water Conservancy District is res ipsa loquitur. Perhaps a little 
IIresearch" on Clyde's part would demonstrate to him, as it has to 
many others, that there ~ a problem of the kind we identify. 
134 
A CRITIQUE OF THE USU STUDY 
Dr: Alten B. Davis, Professor of Political Science 
Weber State College 
The study team from Utah State University under the direction of 
Dr. Jay M. Bagley is to be congratulated for their venture into the 
thicket of intergovernmental relations in the area of water policy, 
development, and management. Water resource development in the West 
is becoming increasingly complex as urban and industrial growth take 
place. California, Arizona, and Colorado have generally (up to this 
point in time) had to deal with these factors of growth more than their 
neighboring states. However, all of the remaining western states are 
now aware that multiple purpose projects mean supporting clientele 
groups with differing reasons for supporting a given water development 
project. Not only do mUltipurpose projects bring diverse clientele 
support, they also bring the same increasing number and diversity of 
opposing interests. To this picture must be added the institutional 
factor of the special purpose district which has been utilized by local 
governments and citizens throughout the country to deal with specific 
problems within specific geographical boundaries. These organizations 
have proven to be a boon in dealing with anything from slum clearance, 
to mosquito control, to sewage disposal, and a host of other important 
and less important problems. But the extensive use of the special 
purpose district is now being viewed by government administrators and 
citizens as a somewhat mixed blessing. Such districts are independent, 
and individually governed and therefore prove to be difficult to expand, 
abolish, coordinate or adapt to whatever may be needed in a dynamically 
growing and changing society. (Perhaps any future study should scan 
briefy the existing literature evaluating the special purpose district.) 
The Utah State University study gives a much needed look at the 
problems of water organization operating in the environment described 
above in an attempt to establish some guidelines to permit water develop-
ment agencies to function more rationally and effectively. 
The strength of the study lies in its comparative approach to 
create an awareness of approaches used by other states to meet specific 
problems. The states selected offer an excellent mix of varying degrees 
of impact and growth. California is in SOme respects so different from 
the rest of its neighbors in the West that its omission is to be commend-
ed. The highlight of the study is the extensive table giving statutory 
comparisons of the organizations created by each state to deal with 
multipurpose water management. The study is also to be commended for 
its emphasis on the increasing role of the state in water resources 
planning, development, and coordination. The message of the study is 
that water resource development in all western states has become in-
creasingly complex because such development affects and is related to 
all other types of development and hence impacts heavily on the operation 
of state and local governments. These factors call for a more concerted 
effort to clarify water development goals and to establish cooperative 
and coordinating procedures to achieve those goals under the existing 
institutional system. 
The major shortcoming of the study lies in its attempt to develop 
and use criterion to judge the existing system. The development of 
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criteria and their validation would involve another extensive study. 
The criteria utilized seem quite rational and pragmatic, but their 
origin and justification are not dealt with. Furthermore, the study is 
reluctant to apply its criterion. In at least one place in the study a 
given state's activities are described after the necessary guidelines 
have been spelled out and the variance of the state's action from the 
criterion are obvious to the reader, but the study does not proceed to 
the next logical step and label the state's actions as being either 
ineffective or counterproductive. 
I understand that this study and its conclusions are considered by 
some to be controversial. That is not surprising in the light of my 
analysis of the complexities involved. Some years ago another Utah 
State University team did a study of the attitudes regarding the develop-
ment of the Bear River Project. To their surprise they found a greater 
support for the project from the urban residents of Ogden than they did 
from the residents of the more rural areas of Box Elder and Cache 
Counties, where the major benefits of the project would accrue. This 
survey simply demonstrated the "built-in bias" that most westerners have 
in favor of water development. But the growing complexity and costs of 
water development projects in the West lead to a greater dependence on 
the federal government for funding. Federal funds have always been 
limited in the water resource development area so it was only logical 
that Congress would evolve a rule of thumb that unless there was unified 
local support for a project it could not expect to survive the authoriza-
tion and appropriation process. Therefore significant local opposition 
or criticism could mean the death of a project and so any citicism was 
viewed in that light. In 1983 the realities are much more complex as 
indicated by the continued growth throughout the West, the continuing 
withdrawal of the federal government from the water resources development 
area, and the increasingly important role of the state. These realities 
have also changed the once rather simplistic process of federal support 
noted above. 
The study shows that there have already been some significant changes 
in the powers and relationships of the existing system. The metropolitan 
water districts in particular have had to deal with these new realities. 
They have learned that to "notify" is not "informing." They have also 
learned that "informing" is not all there is to a process of "coordinating 
and cooperating." Furthermore, they are now aware that it may well be a 
"myth" to assume that conflicts between the increasingly complex interests 
in a developing state can be resolved by any amount of discussion, 
cooperation, or compromise. There are farmers and water rights owners 
in the Delta area of Utah who are certain that those who sold their 
water rights to permit the operation of the Intermountain Power Project 
sold their birthright for a "mess of pottage." The Salt Lake County 
Conservancy District and its clientele need the Central Utah water 
delivered to them for use in 1985 even if that means a covered aqueduct 
constructed through the once agricultural areas and now thriving suburbs 
of northern Utah County. Not all disputes are resolvable by compromise. 
This study by the Utah Sate University team illuminates and puts in 
perspective a growing problem area and indicates what actions have been 
taken and possibly should be taken to reduce the areas of conflict. The 
study did not create the problems and if these problems are ignored they 
will simply grow in number and complexity. 
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Author's Response to Dr. Davis Commentary 
Dr. Davis applauds the authors efforts to give a "much needed look 
at the problems of water organizations" operating in complex inter-
governmental thicket which he describes succinct ly. He finds some 
shortcomings with the expression and justification of criteria with 
which effective interactions are judged. He also indicates that we are 
reluctant to label certain institutional actions as being ineffective or 
counterproductive when the facts suggest that they are clearly at 
variance with our criteria. 
We cannot argue with Dr. Davis on the above observations. Had time 
permitted, the report might have been reorganized co give the criteria 
more prominence up front and more direct utilization in the discussions 
about impediments. Such treatment would likely have sharpened the 
impact and clarity to most readers. 
We also agree with Dr. Davis' observation that we should not 
ignore the problems identified but rather illuminate them, put them into 
perspective, and strive to reduce areas of conflict. 
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SHELDON H. HOLMES. Chairman and Director 
NOAl C. BATEMAN, Vice Chairman and Director 
August 11, 1983 
Dr. Jay Bagley 
Director 
Utah Water Research 
Laboratory 
Utah State University 
Logan. Utah 84322 
Dear Jay: 
ROBERT B. HllBE 
Generai Mana 
Secretary, Treasu 
In response to your latest draft entitled, "Impediments to 
Effective Interactions Between Multipurpose Water Districts and 
Other Governmental Institutions in Urbanizing Areas, 11 I have 
the following comments: 
In general you have made many improvements since the 
initial draft and this one appears much more objective. 
Its general thrust still appears to be slanted towards 
Central Utah. There is also a very unequal treatment of 
water conservancy districts versus metropolitan water 
districts. The comparative section on districts in other 
states is very interesting. 
On page 49, the first sentence in the last paragraph, 
where is says, "From its early conception, the CUP has 
sought to obtain Department of the Interior financing, 11 you 
probably mean the CUP sponsors. 
On pages 65 and 66 under your discussion of, "Conflict 
of Interest Potential," you are probably right in regards 
to engineers and legal counsel, but I am concerned about 
the implications for board members. A District such as 
mine which has a large stake in the outcome of the Central 
Utah project deserves and is entitled to representation on 
its board for the liaison and coordination of the 
project development. Considering our financial stake in 
the form of tax revenues coming from our District and the 
future revenues that will be flowing to the Central Utah 
District in the form or water purchases, we feel a great 
need for representation on the board, though, I agree that 
any type of relationship could be misused if unprofessional 
people were allowed to be appointed. 
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3495 South 300 West. P.O. Box 15618· Salt Lake City, Utah 84115. (801) 262-7421 
SALT LAKE COUNTY WATER CONSERVANCY DISTRICT 
Dr. Jay Bagley 
Director 
Utah Water Research 
Laboratory 
August 11, 1983 
Page Two 
On page 67, in the second paragraph, under your 
discussion of the willingness of the Salt Lake County 
Water Conservancy District to provide service, I would 
like to give you a little better historical perspective. 
Our District has two retail areas, the Granite Park area 
between South Salt Lake and Murray and what we call the 
1300 East area which extends from about 5600 to 9400 
South. Both of these areas were clearly established by 
need prior to the development and expansion of South Salt 
Lake, Murray and Sandy cities into these areas. As a 
matter of record, the 1300 East retail area was offered to 
Sandy prior to Sandy's rapid expansion in the 1970's and 
was turned down by the administration at that time. In 
recent years South Salt Lake and Murray have expanded into 
the Granite Park retail system through annexation. In 
some of these areas we serve retail customers at the 
request of Murray City and we are negotiating with both 
South Salt Lake and Murray for the best possible service 
arrangements for these areas. In the case of the 1300 
East area, the initial retail systems in these areas were 
established by private water companies. When they sought 
to get out of the retail water business, they turned their 
systems over to our District. We have not sought to 
expand our retail system in these areas. but have only 
filled in, in established areas. The competition, if 
there be any in these areas, has been created by the rapid 
expansion of Sandy, in and around our long-time existing 
retail service areas. The role of our District in 
assuming retail service responibilities in Salt Lake 
County has been relatively minor compared to that of 
improvement districts such as Granger-Hunter, Taylorsville 
Bennion. Kearns Improvement Districts and private water 
systems such as White City, Draper Irrigation Company and 
the Bell Canyon Irrigation Company and others. It is a 
long standing policy of this District that we will not 
compete with existing municipal entities for retail water 
service. 
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SALT.LAKE COUNTY WATER CONSERVANCY DISTRICT 
Dr. Jay Bagley 
Director 
Utah Water Research 
Laboratory 
August 11, 1983 
Page Three 
On page 68, at the bottom of the page, comments 
concerning Utah County developments near the Salt Lake 
County-utah County border obtaining water service from 
Salt Lake County is without any fact. We have annexed a 
2,500 acre tract of land into this District and are 
working with the developers to provide a wat~r supply for 
these lands sometime in the future, but there is no such 
service existing today. Your implications in this 
paragraph and in the paragraph at the top of page 69 are 
pure speculation and do not deserve treatment in this 
text. 
On page 78, the second to last paragraph from the 
bottom concerning competition, I have already addressed 
our position in this regard. If there is an overriding 
weakness in this text, it is the generalizations that you 
use for all water conservancy districts. It is impossible 
to describe all sixteen water conservancy districts in the 
State of Utah in the manner that you have attempted in 
this study. 
On page 81, in the third paragraph, you should define 
what you mean by a small district and a homogeneous water 
market. 
On page 82, in the third line from the top, the use 
of the word "would" is not appropriate. Perhaps "could" 
would be a better usage since this is a future event. 
On page 82, second paragraph from the bottom, your 
discussion of bonds is inaccurate. All water conservancy 
districts have the authority to issue a revenue and 
general obligation bond, but not all districts can issue a 
revenue bond. To say ad valorem taxes are the preferred 
measures for raising needed revenues is surely an 
unsupportable assumption on your part. 
On page 85, your comments concerning the Salt Lake 
County Water Conservancy District should be attributed to 
its General Manager rather than its Director. 
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SALT LAKE COUNTY WATER .CONSERVANCY DISTRICT 
Dr. Jay Bagley 
Director 
Utah Water Research 
Laboratory 
August 11, 1983 
Page Four 
At the top of page 86, concerning a floor of income, 
we. at the request of bond counsel, have now gone back and 
rewritten all of our agreements to provide for a minimum 
purchase requirement in order to provide security for the 
bond holders. 
In the second paragraph, we work with developers in 
Salt Lake County to provide water only where it is 
reasonable and cost effective, that is to say, where we 
have existing waterlines or the developer is willing to 
participate in the cost of extending waterlines and 
facilities to his development. 
In the third paragraph. the last sentence, you should 
note that Taylorsville and Bennion are not cities. It is 
the Taylorsville Bennion Improvement District. 
You have made a number of very good observations in 
this study. I still feel that your perspective is too 
broad, including all water conservancy districts and 
metropolitan water districts in this study when you are 
truly only addressing one water conservancy district. 
I hope that you will find my comments helpful and that 
they may be included in the report. If I can be of further 
service to you. please contact me. 
Sincerely, 
Robert B. Hilbert 
General Manager 
RBH/bt 
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Author's Response to Robert B. Hilbert Commentary 
Mr. Hilbert finds that the report is weighted with Central Utah 
WCD examples. That there is considerable institutional disproportion in 
the citation of impediments has been called to our attention by other 
reviewers. As has been said elsewhere, this imbalance was not by 
design. Interviews were not concentrated in anyone area as the append-
ed list will confirm. The authors were concerned with ident ifying 
experienced or potential impediments and considering how they might be 
avoided or alleviated. The specific institutional source of the ex-
amples was not of concern, although as the material was organized and 
written it was c lear that the CUWCD was providing a disproport ionate 
share of the examples. A partial explanation of this is given on page 
48 in the introductory statement to Chapter III. 
p. 49. The clarification has been inserted. 
p. 65-66. Hilbert expresses concern about implications of the "con-
flict of interest" discussion for board .membership. We recognize that 
ofttimes certain board members of some organizations are "ex officio" 
for the very reason Hilbert cites for representation. We don't ignore 
the advantages that Hilbert and others have pointed out to us for 
mUltiple board membership in terms of overall coordination and justified 
by the size of the financial stake. On the other hand, the problem of 
an individual adequately representing mUltiple constituencies on issues 
for which compromises on policy decisions must be forged is very real 
and deserves consideration also. 
p. 67. Hilbert r s historical perspect ive as it relates to evolving 
policies of his District and its services is very helpful. Others have 
provided historical perspectives which we have blended with those of 
Hilbert in a highly compressed way. 
p. 68. We have changed the tense from present to future in the first 
sentence. The paragraph at the top of page 69 is not pure speculation. 
We simply do not draw a definite cause and effect relationship from the 
facts we have gathered, and so state. 
p. 78. Interviews with community and special improvement district 
water officials indicate somewhat different perceptions than Hilbert 
about collaboration and competition. We don't elaborate on these 
differences, but must recognize that they have occurred and do occur. 
While Chapter II may be applied quite generally, much of Chapter 
III cannot. Chapter III is primarily concerned with WCD's operating in 
urbanizing areas, as the title implies, and does not purport to describe 
all sixteen WCD's as Hilbert presumes. 
p. 81. Revisions made accordingly. 
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p. 82. Revision made accordingly. 
p. 82. The statement that ad valorem taxes are preferred measures 
for raising needed revenues for weD's is not an unsupportab Ie assump-
tion but may be an over generalization. Financiers, federal govern-
ment or otherwise, place great weight on the security of repayment 
an ad valorem tax provides. The BOR has certainly shown a preference 
for contracting with WeD's rather than entities that operate by assess-
ments and user charges. Hilbert's use of a "floor" of income from 
purchasers (as noted in his p. 86 comment on security to bond holders) 
is a use of the same justification for which ad valorem taxes are 
preferred. 
p. 85. Revision made accordingly. 
p. 86. Revision made to include present provisions. 
p. 86. Second paragraph. Hilbert I s comment adds clarification to 
criterion for providing service and has been incorporated. 
p. 86. Third paragraph. Revision made accordingly. 
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2837 EAST HIGHWAY 193 • LAYTON, UTAH 84041 • PHONE (801) 825-1677 
Mr. Jay M. Bagley, Professor 
Utah water Research Laboratory 
UMC 82 
Logan, Utah 84322 
Dear Professor Bagley, 
August 11, 1983 
I have reviewed your report entitled "Impediments to 
Effective Interactions Between Multipurpose water Districts 
and Other Governmental Institutions in Urbanizing Areas." 
I found it informative and accurate, to the best of my 
knowledge. However, recent legislation has changed the 
procedure for selection of the Board of Directors of water 
Conservancy Districts. You might check sections 73-9-9 and 
73-9-14, Utah Code Annotated 1953 for current procedure. 
Thank you for sending us a copy of your report. I hope my 
comments are helpful. 
KJ/dh 
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Yours truly, 
Keith G. Jensen 
secretary-Manager 
Authors' Response to Keith G. Jensen Commentary 
Jensen noted the recent legislative changes in the procedure 
for selection of Boards of Directors of Water Conservancy Districts. 
The report now incorporates those changes. 
Jensen found the report informative and accurate and made no 
other suggestions for improving its content. 
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Joseph Novak 
Eleanor S. Olsen 
LaRue Pickup 
David Rasmussen 
Clyde Ritchie 
L.Y. Siddoway 
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P.O. BOX 427 OREM, UTAH 84057 TELEPHONE 225-0042 R. Roscoe Garrett. President 
Mr. Jay M. Bagley 
Utah Water Research Laboratory 
Utah State University 
Logan, UT 84322 
Dear Mr. Bagley: 
May 25, 1983 
G. Marion Hinckley, Vice President 
Lynn S. Ludlow, Secretary/Manager 
By letter of 11ay 10, 1983, you transmitted to this District a 
draft copy of a report prepared by authors representing the Utah 
Water Research Laboratory at Utah State University. The draft 
report is entitl ed, II Impediments to Effective Interacti ons Between 
Multipurpose Water Districts and other Governmental Institutions 
in Urbanizing Areas. 1I You requested comments prior to preparation 
of a final draft. 
The District has not prepared specific comments in the form 
you desired. Rather, the District wishes to make it unequivocally 
clear that it vigorously objects to publication of the report in 
its present context. The report has taken much of the information 
that was compiled in the objectionable and unpublished 1977 report 
entitled, "A Cursory Review of Utah \~ater Conservancy Districts--
Their Role and Operation," and continues to contain the long 
standing, well known and adverse opinions of the authors. The 
contents of the report as presently written are not consistent 
with the title, and do not represent the task as described in the 
proposal for funding. A more accurate title would be, IIA Specific 
Criticism of the Central Utah Water Conservancy District, Its 
Mission, Role and Operating Policies." 
Your transmittal letter states the proposed report II .. draws 
heavily on results of interviews with a variety of individuals •. 
• 11 The report reflects opinions of those interviewed who are 
strongly adverse to the District and Central Utah Project. The 
District is aware of only one limited and restricted interview 
with a member of its staff and is not aware of any interviews with 
Directors. Throughout the report interviews with others are 
accepted and reported as facts without any effort to verify them 
for their accuracy and with no attempt to report the District's 
position. Had such an effort been made your report might represent 
a more balanced and unbiased approach to the subject matter. The 
purported interviews and facts really fall in the realm of heresay 
rather than documented research. 
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Mr. Bagley 
Page 2 
May 25, 1983 
Chapters III, IV and V should include an analysis of Water 
Conservancy Districts in Utah. Instead of an analysis of Districts, 
the authors immediately begin an intensive negative campaign 
against the Central Utah Project and in particular the Bonneville 
Unit. They start out calling the project a "scheme" that has 
blunted the examination of alternative ways of meeting water 
needs. The scheme, or more appropriately the plan, was formulated 
under the direction of the State prior to the creation of the 
District. It has been quoted often by State officials and techni-
cians that the Central Utah Project is the "backbone" for the Utah 
State "'later Plan. The State also provided the leadership in the 
creation of the District. The Central Utah Project does not set 
out independent from other water development programs. Actually, 
the project encourages and makes possible the full development of 
all sources of water. The District also encourages and supports 
the development of additional water by all water users throughout 
the State. 
The report is negative, narrow and an inaccurate assessment 
of the problems facing the wpter Conservancy Districts. The 
authors have extensively quoted this District's policies, which 
have been established by a 19 member citizen board, yet neither 
the authors nor anyone representing the authors have attended any 
District Committee or Board meetings. In many instances the 
policies they quote are simply not correct. In fact, instead of 
research, the authors attempt to distort administrative decisions 
without presenting the "pros or cons ll that faced the decision 
makers at the time the decision was made. 
The proposed report concludes by calling for a team of profes-
sionals, unconstrained by anything or anyone, to make a complete 
financial, contractual and economic re-evaluation of the Central 
Utah Project to identify possible modifications. As a matter of 
fact, timely modifications have been and are being made that are justified and appropriate as is provided for in the repayment 
contract between the United States and the Central Utah Water 
Conservancy District. The District asserts that planning for the 
Central Utah Project has taken place over time involving well 
qualified and skilled professionals that are versed in legal and 
institutional constraints and with a broad recognition of the 
needs of as many water users and others as possible. There are 
contract commitments that in the interest of continuity prohibit 
modifications to meet every change that may be proposed by others. 
The Bonneville Unit Plan as being constructed was specifically 
approved by an overwhelming majority in a public election which 
authorized the District to execute a contract with the United 
States for its construction. 
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Mr. Bagley 
Page 3 
r~ay 25, 1983 
As stated previously, it is our strong oplnlon that the 
report should not be published. It;s not a research report, but 
a reflection of opinions of its authors and other anti~project 
anti-District advocates and as written is a discredit to the 
purpose served by the Utah l~ater Research Laboratory. If it is 
published without being extensively modified, the District will 
pursue every possible action to discredit this report, its authors 
and any associated studies. The District will also oppose future 
funding from any source to prohibit this type of distorted research 
by the Utah State Water Research Laboratory. 
LSL: sr 
cc: Stanford Cazier 
L. Dougl as James 
Daniel Lawrence 
Clifford Barrett 
Very truly yours, 
.- ---- /~.. ~ .. ~ .- /' ~ .. . -'~-"--J Y' //.- / . . ~-j;}?-'>- ,/ ;,.-' /// .. ----~ _ C ~c;; / Ct''':-t:,/ 
.. . Lynn S. LudJ.o'w 
, General Manager 
148 
UTAH STATE UNIVERS!TY- LOGAN, UTAH 84322 
COLLEGE OF ENGINEERING 
Mr. Lynn S. Ludlow, General Manager 
The Central Utah Water Conservancy District 
P.O. Box 427 
Orem, UT 84057 
Dear Lynn: 
UTAH WATER RESEARCH LABORATORY 
UMC 82 
May 27, 1983 
Thank you for your M8Y 25, 1983, letter with regard to the draft 
manuscript "Impediments to Effective Interactions Between Multipurpose 
Water Districts and Other Governmental Institutions in Urbanizing Areas." 
You have indicated that there are inaccuracies and distortions in the 
report. Although you didn't identify them specifically, we are anxious that 
any errors be removed which, of course, is the purpose of the manuscript review 
process. If you do not wish to return a marked copy or offer specific comment 
in writing, we would be most happy to come to Provo and receive them verbally. 
As researchers associated with the university system, we have everything to 
lose and nothing to gain by publishing material which proves to be inaccurate. 
We did not include a listing of individuals interviewed in the draft report. 
This list will be included in the final report so that readers may better judge 
whether bias could have been introduced into the interview process. Your present 
impressions, particularly with respect to lack of interviews with District managers, 
is incorrect. In your own instance, you will recall that I arranged an appoint-
ment with you personally. Upon arrival, I was informed that something unexpected 
had come up and that I should visit with Carl Carpenter. After Carl and I had 
spent the entire morning together, I left with him a copy of an interview guide 
(set of questions) with the presumption its return to us would include your input. 
As you know, I visited with Carlon one other occasion. Since the report is in 
the draft stage, we can incorporate any additional information you care to provide 
and will welcome any corrections to statements you know to be in error. 
Your letter reveals a great concern that research work at UWRL be objective 
and thorough. Just as you should expect university researchers to approacb their 
tasks without any axes to grind nor vested interest in the research outcome, so 
also should it be a comfort to you (and other citizens) to know that university 
researchers findings cannot be suppressed or manipulated by threat or intimidation. 
We look forward to getting together with you. We would be willing to go over 
the manuscript with you page by page in order to take full account of your comment. 
JMB:bjh 
SinO'e"rely yours, 
\//}. 
1..1 ~1 
Jai:M. Bq'ley, Professor 
Civil and Environmental Engineering 
cc: Stanford Cazier, Bartell Jensen 
L. Douglas James, Daniel Lawrence 
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P.O. BOX 427 OREM, UTAH 84057 TELEPHONE 225-0042 R. Roscoe Garrett, Presidenl 
June 15, 1983 
Jay M. Bagley, Professor 
Civil and Environmental Engineering 
Utah Water Research Laboratory 
Utah State Univer~ity 
Logan, Ut 84322 
G. Marion Hinckley, Vice Presidenl 
Lynn S. Ludlow, Secretary/Manager 
RE: Impediments to Effective Interactions Between r~ultipurpose 
Water Districts and Other Governmental Institutions in 
Urbanizing Areas 
Oea r Jay: 
The District has received your letter of May 27, 1982, and 
your invitation to meet and review our concerns about the above 
reference manuscript. Since our letter to you on ~lay 25, 1983, we 
have become aware of comments of others who have corresponded with 
you reflecting their concerns on the research report. After a 
review of their comments and our previously expressed concerns, we 
again state that this research report should not be published in 
its present context. If it is to be published, a total rewrite of 
those sections essential to bring the report up to date and to 
remove many biases and inaccurate comments about the Central Utah 
Water Conservancy District, the U. S. Bureau of Reclamation, and 
the Central Utah Project would be imperative. I have to concur 
with the general comments made in the letter to you from Joseph 
Novak in which he stated the following: 
(1) the subject matter of the draft document does not appear 
to me to be an appropriate research project for the Utah Water 
Research Laboratory. 
(2) the draft document comprises an academic analysis of 
political, legal and institutional issues, both real and imaginary, 
and is lacking in objectivity. 
(3) the draft document is now obsolete as to Utah Water 
Conservancy Districts with the passage of Substitute Senate Bill 
No. 11 (SB 11), during the 1983 session of the Utah Legislature. 
(4) the draft document has a built-in bias against the U. S. 
Bureau of Reclamation (BOR), Central Utah Project (CUP) and Central 
Utah Water Conservancy District (CUI~CD). 
I believe that in view of the numerous objections that have 
al ready been provide to you a page by page review by tl,is District 
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at this time vlould be ineffective. ~4e "/ould be glad to meet with 
you after a redraft has been completed. 
The District appreciated the opportunity to review this 
report before it was published. 
LSL:bf 
cc: Stanford Cazier 
Bartell Jensen 
L. Douglas James 
Daniel Lawrence 
Cl ; fford Ba rrett 
151 
Very truly yours, 
;t:;,,/;} L· 
.{ynn S, Ludlow 
." General Manager 
Board of Directors 
Genevieve Atwood 
Thomas I. Baum 
Don A. Christiansen 
Charles Crozier 
R. Roscoe Garrett 
Robert B. Hilbert 
G. Marion Hinckley 
Jamec: B. Lee 
Rondal McKee 
Dave McMullin 
J. Neil Nielson 
Joseph Novak 
David Rasmussen 
Clyde Ritchie 
L.Y. Siddoway 
P. Waldo Warnick 
Melvin B. White 
Charles Wilson 
Lynn R. Winterton 
P.O. BOX 427 OREM, UTAH 84057 TELEPHONE 225-0042 R. Roscoe Garrett, President 
August 5, 1983 
f4r. Jay t~. Bagley, Phd. 
Utah \~ater Research Laboratory, Uf'1C 82 
Utah State University 
Logan, UT 34322 
Dear Jay: 
G. Marion Hinckley, Vice President 
Lynn S. Ludlow, Secretary/Manager 
The District received a copy of the final report entitled, 
IIImpediments to Effective Interactions Between t·1ultipurpose fJater 
Districts and Other Governmental Illstitutions in Urbanizing Areas ll 
on August 2, and was requested to furnish comments by August 5, 
1983. The District would like to re-iterate its position regarding 
this report as stated in its letters dated May 25 and JUne 15, 
1983. 
Although the report has updated those portions relating to 
the appoi ntment procedu res for boa rd members as changed by the 
last State Legislature, it still contains many things objectionable 
to this District. The title of the report bears little resemblance 
to the subject matter contained therein. It appears to address 
two different subjects viz., (1) a comparion of States· use of 
special districts to sponsor water projects; and (2) a specific 
and often misleading and unwarranted criticism of the Central Utah 
Hater Conservancy District, its mission, role, and operating 
policies. There is some merit to publishing the results of the 
former but none for the latter. It seans to miss the objective 
stated in UWRL/G-82/01, pages 11 and 99. 
Very truly yours, 
LSL:sr 
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Author's Response to Lynn Ludlow Commentary 
A partial response to Ludlow's letter of May 25, 1983 was provided 
in Bagley's letter of May 27, 1983. Although Ludlow has provided no 
specific comment nor desired to meet with the authors during the re-
vision process, he concurs with the general criticism offered by Joseph 
Novak (letter of June 15, 1983) and still finds "many things objection-
able to the District" in the final manuscript (letter of August 5, 
1983). Ludlow has circulated copies of comments prepared by Edward 
Clyde, Joseph Novak, and Robert Hilbert which would indicate endorsement 
of their comment and criticism. Hence, response to comments of those 
individuals may constitute at least a partial response to Ludlow's 
concerns, also. 
One characteristic of Ludlow's letter is that his message was 
not to the authors in the interest of improving the manuscript, but to 
those he believed might be influenced to prevent its publication. 
Ludlow's assertions of "built-in" author bias against the Bureau of 
Reclamation, the Central Utah Project, and the Central Utah Water 
Conservancy District; his questioning of the subject matter as an 
appropriate research topic for USU and UWRL; and his suggestion that the 
contents of the report did not represent the task as outlined in the 
proposal, are criticisms that have nothing to do with report substance 
but are calculated to influence certain administrators who received 
copies of his letters. Apparently unable to counter findings of the 
report he found objectionable or unflattering, Ludlow wants to suppress 
publication. 
Ludlow is critical of a suggestion to get at some of the root 
causes of political and legal confrontation among entities, which 
seem to be escalating, by fostering an open and full reappraisal 
of the financial, contractual, and economic features of the CUP. 
From the stout defense Ludlow makes for District policies and actions 
one would think he would welcome such a review as a way of confirming 
and publicizing the correctness of the mission, role, and operating 
policies of his District. We see no reason why Ludlow should object to 
an independent evaluation so as to convincingly put to rest some of the 
questions that are surfacing. He should want to eliminate some of the 
uneasiness that is being experienced amount certain groups. 
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HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 
STATE 0 F UTAH 
REP. GAYLE F. MCKEACHNIE 
56TH DISTRICT 
363 EAST MAIN STREET. VERNAL, UTAH 84078 
COMMITTEES: APPROPRIATIONS (I!:XECUTIVE OFFICES, COURTS AND CORRECTIONS) • RULES, CHAIRMAN' ENERGY AND 
NATURAL RESOURCES 
May 23, 1983 
Mr. Jay M. Bagley, Professor 
Civil and Environmental Engineering 
Utah state University 
Logan, Utah 84322 
Dear Professor Bagley: 
I have received and examined a copy of your draft of the 
work entitled "Impediments to Effective Interactions Between 
Multipurpose Water Districts and Other Governmental Institu-
tions in Urbanizing Areas." 
First let me say that I congratulate you for all the work 
you have done in putting together the draft. I have several 
general comments. 
First, you should be aware that the 1983 Legislature 
changed the procedure for selection of directors of water 
conservancy districts and the material on Page 30 of the draft 
needs to be updated. Senate Bill 11 now provides that County 
Commissioners appoint directors in single county conservancy 
districts and the Governor, with the confirmation of the State 
Senate, selects directors in multi-county districts from nomi-
nations submitted by county commissioners. There is also a 
provision for appointment by cities where districts are fully 
made up of municipal territory. 
You may be interested (if you do not already know) there 
is presently pending a legal action challenging the constitu-
tionality of court-appointed directors in Utah water conservancy 
districts and the recent legislation was supported in part as an 
effort to correct what many thought were constitutional defects 
in the existing statutes. The question of constitutionality 
revolves around two points: (1) The judicial branch becoming 
involved in the appointment process and (2) the ability of 
conservancy districts to tax the citizens of a county when 
those citizens have no voice in selecting either the directors 
of a conservancy district or the judges who appoint them. 
As your report points out, water conservancy districts are 
often created to purchase water from large projects and to market 
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it in the state. The tendency on the of some water conser-
vancy districts, especially those which purchase water from 
projects constructed by the U. S. Bureau of Reclamation, is to 
consider the Bureau of Reclamation as constituency rather 
than the people who are the ultimate recipients of the water. 
Conservancy distr often receive a good portion of the 
funding for the projects it is involved in from the Federal 
Government and the constant association of staff with the staff 
of the Bureau of Reclamation caused many to assert that conser-
vancy districts have become simply an extension of the Bureau 
of Reclamation. 
Similarly, state officials have been concerned that 
no real overall policy in the state of Utah regarding the 
development of water projects and conservation. The many water 
conservancy districts either adopt the Bureau of Reclamation 
policies or each its own individual policy. There is something 
to be said for that procedure because gives some local autonomy. 
However, concern exists that those offic s in state government 
who are charged with executing state water policy have no control 
or often even litt influence over the practices, programs and 
projects of the water conservancy distr s. Part of the reason 
for including the governor in the appointments process for water 
conservancy directors was to give the state some input into what 
is going on in water conservancy districts which affect more than 
one county. 
I appreciate your sending me a copy of your work and would 
be interested in receiving a copy of the final product. Thank 
you. 
GM/mc 
Very truly yours, 
~~-'\\\:L&tt~~ 
Gayle F. McKeachnie 
State Representative 
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HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 
STATE OF UTAH 
REP. GAYLE F. l\ICl{EACHNIE 
56TH DISTRICT 
363 EAST MAlN STREET. VERNAl... UTAH 84078 
COMMITT£P:St APPROPRIATIONS (EXECUTIVE OFFICES. COURTS AND CORRECTIONS) • RUl.ES. CHAIRMAN· ENERGY AND 
NATURAL. RESOURCES 
August 8, 1983 
Professor Jay M. Bagley 
Civil and Environmental Engineering 
Utah State University 
Logan, UT 84322 
Dear Professor Bagley: 
Thank you for the copy of your project entitled "Impediments 
to Effective Interactions between Multipurpose Water Districts 
and Other Governmental Institutions in Urbanizing Areas". 
I believe the comments made in my letter of May 23, 1983, 
contain my concerns. I see that you have incorporated the 
information concerning the new method of selecting directors 
for water conservative districts. 
I appreciate you letting me be involved. 
you have done a very good job. 
It looks like 
dcr 
Very truly yours, 
A~~\f\~tU-Ov~ 
Gayle F. MCKeachnie 
State Representative 
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Authors' Response to Gayle MCKeachnie's Commentary 
Mr. McKeachnie makes some specific suggestions on the draft 
report which have been incorporated in the final draft. He also 
makes some general comments which are corroborative of our findings 
and with which we agree. 
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Jay M. Bagley, Professor 
Civil and Environmental Engineering 
Utah Water Research Laboratory 
Utah State University 
Logan, UT 84322 
Re: Impediments to Effective Interactions Between 
Multipurpose Water Districts and other 
Governmental Institutions in Urbanizing Areas 
July, 1983. 
Dear Jay: 
I respectfully submit the following comments to the final 
draft of the above document. However, it should be noted that 
the comments which follow are my personal comments, and not as 
general counsel for Metropolitan Water District of Salt Lake 
or Provo River Water Users' Association or as a member of 
the Board of Directors of the Central Utah Water Conservancy 
District. 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
I reviewed the above final draft in 1 of my comments 
to the February, 1983 draft, outlined in my letter to you dated 
June 6, 1983. While the final draft has been modified to change 
or eliminate much of the language of the first draft which I 
considered objectionable, the thrust of the document remains 
essentially unchanged. 
Since my above letter of June 6, 1983, you have refreshed 
my recollection that several years ago you did in fact jointly 
interview me and Vaughn Wonnacott, then manager of the Metro-
politan Water trict of Salt Lake City (HWD). However, that 
interview was 1 ted to the organization and history of ~~vD, 
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its role in the development of the Provo River Project and 
its relationship to Salt Lake City. Thus, the interview did 
not follow the Interview Guide attached as Appendix A, if in 
fact such existed at that state of the project. 
GENERAL COJ.i.1I1ENTS 
1. The Final Document Comprises an Academic Analysis 
of Political, Legal and Institutional Issues, Both Real and 
Imaginary, and is Not an Appropriate Research Project for the 
Utah State Water Research Laboratory. 
I am mindful that 42 U.S.C. § 7801 of the Water Research 
and Development Act of 1978 provides for a designated college or 
university to conduct competent research and development, 
including investigations and experiments of either a basic or 
practical nature, or both, in relation to water resources, etc., 
which may include economic, legal, social and other aspects of 
water problems. However, I suggest that the subject matter of 
the draft document is permeated with political overtones which 
transcends the authorized scope of activities. 
It appears from the title of the authors contained ln the 
Acknowledgment page, that except for Lee Kapaloski, the remaining 
authors are academicians employed at Utah State University. I 
suggest that any other qualifications of the authors relating to 
the subject matter should be clearly stated. Since the subject 
matter of the document is most controversial, I believe those 
qualifications are essential to any evaluation of the credibility 
of the criticisms and conclusions stated therein. 
I view the document as an academic analysis of what the 
authors perceive to be the shortcomings of WCDs and rvrwDs in an 
idealistic world. While insight might have been gained from 
those interviewed, there is no substitute for experience in the 
real world of WCDs and HWDs. Furthermore, it cannot be ascer-
tained whether the criticisms and conclusions reached therein 
represent a consensus of those interviewed or are the personal 
views of the authors. 
I have no quarrel with academicians expressing their views 
on controversial issues. However, it should be made clear that 
such are the personal views of the authors and are not those of 
the institution. To do otherwise under the auspices of one of 
our respected institutions and thereby clothe those views with 
credibility, is improper. In substance, it seems to me that 
the more appropriate research project for the Utah Water Research 
Laboratory would be in the technical areas of water research 
and development where qualifications are acknowledged. 
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2. The Final Document Implies That the Individuals 
Interviewed Lend Credence to the Criticisms and Conclusions 
Contained Therein. 
The discussions under Study Approach and Scope (pages 3-5), 
relating to interviews being the source of information of the 
document implies that the individuals interviewed for both 
studies, as listed on Appendix B, concur in whole or in part 
with the criticisms and conclusions stated therein. I, for one, 
strongly disagree with the vast majority of those criticisms 
and conclusions and am advised that a number of those listed 
share my concern. Accordingly, I respectfully suggest that the 
above section contain a general disclaimer for those like myself 
whose comments negate such endorsement. Likewise, I suggest that 
either the above section or the attached Appendix B identify 
those like me whose interviews were limited to specific areas 
and the specific subject matter thereof. 
3. The Title the Final Document Does not Accurately 
Describe its Contents, Lacks Objectivity, and has a Built-in 
Bias Against the Bureau of Reclamation (BOR) , Central utah 
Project (CUP) and Central Utah Water Conservancy District (CUWCD). 
I suggest that the subject matcer of the document is not an 
objective discussion of "impediments". Rather, it is a critical 
attack on CUP and CUWCD under the guise of a general research 
project of public water districts in the several states. The 
materials contained in Chapter II for the most part are helpful 
in making comparisons between the districts in those states. 
However, Chapter III is permeated with an obvious and almost 
obsessive bias against the BOR, CUP and CUWCD. Whether that 
bias stems from the personal views of the authors, or from some 
of those interviewed, is not readily apparent. 
The format seems to be to launch the attack by way 
example, and then zero on all of the negative aspects of the 
example. In fairness to those who have dedicated their lives 
to the efficient management and operation of these districts, 
the positive aspects also should be stated. For example, the 
document makes repeated references to the power these 
districts to levy taxes and the potential for abuse of that 
power. Yet, nothing is said about the experience of MWD of 
Sal t Lake city, which reduced its tax levy from blO mils in 
1974 to one and a half mils in 1975 and 1976, to one mill in 
1977 and to zero in 1978 and thereafter. This I called to your 
attention in my letter dated June 6, 1983, but apparently it is 
still unworthy of comment in the document. 
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Throughout Chapter III, it is suggested that the BaR is 
overly dominant and through political power imposes pre-
ferred options on the people, which I believe is an unfair 
criticism. Likewise, it is suggeste"d that WCDs, and in 
cular CUWCD, blindly accept BaR icies, which I be 
both unfair and untrue. For example, on page 73, it is 
that some of those interviewed be that the BaR pol s 
become the perspectives and positions of an "unquestioning" 
CUWCD. Had any of the authors attended any of the CUWCD 
board meetings during the past year and a half, he would under-
stand t hand that such cri is unfounded. The point 
of it is that only the negative and none of the posi is 
stated throughout the document. 
I suggest that the concluding paragraph on pages 95 and 
96 will be most distressing to those who have devoted 
lives to a realization of the CUP. The bottom line 
seems to be to place the fate of CUP the hands of a team 
of professionals ostensibly to be selected from the 
institutions which I believe would be a tragic mistake. 
CONCLUSIONS 
On the whole, I suggest that the final document is ill 
conceived, misguided and is not an appropriate research ect 
for the Utah Water Research Laboratory. I still believe that 
to publish the document in its form without wholesale 
revision, will bring disrespect and discredit to the Utah Water 
Research Laboratory and Utah State University. Accordingly, I 
am still hopeful that the whole matter will be carefully re-
examined and reconsidered by those who have the ultimate 
responsibility for its publication. 
IN: jm 
cc: Metropolitan Water District of Salt Lake City 
Provo River Water Users Association 
Central Utah Water Conservancy District 
Lee Kapaloski, Esq. 
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Author's Response to Joseph Novak Commentary 
At the outset, Novak stresses the fact his comments are not 
prompted by his role as general council for the Metropolitan Water 
District of Salt Lake City and the Provo River Water Users Assn., nor as 
a member of the board of directors of the Central Utah Water Conservancy 
District. We appreciate this disclaimer of an advocacy role. 
We certainly do not agree with Novak's suggestion that the report 
is permeated with political overtones. It may well be that certain 
findings will have political implications whose importance and propor-
tions will be seen differently by different readers. Novak seems to be 
saying that the authors' objective was to deliberately introduce politi-
cal overtones while feigning something else. This is nonsense. 
General Comments 
1. Novak says this is not an appropriate research project for 
the Utah Water Research Laboratory. If Novak cared to peruse the 
findings of congressional committees (perhaps beginning with the 1958 
Senate Select Committee on Water Resources); the periodic evaluations of 
research and research needs made by the Federal Council of Science and 
Technology (primarily through its Federal Interagency Task Groups and 
Committee on Water Resources Research); the deliberations and dis-
cussions preceding the enactment of the Water Resources Research Act of 
1964 (P.L. 88-379); the assessment of water pToblems and the statements 
of research priorities by the Office of Water Resources Research an? its 
successor, the Office of Water Research and Technology; he would find 1) 
that greater involvement of the universities in water research was a 
prominent recommendation of experts from both administrative and 
legislative branches of government, and 2) that more research emphasis 
was needed concerning techniques and methods of water resources plan-
ning, the evaluation process by which the worth of water projects is 
determined, the effectiveness of water laws and institutions, and the 
ecological impacts of water resource development. 
Whether warranted or not, framers of P.L. 88-379 expressed skepti-
cism at intramural research conducted by mission-oriented agencies with 
respect to the above topics. Since its beginning, and furthered by its 
affiliation with the OWRT program, the UWRL has promoted a broadly based 
program of research which includes the legal, institutional, organiza-
tional, and policy aspects of water resources management. The research 
proposal under which this study was initiated was reviewed and evaluated 
by campus scientists, members of the USU Citizen Advisory Panel on Water 
Research, and by OWRT staff in Washington, D.C. Its selection for 
funding connotes a broad approval of its appropriateness and priority 
as a UWRL project. Contrary to Novak's view, universities are sought 
out for analyzing institutional and policy problems because of the 
atmosphere of free and open inquiry they enjoy, with freedom from 
vested interest in research outcome. 
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Novak observes that the document is an academic analysis by 
individuals living in a dream world. That being so, Novak should 
have no difficulty finding flaws and errors in the substance of the 
report. It is a common frailty that when troubled by truths that cannot 
be refuted, one is inclined to malign their source. Novak shows more 
concern for qualifying witnesses than he does for examining the testi-
mony itself. If it were editorial policy to include complete experience 
resumes of authors in a report of this kind, we would be happy to do 
so. In the absence of this, we would simply remark that the individual 
and collective research and professional experience of the authors at 
state, national, and international levels is indication of very adequate 
credentials for researching water organizations and their interactions. 
We invite Novak to prove otherwise. 
Novak also alleges that the authors are allowing personal feelings 
to cloud their judgment in reported findings while creating the impres-
sion that these personal views are those of the university in order to 
infer credibility which presumably would be absent otherwise. We are 
not given the criteria on which this judgment is based. We disavow 
Novak's allegation of biased research in the strongest terms. 
In case Novak doesn't realize it, the manuscript review pro-
cess, a hallmark of university research, is a very efficaceous system 
for enforcing standards of objectivity. The review and referee process 
to which manuscripts are subjected prior to publication is a mechanism 
for spotting weaknesses in the authors' assertions, and for discovering 
deficiencies in objectivity, verifiability, and clarity of explanation. 
It is intended that advocacy, or the twisting of facts to suit personal 
views be weeded out in refereed science of universities. Over time, the 
manuscript review process provides a mechanism for repeated reassessment 
of whether an individual researcher's findings are legitimate and 
provable. 
The aggregation of review comments is invaluable in upgrading and 
certifying the quality of a final research report. Novak and 44 
others were invited to be a part of this important process for this 
report. Although authors must exercise their own judgment in accepting 
or rejecting comment, that judgment is substantiated by 1) the first 
hand experience in the conduct of the research itself, 2) the access to 
an accumulation of information on the subject and intimate association 
with its evaluation and utilization, and 3) the advantage of the com-
parative assessment of different review comments in the context of 1) 
and 2). While no claim is made for infallibility in this manuscript 
review process, it is as good a system for guaranteeing objectivity as 
has been devised. When coupled with the reality that if a university 
researcher loses credibility he loses everything, there is rather strong 
incentive to be objective. Multiple authors provide another check on 
object ivi ty. 
2. While others have not expressed concern that being listed 
as one interviewed implied concurrence with research findings and 
conclusions, Novak's point is well taken. The Acknowledgment section 
and the section on Study Approach and Scope have been modified to make 
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to make it c lear that the perspect ives of those interviewed did not 
always coincide, and the authors' report rendition, based on the com-
posite of interview materials, should ln no wise imply concurrency by 
all of those listed in Appendix B. 
3. The allegation of Novak that the report is an attack on CUP and 
CUWeD under the guise of a title indicating something else, and his 
observation that the authors display an obsessive bias against the BOR, 
CUP, and CUWCD have been answered in the authors remarks to Edward Clyde 
and Lynn Ludlow who made similar assertions. 
Novak scolds us for emphasizing the negative aspects of dis-
trict taxing authority while failing to acknowledge the positive ex-
amples of the MWD of Salt Lake City which has had a progression of 
decreases in tax levy. In our draft report, page 11, 23, 57, and in 
Table 1; and in the final report pages 13, 14, 64 and in Table I, p. 27, 
we state quite clearly that the Utah MWD does not prefer taxes over rate 
structure but is in fact instructed in the statutes not to do so. The 
reductions in taxes Novak cites for MWD of Salt Lake City are most 
certainly in keeping with that guide. For capital investments of MWD's 
under a bonding program, the board is to levy a tax specifically for 
repayment of the bonded indebtedness. When the debt is paid, the tax 
levy ceases. There is no such provision in WCD legislation. The final 
draft has been modified to more correctly and completely describe the 
use of a mix of rate charges and taxes by districts. 
Novak believes our statements in Chapter III relating to BOR 
policies and influences are unfair and untrue. If Novak could cite the 
textual examples of this we could better evaluate his opinions. Novak's 
interpretation of what is fair or untrue is contrary to views expressed 
by others (see, for example, McKeachnie's letter which is appended). 
While Novak's attendance at CUWCD Board meetings is commendable he may 
benefit from getting out of the board room and closer to the constitu-
ency on occasion for a better appreciation of what we are saying. 
Novak opines that our suggestion of a possible way of stemming 
the increasing tide of political and legal confrontations involving the 
CUWCD by inviting an open and full reappraisal of its policies, direc-
tions, and commitments will be most distressing to those who have 
devoted their lives to the realization of CUP. Why should that be? 
Could it not be a way of confirming their efforts and silencing critics? 
We see this approach as a way of relieving stress, not creating it. 
Our report deals with institutions. We do not deal with personali-
ties. If individuals become distressed with our findings, is the public 
better served by protecting the feelings of its public stewards or by 
having the kind of information by which taxpayers who are footing the 
bills may better judge the act ions and decisions of their representa-
t ives? Novak's reading into the report a recommendat ion that aca-
demicians should be responsible for any proposed reevaluation and decide 
the fate of the CUP is not intended. 
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Conclusions 
Mr. Novak's conclusions are obviously not intended for the authors 
but constitute a message to "those who have ultimate responsibility 
for its publication" not to allow this "ill conceived, misguided" report 
to see the light of day. It could only "bring disrespect and discredit 
to the Utah Water Research Laboratory and the Utah State University." 
Yet Novak's appeal has a hollow ring since his preceding comments 
provide no rationale for such a conclusion. His comments consist of 
opinions which fail to call into question any of the contents or sub-
stance of the report. Rather, Novak resorts to fault the cre-
dent ials of the authors and their integrity, quest ioning the appro-
priateness of the project for UWRL sponsorsh , laments that being 
interviewed may be construed as being in support of the authors find-
ings, and asserts that the authors have obsessive prejudices against 
certain entities. Presumably it is the content of the report that 
should determine its merits for publication. When critics must seek 
reasons outside the report content for objecting to its publication, the 
merit of the report may have been given strong confirmation. 
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